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Abstract  
Hilary MantelÕs work, published over three decades, has only recently begun to get 
critical attention. This is partly due to the success and adaptation of her novels Wolf 
Hall and Bring up the Bodies. The first woman to win the Booker twice, MantelÕs 
writing has won the kind of praise that is the lifeblood of the commercial writer. 
However, critical responses to her work have so far been focused on three areas: the 
historical themes of her novels on Thomas Cromwell, biographical and 
autobiographical themes, and the realism of her fiction. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to Mantel scholarship by questioning its critical assumptions. In this it has 
one precedent, Eileen PollardÕs critically ambitious 2013 thesis, which takes the 
ellipsis as an Ôexploded full stopÕ and takes this as a figure through which to reread 
Mantel. Pollard offers detailed readings of texts Fludd, Beyond Black and Giving up 
the Ghost, and questions the assumptions that have tended to underpin Mantel 
scholarship so far: an over-emphasis on the ÔunityÕ and ÔoriginÕ of MantelÕs work, 
which closes off what Pollard calls the excess of her writings. Although my thesis 
shares a preoccupation with Pollard in emphasising the openness of MantelÕs work, 
the focus on ellipsis risks abstraction, and loses contact with MantelÕs own popular 
appeal. This thesis thus intends to wed a sense of the complexity and sophistication 
of Mantel with a criticism that remains true to the approachable and open quality of 
her writing. The openness of MantelÕs work is thus my starting point, where I begin 
to think about her writing in terms of provisionality.  
 Provisionality is not ambiguity, nor indeterminacy, although both of these 
effects inform my reading of Mantel. Provisionality describes the way that MantelÕs 
writing crosses spatial, temporal, imaginative and generic borders. I use the idea to 
discuss MantelÕs transforming approach to vision, the spectral, realism, the child, and 
writing itself. What does it mean to write a full length work on an author who is alive 
and publishing at the same time? This work seeks to provide readings, as well as to 
take stock of the other provisions available to MantelÕs readers for thinking about her 
work.  
 Chapter One focuses on Beyond Black (2005) and ÔThe Assassination of 
Margaret ThatcherÕ (2014), to developing the idea of provisionality and its 
connection to the spectral logic that in these texts relates writing to time and to the 
other. I think about the use of visual representations, drawing on Hardy and 
Wordsworth, and investigate the short story in terms of the Ôblink.Õ Chapter Two uses 
Fludd (1989), Wolf Hall (2009) and Bring up the Bodies (2012), to discuss MantelÕs 
relation to mimesis, realist representation and their implications for notions of time 
and history.  Chapter Three offers readings of A Change of Climate (1994) and Every 
Day is MotherÕs Day (1985), connecting the provisional with the figure of the child. 
This chapter also develops Chapter TwoÕs insights about time in Mantel. Chapter 
Four more broadly considers the idea of the writing process in MantelÕs works, 
particularly focusing on her memoir Giving up the Ghost (2003). Taken together, 
these chapters will form a contribution into Mantel criticism which explores 




Parts of chapter four appear in an essay, ÔSubjectivity in Process: Writing and the ÒIÓ 
in Giving up the Ghost and Ink in the BloodÕ: forthcoming in an edited volume from 
the Bloomsbury Contemporary Critical Perspectives series. 
This project would not have been possible without the award of a University of Kent 
50th Anniversary Scholarship; nor Jan Montefiore, who gave her time and 
encouragement during the application process.  
It would also have been impossible without my supervisor, Sarah Wood, who has 
guided and supported me and the project through some challenging times, and my 
second supervisor Ariane Mildenberg; both of whom have inspired me from the 
beginning. 
Thanks also to my School of English colleagues Barbara Franchi, Jenny DiPlacidi 
and Kim Simpson for providing both serious discussion and light relief. 
And to Terry; thank you for your love and support. It has kept me going through 
these last five years.  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Note on Abbreviations 
The titles of MantelÕs works are abbreviated as follows: 
AMT  ÒThe Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÓ 
APOGS A Place of Greater Safety 
BB   Beyond Black 
BUB  Bring up the Bodies 
CC  A Change of Climate 
ED  Every Day is MotherÕs Day 
EL  An Experiment in Love 
GUG Giving up the Ghost 
Ink Ink in the Blood 
WH   Wolf Hall 
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For Isobel and Alex, with love.  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Introduction: Mantel as provisional writer 
Hilary MantelÕs works are Ôrich and strangeÕ, as John Mullan writes in a Guardian 
profile of 2015.  Of her twelve published novels and two short story collections, she 1
is best known for her historical novels Wolf Hall (2009) and Bring up the Bodies 
(2012). Both of these books won the Man Booker Prize, making her the first woman 
to do so twice. The intense critical acclaim for the ÔTudorÕ novels has highlighted the 
dearth of critical material on her other published works, and indeed a lack of public 
awareness of it.  There are no book length studies of Hilary MantelÕs work currently 2
published, although this is changing.  This study will address a gap in Mantel studies, 3
by considering a range of her novels thematically, discussing her work in relation to 
Jacques Derrida, Jacques Rancire, Roland Barthes, and Sigmund Freud, among 
others.  The failure to categorise Mantel is demonstrated by a seeming reluctance to 
work across her oeuvre, which takes in a wide range of genres and modes. Scholars 
work on one aspect or book in MantelÕs oeuvre; for example, Victoria StewartÕs 
article on Beyond Black, which historicises the issue of mediumship as a renewed 
interest in spiritualism in contemporary British fiction.   4
!  Itself an allusion to ArielÕs song in The Tempest, Act 1 Scene 2: Full fathom five thy father lies;/Of 1
his bones are coral made;/Those are pearls that were his eyes./Nothing of him doth fade,/But doth 
suffer a sea-change/Into something rich and strange./Sea-nymphs hourly ring his knellÉ(964) 
Shakespeare, William. The Tempest. in The Complete Oxford Shakespeare. Wells, Stanley and Gary 
Taylor eds., Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987.
 Being interviewed after winning the Booker for the second time, Mantel said, ÒAs I said in my 2
acceptance speech just now, there are people who think I was hatched out of an egg on the day Wolf 
Hall was publishedÓ going on to suggest they go back to her earlier work to Òsee what IÕve been up to 
all these years.Ó Nightwaves. BBC Radio 3. 07/03/2013, 22.00. https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/
ondemand/index.php/prog/02F96856. Accessed 15th July 2017. 
 Bloomsbury will publish a Contemporary Critical Perspectives collection in 2018, edited by Eileen 3
Pollard and Ginette Carpenter, to which I make a contribution: ÔWriting and the ÔIÕ: Subjectivity in 
Process in Giving up the Ghost and Ink in the BloodÕ. Eileen PollardÕs 2013 thesis ÒWhat is done and 
what is declaredÓ: Origin and Ellipsis in the work of Hilary Mantel explores a selection of MantelÕs 
books from a Derridean standpoint. Lucy ArnoldÕs 2016 thesis Where the Ghosts of Meaning Are: 
Haunting and Spectrality in the Work of Hilary Mantel focuses on spectrality. Other theses discuss 
MantelÕs work in relation to other women writers such as Jeanette Winterson. 
 Stewart, Victoria. ÒA Word in your Ear: Mediumship and Subjectivity in Hilary MantelÕs Beyond 4
Black.Ó Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction. 50:3, 2009: 293-312. http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/
CRIT.50.3.293-312. Accessed 3rd November 2017. 
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 What I call reluctance is both practical (Mantel is two books in to writing a 
trilogy), and, more importantly, theoretical. Finding it difficult to ÔplaceÕ an author 
produces an uneasiness; the fear of work that somehow fails to stay in place or shape-
shifts. With this is mind, provisionality developed out of a desire to explore the 
richness of MantelÕs work without imposing a framework or reductive reading. 
Taking the lead from the epigraph to Every Day is MotherÕs Day, quoted from Pascal, 
ÔTwo errors; one, to take everything literally; two, to take everything spirituallyÕ; this 
thesis will develop a provisional reading practice that can suspend judgement, 
allowing meaning to ÔhangÕ. This constitutes a walking ÔalongsideÕ Mantel, rather 
than imposition from above or deconstruction from within. Provisionality is one of 
many deconstructions, and this thesis builds on the work of Jacques Derrida and 
others in order to explore deconstructive reading practices that complement, sit with 
and revel in rather than illuminate or interrogate.  5
 In ÒAphorism CountertimeÓ Derrida writes of RomeoÕs name, and JulietÕs 
injunction that he should lose it: ÒOh, be some other nameÓ (Derrida ÒAphorismÓ 
137). In aphorism 34: 
 Irony of the proper name, as analyzed by Juliet. Sentence of truth that carries death,  
 aphorism separates, and in the first place separates me from my name. I am   
 not my  name. One might as well say that I should be able to survive it. But firstly it  
 is destined to survive me. In this way it announces my death. Noncoincidence and  
 contretemps between my name and me, between the experience according to which I  
 am named or hear myself named and my Òliving present.Ó Rendezvous with my   
 name. Untimely, bad timing, at the wrong moment. (140-1 and passim) 
ÔWhatÕs in a name? That which we call a rose / By any other word would smell as 
sweetÕ exclaims Juliet as she contemplates her lover Romeo; also her familyÕs sworn 
enemy and the unknowing architect of her death. What is in a name, and more 
specifically, what is in the name of Mantel? The irony being here that her name is 
 Rita Felski in The Limits of Critique (2015) suggests alternatives to what she calls the Ôpiercing but 5
one-eyed gaze of critiqueÕ (18). Provisionality is also offered in this spirit. 
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changed as well, the name of the father supplanted by her motherÕs lover. Her name 
suggests significant etymological moves, another way of thinking provisionally by 
figuring the reading experience. Provisionality is thus reading practice as much as 
anything else. 
 WhatÕs in MantelÕs name? Chambers defines mantel, from mantle, latin 
mantellum as; 1. Protective garment or blanket, immediately bringing to mind the 
many uses in MantelÕs fiction of cloaks, coats and coverings which signify in literary 
and social ways. For example, the pressure on Mantel to give up academia and work 
in a dress shop (GUG 174; ÒSanityÓ 28-9) or LynetteÕs fur coat, in An Experiment in 
Love, so freely given and yet paid for with her life. The importance of weaving is 
explored in the second chapter through the idea of text and texture. To return to 
ChambersÕ definitions of mantel that are useful for the purposes of this study: 2. 
Figurative sense of anything which enfolds, entraps or encloses as a mantle; an 
immaterial thing likened to or described as a covering (also formerly guise or 
pretence, obsolete), and 4. A duty or position of authority assumed or inherited from 
another. These definitions of ÔmantelÕ will be used throughout to suggest provisional 
readings. 
 The name is at the border: figuring the singularity of the bearer, it also takes 
on a life of its own. This life of its own is referred to by Derrida as a death sentence, 
for the name is destined to outlive its holder. The name exists only in language, but 
the lived experience of bearing a name suggests that naming has power: Ôpersons 
shouldnÕt name youÕ as Mantel writes in her memoir, after the doctor has coined a 
new name for her: ÔHe calls me Little Miss Neverwell. I am angry. I donÕt like being 
given a name, itÕs too much like power over meÕ (GUG 82). Names stick; to be 
!10
unnamed is to be inhuman, outside of the networks of time, subject to contretemps, as 
Derrida might say. 
What is provisionality and why is it needed? 
In short, provisionality is a reading practice that walks a fine line between the ethical 
demands of the present moment and the chaos of history. The etymology of 
provisional, according to Chambers dictionary, is the Latin provisio, which derives 
from providere:  pro being before, and videre meaning to see. The obsolete usage of 6
provide, Ôto make ready beforehandÕ or Ôprepare for future useÕ reflects this root as 
does the modern usage of provisioning supplies, such as for an army. Provisionality 
has connotations of foresight through its root in providere, which connects to an 
obsolete usage of provisional as ÔforesightÕ (OED). Already there is an engagement 
between provisionality and etymology; provisionality denotes polysemy, although it 
is not only multiplicity of meanings, as we have already seen. Etymological 
investigation is in itself a kind of provisionality, which complicates knowing, makes 
it uncanny. There is something in provisionalityÕs ÔproÕ, meaning before or in front, 
that invokes protection, the construction of a shield or fortress. Like the child 
MantelÕs favourite word, ÔcitadelÕ, to provision suggests a defensive move. The 
problematic of this defensiveness returns in the final chapter, when I discuss the 
vulnerability in DerridaÕs scene of writing.  
 Provisionality starts life in 1821, according to the Oxford English Dictionary. 
Born into an explicitly political context, the word begins a trajectory of meaning 
 Nicholas Royle also makes this observation about providere, in relation to his idea of telepathy and 6
seeing ahead Telepathy and Literature (34).
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which travels into the present. Provisionality means ÔprovisionalnessÕ in its first 
recorded usage in The Examiner of London. We discover that provisionality is heard 
during a debate in the much-contested lower house of the French parliament, during 
the Bourbon restoration. This parliament, increasingly dominated by the right wing, 
hears an impassioned speech from liberal moderate Monsieur de Corcelles. In this 
speech he accuses his political opponents of promoting Ôprovisional justiceÕ. 
Provisionality, he argues, Ôis infused into all the branches of your system, and 
enervates and withers youÕ.  M. de CorcellesÕ cri de coeur against the reactionary 7
forces of the Bourbon Restoration describes a system which stands in for ÔproperÕ 
justice, a calculated system, a system of law more than justice.  Already a problem 8
arises; in the post- and counter-revolutionary chaos of early-nineteenth-century 
France, provisionality effectively begins its life as a derogatory term levelled against 
conservative forces . How can the notion of provisionality provide any usefulness in 
reading Hilary Mantel?  
 By tracing provisionalityÕs beginnings in a time of political upheaval, I will 
show how provisionality as a reading practice can be employed to investigate the 
networks of meaning that exist within a selection of her novels, short stories and 
memoir. Provisionality will thus be the axis around which my central claim is stated: 
that Hilary MantelÕs work as an author has an overtly political and philosophical 
significance for how to live. (I say how to live to differentiate living from survival. It 
is not possible to ignore those for whom living is theoretical, who do just survive on a 
daily basis). Taking up the mantel (as it were) of thinking the present crises facing the 
 I infer this through the paperÕs reporting of the reaction of the house to the speech: ÒLong continued 7
plaudits from the left, and silence on the rightÓ (emphasis in original). 
 See for example Joseph GoyÕs entry on the ÒCivil CodeÓ in A Critical Dictionary of the French 8
Revolution Francois Furet and Mona Ozouf eds. Harvard UP: Cambridge and London, 1989. 
(437-448)
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world means finding a different way of thinking those crises. Consider MantelÕs 
political commitments: she publishes regularly in the London Review of Books, for 
example. She is on record as feeling a Ôboiling detestationÕ for Margaret Thatcher, 
first female UK Prime Minister (Guardian).  She refuses to be categorised as a 9
ÔBritishÕ writer, preferring instead to be considered European. As she writes, ÔIn my 
dreams of Europe, I had found the keys to the gates of an unknown city. For the 
constant and passionate imagination, no documents or passes are neededÕ (Leader ed. 
97). As I write this, the UK has voted to leave the EU, Prime Minister Theresa MayÕs 
decision to call a snap election has left a hung parliament, and the country is in 
disarray while the austerity-led Conservative party cling to power. There is turmoil 
within the country, but also hope that the current political upheaval will lead to a 
change of direction against austerity politics. Of course, I am responding to a 
particular moment here and now. What I am also suggesting is that these ÔmomentsÕ 
in Hilary MantelÕs work can be read as ways of helping us know how to live. This 
response will show how MantelÕs provisionality is important for justice, a 
preoccupation that is implied throughout her work and explicitly stated in a Radio 4 
interview where she states, ÔI want to do justice to my charactersÕ (Today 
programme). 
 Thinking about the connections between MantelÕs work and todayÕs social 
and political turmoil: it is no coincidence that provisionalityÕs impossible birth occurs 
at a high point of upheaval. Relevant for todayÕs struggle against late capitalismÕs 
inflexibilities, provisionality points to a critical juncture for justice, at its birth and 
right now. Take for example MantelÕs novel A Place of Greater Safety (1992), which 
 ÔHilary Mantel on Margaret Thatcher: ÒI can still feel that boiling detestationÓ Guardian. Damian 9
Barr. 19th September 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/sep/19/hilary-mantel-interview-
short-story-assassination-margaret-thatcher 
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brings revolution and provisionality together. Although published in 1992, it was 
conceived and written earlier, throughout a period of mental and physical turmoil in 
MantelÕs own life. The novelÕs genesis thus echoes provisionalityÕs own birth in the 
tumult of post- and counter-revolutionary politics. By giving an account of the 
interiority of three characters (Camille Desmoulins, George DÕAnton/Danton, 
Maximillian Robespierre) who comprise the revolutionÕs ÔactorsÕ, she asks the reader 
to consider the meaning and application of justice, both then and now. For instance, 
MantelÕs use of Maximillian RobespierreÕs proclamation on justice, quoted as the 
epigraph to Part Five of A Place of Greater Safety: 
 Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, stern and inflexible; it is not so much a  
 particular principle as a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied  
 to the most urgent needs of our countryÉThe government of the Revolution is the  
 despotism of liberty against the tyrants (quoted in APOGS 491).  
Mantel gives an account of Robespierre that shows his inflexibility as a character 
flaw; his avoidance of intimacy with women represents an essential inhumanity and a 
frightening indifference to loss of life (including his own). About halfway through the 
text, a conversation takes place between Maximillian Robespierre and Camille 
Desmoulins: 
        ÔBut if we are not under Providence, what is everything for?Õ Robespierre now   
 looked wildly alarmed. ÔWhat is the Revolution for?Õ 
        For George-Jacques [Danton] to make money out of, Camille thought. Robespierre 
 answered himself. ÔSurely it is to bring us to the kind of society that God intends? To 
 bring us justice and equality, to full humanity?Õ    
       Oh good heavens, Camille thought. This Max, he believes every word he says.  
 (APOGS 445)  
RobespierreÕs idealistic zealotry is treated by his friends as a harmless character 
defect, until his unswerving devotion to the revolutionary cause means a purge of 
those who disagree with him. In many ways MantelÕs portrayal of Robespierre 
conforms to the clich of the work obsessed ascetic (on the same page as this 
conversation Camille Desmoulins examines MaxÕs hard bed and tidy work desk), 
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who cares too much about books and not enough about life, and who inadvertently 
hurts those around him (see also the Thomas More of Wolf Hall). MantelÕs 
exploration of the character of Robespierre employs this trope partly as a literary 
device, but also to show that the replacement of aristocratic despotism for the 
despotism of the rabble is a decision that turns libertarians into tyrants. Robespierre is 
ultimately guilty of thinking inflexibly: of not understanding that there is a just 
decision somewhere in between tyranny and liberty.   10
 The fictional Ñ or at least exaggerated Ñ tide of optimism that sweeps 
France in 1789 is something that Mantel holds in abeyance. In the novel, revolution 
happens through realpolitik, dominated by backroom bartering and double-dealing. 
The reader sees not the spontaneous uprising of the peasantry to overthrow the feudal 
master, but a calculated power grab by the bourgeoisie. The massed rabble of French 
peasantry are thus simply dupes, destined to replace one set of masters for another.  11
What MantelÕs portrayal of revolutionary France demonstrates is the mutability of 
history and the necessity for caution in making interpretations; how easy it is to 
erroneously ascribe motives and thoughts to characters we only know as if through a 
fiction. In other words, to tread carefully with the dead. As Nicholas Royle states, 
ÔThe literary turn is about a new sensitivity to the ghostliness of literatureÕ, what he 
calls in the preceding paragraph Ôa new appreciation of the ghostliness of fiction, the 
spectral virtualities of literature in which our culture and society, law and institutions 
are inscribedÕ (Royle Veering 134).  
 The ethical responsibility towards her characters, to Ôdo justiceÕ to them thus 
echoes DerridaÕs thinking of (and for) the ghost in Spectres of Marx. The Exordium 
 For another modern assessment of RobespierreÕs thought, see Virtue and Terror edited and 10
introduced by Slavoj Žižek. Verso, 2007. 
A thesis that Franois Furet puts forward in his revisionist Revolutionary France 1770-1880. 11
Blackwell: Oxford, 1992.
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sets out the responsibility towards the spectre as the exemplary ÔotherÕ. This dead 
ÔotherÕ represents the ability (or otherwise) of what Derrida calls the ÔsociusÕ to Ôlive 
otherwise, and better. No, not better, but more justlyÕ (xviii). The call of the dead 
must be responded to. The spectre functions as the model for just relationships. 
Unthinkable without responsibility, justice must respect those who are both no longer 
there, and the not yet living, which Derrida calls the Ônon-contemporaneity with itself 
of the living presentÕ (xviii). Learning to live can only happen between life and death, 
is what Derrida seems to say on xvii-xviii; at once an impossible yet also utterly 
necessary task.  
 The connection must be made with MantelÕs autobiography, Giving up the 
Ghost (2003), which begins with her step-fatherÕs ghost. In a sense she sequesters the 
ghost; not denying its existence but placing in reserve whether or not he is ÔthereÕ. In 
writing about the ghost and the logic of the spectral, they are both writing about 
being and existence, the responsibility of one to the other. MantelÕs writing 
participates in a thinking of spectral logic; one of whose manifestations is the ghostly 
figure. This logic also haunts writing, all writing; not just that concerned with the 
ghost as figure or a representation of the dead.  
 A spectral logic is also at work in MantelÕs writings, in her preoccupation 
with the ÔmomentÕ. Like DerridaÕs moment in Spectres of Marx,Ôa spectral moment, a 
moment that no longer belongs to timeÕ (Derrida Spectres xix), Mantel is preoccupied 
with the moment when everything changes. This is not the moment of decision, or of 
conscious intention, or of ÔtimeÕ (Ôas a series of modalized presentsÕ (xix): it is the 
Ôin-betweenÕ. This Ôin-betweenÕ is suspended; in its play with the limits between 
reality and fiction it is also provisional. Suspended in the sense of no longer working, 
or being held in an indeterminate state (Chambers), provisionality is reading. But 
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reading in such a way as to avoid reducing the text and the experience to a real 
ÔreferentÕ. Provisionality is the Ôword made fleshÕ; a material symbol which works on 
and in multiple spaces and times, in both literal and figurative modes. In terms of 
provisionality as a reading practice, it is not only an exegetical tool but a mode of 
political commitment that can withstand the affective, temporal, intersubjective, and 
verbal processes that we call literature. For Derrida, spectrality as a means of 
crossing divides between the living and the dead expands the scene of responsibility 
towards the other exponentially. It is this ÔsceneÕ of responsibility Ñ to bring back in 
the visual component so crucial to provisionality Ñ that MantelÕs work demonstrates 
in such a clear-eyed way.   12
 The example of the word ÔbirthÕ illustrates provisional reading. I have used 
the word ÔbirthÕ several times in the preceding pages: the ÔbirthÕ of provisionality, the 
conception and ÔgenesisÕ of the novel. Birth suggests origins, a fixed time and place 
where provisionality happened: but provisionality is constantly being made and 
unmade. In the process of making, certain elements come together and break apart, 
come together again. The reader traces MantelÕs idea of revolutionary France via 
provisionality, also a trace from revolutionary France. To hold provisionality up as 
connected to Revolutionary ideals embodied in the slogan libert, galit, fraternit, 
and in the process erase the other side, the uncertainty and ambiguity of the 
provisional. To embrace and enjoy the experience of Ônot knowingÕ. Provisionality 
works to expose the mechanisms of power in texts, and in the world. Returning to M 
de Corcelles, it seems that indecision is the enemy; for him, provisionality reflects 
 I am indebted to Sarah Wood for this insight. Derrida, in ÒThe Principle of Reason: The University 12
in the Eyes of Its PupilsÓ uses the example of scleropthalmic animals (5) to illustrate the figurative 
relationship between learning and seeing, also invoking the trope of the blink. Diacritics. Vol. 13, no.
3. (1983): 2-20. Similarly, Rita Felski suggests Ôneither [art or politics] is reducible to the piercing but 
one-eyed gaze of critiqueÕ(18). The tension here is explored further in chapter two. 
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that indecision. For example: de Corcelles says, ÔprovisionalityÉinfuses your 
system,Õ ÔenervatesÕ and Ôwithers,Õ suggesting that provisionality decays the system 
from within.  
 Where does M. De CorcellesÕ uneasiness come from? Compare DerridaÕs 
description of the ÔundecidableÕ in Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of 
Authority: the undecidable as a ÔghostÕ, working from within to undercut certainty, to 
undermine any absolute notions of decisiveness that might arise from the existence of 
actual decisions:  
 The undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost - but an essential ghost -  
 in every decision, in every event of decision. Its ghostliness deconstructs from within 
 any assurance of presence, any certitudeÉthat would assure us of the justice of a  
 decision, in truth of the very event of a decision. Who will ever be able to assure us  
 that a decision as such has taken place? (965) 
Who indeed? The judgement of the decision is endlessly deferred because it is 
beyond the human capacity; the judge is a stand in for God, in effect.  Acting like a 13
God, wielding such authority as to make oneself into God, is a charge levelled 
against Robespierre, in his time and beyond it. The circumstances of provisionalityÕs 
revolutionary birth exposes the ÔundecidableÕ: not, as M de Corcelles assumes, 
because of indecision, but because the decision Ôrends timeÕ like the cut of the 
guillotine. The cut of the guillotine blade forestalls any other decision; its downward 
stroke takes its place in the Reign of Terror and reverberates through the provisional 
government of 1821. M de Corcelles' attack is thus also a warning; take heed of the 
provisional which ÔwithersÕ and ÔenervatesÕ, which should give one pause to delay a 
decision, until that decision is entirely just. An admirable position that is also 
impossible, given the belatedness of any judgement; only when it is too late can the 
 Consider the royal slogan, dieu et mon droit, for example.13
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decision be judged. We arrive back at the question, by whom exactly is the decision 
to be judged? Who has the right to judge? Upon whose authority does one act?  
 Mantel demonstrates the link between power as terror and justice in A Place 
of Greater Safety; thus exposing the workings of a power that seeks to efface itself, 
kid you that it doesnÕt exist. Remember RobespierreÕs line which Mantel uses as an 
epigraph to Part Five; ÔTerror is nothing other than justice, prompt, stern and 
inflexibleÕ (491). This short quote encapsulates the ideology of the guillotine, its 
terseness like the swift downward movement of the blade itself, its swiftness 
analogous to the sureness of the Robespierrian revolutionary aim. The purity of 
RobespierreÕs conviction leads directly to death by guillotine: death by clinical 
machine, an efficient conveyor belt of death production. In an ambiguous passage in 
A Place of Greater Safety, the narratorial voice reflects:  14
 The weight of the old world is stifling, and trying to shovel its weight off your life is  
 tiring just to think about. The constant shuttling of opinions is tiring, and the   
 shuffling of papers across desks, the chopping of logic and the trimming of attitudes.  
 There must, somewhere, be a simpler, more violent world (120). 
The new, Ômore violent worldÕ is brought about by a clearing out of the old, Mantel 
capturing the physical act of getting out from under the old worldÕs weight. The new 
world proceeds with the cut of the guillotine, clinical killing machine ÔchoppingÕ 
heads as well as logic. The rhythm of this passage presages the guillotineÕs action as 
well as the bladeÕs cut; the ÕshuttlingÕ ÔshufflingÕ ÔchoppingÕ and ÔtrimmingÕ verbs 
miming the movement of the blade, its relentless downwards stroke. The coup de 
grace, the execution of the king, is anticlimactic in MantelÕs rendering. Her spare 
description of LouisÕ execution is poetic in its tone. The reader does not see the 
guillotine killing King Louis XVI. In one moment, he is parcelling out his clothes, 
and then, ÔPeople are swarming around the scaffold, soaking rags in the spilled blood. 
 I discuss point of view in greater detail in the first chapter.14
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Lepelletier, the martyr, lies in state. Louis, the King, is quicklimed (APOGS 604). As 
Danton says, ÔWe are trying, you see, to alter the nature of thingsÕ (393). On the one 
hand, to Ôalter the nature of thingsÕ is a commendable ideal: on the other hand, who is 
to stop history from being altered in an incontrovertibly terrible way? Who stands 
guard over time, in order to protect human beings from themselves? In MantelÕs 
novel the alteration occurs via the violent strike of the guillotine which cuts out the 
cancer of tyranny in the name of liberty, enacting an excision of all that is Ôanti-
revolutionaryÕ. The effect is, of course, the opposite; the guillotine only serves to 
alienate and shore up opposition to the Robespierrian cause. The novel enacts a 
repetition of the dream of GodÕs judgement, both wish and illusion; a reworking of an 
ancient messianic future. If we ask who makes the decision which Ôrends timeÕ and 
can Ôdefy dialecticsÕ, we are asking the wrong question: what Derrida calls the 
Ôjustice to comeÕ is a Ômessianicity without messianismÕ. Derrida finds that Marxism 
still bears the traces of a Christian eschatology, demonstrating this via his 
deconstruction of FukuyamaÕs end of history thesis. Derrida demonstrates his idea of 
Ômessianicity without messianismÕ via his reading of Francis FukuyamaÕs thesis of 
the end of history. In so doing he suggests that Marxism cannot shake off the traces 
of Christian eschatology. FukuyamaÕs switching between the registers of real and 
ideal strengthens DerridaÕs argument: the logic of the ghost must be insisted upon 
because it Ôexceeds a binary or dialectical logic.Õ (Derrida Spectres 63).  
 A consideration of spectral logic helps us to think the ÔeventÕ, the thinking of 
which Derrida says is missing from FukuyamaÕs analysis. FukuyamaÕs argument is 
founded on the distinction between effectivity or actuality and ideality (DerridaÕs 
emphasis), an unacknowledged distinction which is disrupted when we talk to the 
spectre, lay it a place at the table. In Beyond Black, Mantel calls the realm of the dead 
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an Ôeventless realmÕ but nevertheless the non event of the eventless is tied to the 
event. The non happening is an event in itself, Ônothing happenedÕ being an example 
of such a paradox. In MantelÕs 2014 short story ÒThe Assassination of Margaret 
ThatcherÓ (discussed in chapter 1), the saviour comes to provide a blow, that ushers 
in a new world. Mantel turns ThatcherÕs ÔRejoiceÕ on its head. Distinguishing law 
from justice, Derrida states: ÔJustice in itself, if such a thing exists Éoutside or 
beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing 
exists. Deconstruction is justiceÕ (Derrida ÒForceÓ 945). That justice and the law are 
incommensurable with each other can be demonstrated by a cursory glance at legal 
proceedings; the law carries out judicial blunders, makes judgements that are unjust.  
DerridaÕs claim that deconstruction is inseparable from justice, however, suggests 
that justice can only be endlessly deferred. Returning to M de CorcellesÕ ardent cries 
of ÔprovisionalityÕ, it seems that his fears for the ÔprovisionalnessÕ of the system rest 
on this deferral. To attempt to mete out justice is to come up against this experience, 
what Derrida calls an aporia; the paradoxical deferral of justice, and all its attendant 
delays and detours. Hence, for Derrida, Ôdeconstruction takes place in the interval 
that separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of droit 
(authority, legitimacy, and so on)Õ (Derrida ÒForceÓ 945):  
 Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is   
 incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic   
 experiences are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice, that  
 is to say of moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured  
 by a rule (947).  
What Derrida calls the Ôaporetic experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of 
justiceÕ expose the workings of justice as based on something other to reason or 
rational calculation, what Derrida has called elsewhere a ÔmadnessÕ. If provisionality 
is just one of many possible deconstructions, it has a relationship with this ÔmadnessÕ, 
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at the moment of decision and in reasoning. This logic (if it is possible to call it a 
logic) works in relation to texts too: narrative is supposed to take charge of the chain 
of decisions which make up the story. I say supposed to, because aporetic justice 
shows the impossibility of doing any such thing; the necessary paradox of 
deconstruction means that reason is ÔmadnessÕ and ÔmadnessÕ is reason. Derrida 
attributes this saying to Kierkegaard;  Ô[T]he instant of decision is a madnessÉ.This 15
is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy 
dialecticsÕ (967). MantelÕs novels demonstrate that reason and madness are 
paradoxically inseparable from each other. She is interested in the ways that madness 
and its effects open out onto other planes aside from the personal or psychological.  
 For example, in ÒSanity Madness and the FamilyÓ, an article she wrote for the 
Existential Analysis journal, Mantel refers to a ÔmomentÕ in her life, when she came 
across Laing and EstersonÕs book of the same name: ÔI should like to take you to an 
afternoon in 1973, a place, a time, a book, a moment of inner decision, dawning 
knowledgeÕ (ÒSanityÓ 25). This book, she writes, Ôinflicted the shock of 
recognitionÕ (26) of her own family dynamic: ÔThese family conversations, I have 
heard them. I could, I felt, have constructed another chapter and called it The 
MantelsÕ (27).  What Laing and Esterson did, Mantel says, is to ask us to Ôinterrupt 16
the process and suspend judgementÕ (29): instead of working from the assumption of 
madness, to look closely and see if scrutinising the context of these young women 
would help. To hold it Ôin parenthesisÕ as Mantel phrases it (29). To look more 
closely, might yield up interesting discoveries about the nature of schizophrenia; but 
 See Geoffrey BenningtonÕs ÒA Moment of Madness: DerridaÕs KierkegaardÓ OLR 33.1 2011 15
103-27, in which he reads DerridaÕs reading and citation of this phrase from Kierkegaard, as a way of 
thinking about reading.
 As she writes in an article for the Guardian ÔSo many of these family conversations seemed familiar 16
to me: their swerves and evasions, their doubleness.Õ ÔAuthor Author: Every writer has a ÒHow I 
became a writer story.ÓÕ Guardian. September 6th 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/
sep/06/1 Accessed 2nd November 2017. 
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it also might threaten the existence of established notions of madness, upon which 
our ideas about sanity are based. Laing was at pains to point out that labels of sanity 
and insanity are functions of power.  What Mantel describes in Laing and EstersonÕs 17
method is the provisional. To hold judgement in abeyance; suspend assumptions; to 
question the reality of things (in this case the existence of schizophrenia). MantelÕs 
writings occupy this provisional space, a space in between which manifests 
powerfully in her novels. Being of Irish catholic descent, Mantel begins her life in the 
north of England in a predominantly protestant village, subject to gossip about her 
familyÕs unorthodox living arrangements: ÔJack, my motherÕs lover, came to live in 
our house. My father didnÕt leave; he just moved roomsÕ (ÒSanityÓ 27). From then on 
she is the trustee of family knowledge and keeper of secrets: Ôit was a secret I was 
charged with keeping, and I was considered to be the one most likely to blow the 
familyÕs future to bits by revealing the truthÉÕ (27). Her own part is in-between this 
makeshift family, neither in the old family nor part of the new. She understands the 
nature of the replacement of her father, while also shying away from any closure of 
the fatherÕs story.
Time (Scales) of provisionality: temporariness and contemporariness 
Moving on from the ÔmomentÕ, this section connects Timothy ClarkÕs ÔScaleÕ in time 
and space with provisionality, as a temporary way of being and as a means of being a 
ÔcontemporaryÕ. I will read Mantel as a contemporary in relation to AgambenÕs essay, 
ÒWhat is the Contemporary?Ó. As Mantel writes in A Place of Greater Safety: Ô[I]t 
was a special way of looking at the world, the necessary viewpoint of the worm when 
itÕs turningÕ (64), thus signalling the importance of vision to provisionality. Vision 
 What Mantel is also talking about here is repetition, within the psychological life of the individual 17
and through generations of the family.
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centres and anchors provisionality. ÔOpen your eyesÕ, says M de Corcelles, Ôand you 
will see that provisionality itself is infused into all the branches of your systemÕ. 
Provisionality suffuses your unjust political system, he says, but you do not see it 
through your blindness. Open your eyes; here is provisionality to undermine your 
faith and certainty. Again this exhortation to ÔseeÕ how provisionality Ôis infused into 
all the branches of your systemÕ offers unconscious confirmation of the importance of 
vision in provisionality. The system thus has an inbuilt ÔtemporarinessÕ and the seeds 
of its own critique. The common sense definition of provisional as a temporary 
arrangement suggests the tenuousness of attachments to systems and structures. 
Temporariness is implicit within the etymological sense of provisional: Ôbelonging to, 
or of the nature of, a temporary provision or arrangement; provided or adopted for the 
time being; supplying the place of something regular, permanent or finalÕ (OED).  
 In thinking this temporariness, what is more provisional than the span of 
human life? Provisionality can thus offer a recognition of humanityÕs insignificance 
in the universe; something akin to what Timothy Clark would call ÔscaleÕ. As he 
writes in the article of the same name: 
 Any broadly mimetic interpretation of a text, mapping it onto different if hopefully  
 illuminating terms, always assumes a physical and temporal scale of some sort. It is a 
 precondition of any such mapping, though almost never explicit in the interpretation. 
 The scale in which one reads a text drastically alters the kinds of significance   
 attached to elements of it, but, as we will see, it cannot give itself criteria for   
 judgement. (Clark 157)  
Clark attempts to read a Raymond Carver short story, ÔElephantÕ on three different 
ÔscalesÕ; the ÔpersonalÕ; the broadly historical (which he calls the literary criticism 
scale); and the final Ôhypothetical scaleÕ which reads the story from a period of 
hundreds of years and encompasses the whole earth. About this final ÔexperimentÕ he 
remarks Ôthe feeling of paralysis or arbitrariness in the experiment cannot override 
the conviction that to read at scales that used, familiarly, to Òmake senseÓ may now 
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also be a form of intellectual and ethical containmentÕ (158-9). While Clark is writing 
from the standpoint of environmental concerns, it would be useful to draw the 
parallel between the idea of ÔscaleÕ and provisionality. By broadening out the frame 
of reference within which it is possible to analyse a text, Clark exposes the fragility, 
contingency and temporariness of human life touched on earlier. His idea of scale 
works in both space and time, temps, alerting us to MantelÕs sense of the 
provisionality of the human life span.  
 Working on multiple timelines and across multiple systems, Mantel also 
shows how the human is rendered insignificant. Her short story ÒThe Assassination of 
Margaret ThatcherÓ, for example, is about a ÔmomentÕ in time, and at the same time 
about a whole ÔburiedÕ other history (invisible to the eyes of those who choose not to 
see it) and the door that constitutes the portal between this world and the next 
(imagined spatially as neighbouring flats in a block): that physical manifestation of a 
Ôhistory [that] can always be otherwiseÕ. The movement of MantelÕs story, from 
temporariness to contemporariness demonstrates how the ÔuntimelinessÕ of the 
different time (scales) in MantelÕs novels connects to Giorgio AgambenÕs notion of 
the contemporary as the literature of the untimely.  
 Mantel can be read as a contemporary in AgambenÕs sense of the word, as one 
who is ÔuntimelyÕ.  Thus the contemporary relates to ÔanachronyÕ and Ôdys-chronyÕ: 18
what he calls Ôthat relationship with time that adheres to it through a disjunction and 
an anachronismÕ (Agamben 41). But, he continues, this Ôdoes not mean that the 
 The case for Mantel as a contemporary is strengthened considerably by her notable absence from a 18
large proportion of books about twenty-first century fiction. For example, Peter BoxallÕs Twenty-First 
Century Fiction: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge UP 2013) which deals thematically with issues 
such as Culture, Memory and the Future of the Novel, has a diverse range of writers but no Mantel. 
Ironically, as BoxallÕs conclusion suggests: Ôthe future of the novel, one might suggest, is suspended 
somewhere between two historical tendencies, two frames of mind, which is captured, what is more, in 
the double meaning that is at work in the phrase [future of the novel]Õ (210). Similarly, Daniel LeaÕs 
Twenty-first century fiction: Contemporary British Voices (Manchester UP 2016)focuses on writers 
such as Ali Smith, Sarah Hall, and Tom McCarthy. 
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contemporary is a person who lives in another time, a nostalgic who feels more at 
home in the Athens of Pericles or in the Paris of RobespierreÕ (41). Agamben 
employs the image of vertebrae in his point about the poetÕs contemporariness; the 
backbone of the Ôcentury beastÕ cited by Agamben, that is shattered by time must be 
fused together, ÔsuturedÕ by the poet who Ôinsofar as he is contemporary, is this 
fracture, is at once that which impedes time from composing itself and the blood that 
must suture this break or woundÕ (42).  In his final paragraph of the essay ÒWhat is 19
the Contemporary?Ó Agamben writes, ÔHe [the contemporary] is able to read history 
in unforeseen ways, to Òcite itÓ according to a necessity that does not arise in any way 
from his will, but from an exigency to which he cannot not respondÕ (53).  
 This exigence, the Ôpressing necessityÕ of response occurs in Mantel as a need 
to articulate what must be articulated, whether in speech or writing. AgambenÕs word 
ÔunforeseenÕ brings foresight and another place to bookmark provisionality; an 
obsolete meaning of provisional being Ôto make ready beforehandÕ and Ôto prepare for 
future useÕ. The interesting and surprising ways in which Mantel ÔcitesÕ history, in 
AgambenÕs words, make her a contemporary not merely in terms of subject matter 
but in the willingness to analyse the possibility of representing a history Ôthat can 
always be otherwiseÕ (ÒThe Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÓ (240). In using the 
ÔParis of RobespierreÕ as an example, Agamben exposes the repetitive citation of the 
event that keeps coming back. The definition of revolution contains its return : Ôthe 
 Bones and blood are infused into MantelÕs own conceptualisation of her writing practice. In Giving 19
up the Ghost she uses the image of bones to evoke writing; ÔWhen you have committed enough words 
to paper you feel you have a spine stiff enough to stand up in the wind. But when you stop writing you 
find thatÕs all you are, a spine, a row of rattling vertebrae, dried out like an old quill penÕ(222). In the 
same memoir she exhorts the writer to, ÔEat meat. Drink bloodÉ Rise in the quiet hours of the night 
and prick your fingertips, and use the blood for inkÕ (GUG 5). The Giant, OÕBrien is full of allusions 
to skeletons and bones. Cromwell is referred to by Anne Boleyn as ÔCremuelÕ in Wolf Hall; a 
cremulator is used to grind any leftover bits of bone into powder, after a body is cremated. See also the 
child CromwellÕs chance encounter at the Lollard Joan BroughtonÕs execution by burning: ÔHis eyes 
were sharp even in the gloom, and out of the sludge and muck he picked a fragment of bone. HereÕs 
some, he saidÕ (Wolf Hall 357).  
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act or condition of revolvingÕ and Ôa cycle of phenomena or of timeÕ (Chambers). The 
cycle in its circular motion reminds that Mantel, with her finger firmly on the pulse 
of the Ôcentury beastÕ, has got there before us. The narrator of her short story 
describes what will happen after the assassin escapes into the gap between the flats, 
ÔOne day Trinity Place will fall down, in a puff of plaster and powdered bone. Time 
will draw to a zero point, a dotÉÕ (AMT 236).  
 MantelÕs evocation of time as ÔdotÕ and Ôzero pointÕ represent the action of 
revolution. Not only the circular shape it makes as it revolves, as time draws to a zero 
point the interior of the ÔoÕ is gradually filled in, until it is not perceptible. This 
figures the circular motion of permanent revolution, for who is to say when and 
where it stops? This sense of permanent revolution is a key element of provisionality, 
for the effect it has on writing. As Mantel writes in a private communication, Ôhow 
can you sustain the revolutionary spirit?Õ She continues: ÔHow often did you throw 
out the government and make it new? As soon as you arrive, you must set off again. 
That is my perception about writing Ñ there is no point of stasisÕ (Appendix i 239). 
 That Mantel approaches writing as a revolution plays to other meanings of the 
word ÔrevolutionÕ: the archaic Ôturning things over in the mindÕ and ShakespeareÕs 
revolution meaning ÔmutationÕ (Chambers). Revolution and the creation of texts and 
monsters: we have come full circle back to AgambenÕs exposition of MandelstamÕs 
Ôcentury beastÕ. As the ways we have parsed the word ÔrevolutionÕ shows, 
provisionality is one of the many deconstructions present in MantelÕs work. By 
reading revolution in this way, invoking Robespierre, Thomas More (and by 
association Cromwell), the political dimension can be discussed, without recourse to 
crude gauges of author, reader, or character politics. Politics in the sense that Jacques 
Rancire uses it: the choices writers make within texts and what these choices tell us 
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about the writerÕs commitments. MantelÕs own engagements with the language of 
revolution demonstrate her commitment to provisionality as a state of permanent 
revolution. 
ÔIndisciplinarityÕ and provisionality 
To think about political commitment for the moment: Jacques Rancire states that all 
literature is political, but not in the sense of the writer having specific commitments, 
or writing about specific movements. I am guided in this by RancireÕs idea of 
ÔindisciplinarityÕ. In an interview published in journal of Art and Research, Rancire 
is asked, ÔWould it be right to suggest that your work is not so much inter-
disciplinary as a-disciplinary?Õ (2) to which he replies,  
 Neither. It is ÒindisciplinaryÓ. It is not only a matter of going besides the disciplines  
 but of breaking them. My problem has always been to escape the division between  
 disciplines, because what interests me is the question of the distribution of territories, 
 which is always a way of deciding who is qualified to speak about what (2-3). 
He continues:  
 If emancipation had a meaning, it consisted in reclaiming thought as something   
 belonging to everyone Ñ the correlate being that there is no natural division   
 between intellectual objects and that a discipline is always a provisional grouping, a  
 provisional territorialisation of questions and objects that do not in and of themselves 
 possess any specific localisation or domain (3). 
The word ÔindisciplinaryÕ evokes the sense of boundaries being crossed while at the 
same time conjuring a rebelliousness. Rancire in his reference to emancipation 
issues a call to arms for the marginalised and the misfit. Also striking here is the 
sense of provisional that Rancire is suggesting, of a temporary solution for now: an 
arrangement of disciplines which are contingent, can be changed. The further sense 
of indisciplinarity as indisciplined or unruly, shows how Mantel and Rancire 
connect in a productive tension. The carnivalesque of MantelÕs last non-Tudor work, 
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Beyond Black is testament to this sense of Mantel as mischievous, contrary. Her 
articles and speeches are unafraid to tackle important issues about representation: she 
has a reputation of saying what she wants to say, although by doing so she runs the 
risk of being misunderstood.   20
 For Rancire, literatureÕs specificity arises not from the specificity of its 
language use, a Ôliterary languageÕ, but from precisely the opposite, that everyday 
language use is shaped in new and different ways according to who is writing, 
whether it is spoken and so on. The Ôautonomy of literary languageÕ precludes 
thinking about politics without moving outside of literature, when literatureÕs own 
specificity is held up as political.  Rancire uses a line from a Rimbaud poem to 
illustrate Ôa junction between two regimes of meaningÕ (Rancire Politics 6) and a 
Ônew relationship between the distinctive and the indistinctive, the proper and the 
improper, the poetics and the prosaicÉa new way language can act by causing 
something to be seen and heardÕ (7). Literature does politics, is political, by Ôcausing 
something to be seen and heardÕ and as such is closely related to what Rancire calls 
ÔsubjectivisationÕ. Subjectivisation describes becoming a subject in language, which 
occurs when the beingÕs voice is heard as discourse, and not only as Ômere growlÕ (4).  
 According to Chambers, Ôsubject toÕ means Ôowing allegianceÕ and Ôunder 
obligationÕ; this obligation is related to political commitment, in terms of 
participating in what Rancire calls the Ôdistribution of the sensibleÕ. However, 
Ôsubject toÕ is also Ôdependent upon condition or contingencyÕ (Chambers): the 
 Her ÒRoyal BodiesÓ speech provoked outrage from the Royalist, right wing press, with even David 20
Cameron then Prime minister wading in with a clumsy defence of the Duchess. Erica WagnerÕs New 
Statesman interview discusses the ÔcontroversyÕ. See ÒI was on the end of a hate campaign.Ó New 
Statesman. 18 April-1 May 2014: 38-43. The publication of her short story collection ÔThe 
Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÕ was also the occasion of an outcry from Norman Tebbit, who 
called the BBCÕs decision to broadcast the title story ÔsickÕ. I discuss this further in chapter two. See 




seemingly unproblematic entrance that the subject makes into discourse, somehow 
graduating from howls into ÔfullÕ speech, is thus shown to be a contingent, 
provisional act. Mantel, in writing the story of herself, is both subjectivising, but at 
the same time, through the subjectÕs contingency also participating in her own 
erasure. An example to illustrate: MantelÕs first published work of fiction, Every Day 
is MotherÕs Day (1985) is the story of Muriel. The ÔbackwardÕ child of mother 
Evelyn, bullied and coaxed into submission, Muriel somehow gets pregnant, 
(ÔsomehowÕ seems wrong here, but it is intended to convey the shock inferred in the 
novel by this surprising event).  The novel begins with MurielÕs look of Ôdaft 21
beatitudeÕ (ED 7) and the readerÕs invitation into EvelynÕs narrative perplexity. 
Muriel is eclipsed by her mother throughout (every day is motherÕs day, in MurielÕs 
existence); her place in the narrative is fixed by MantelÕs free indirect style, which is 
skewed towards EvelynÕs viewpoint.  MurielÕs speech is not reported, until the 
denouement, when EvelynÕs death allows her to speak (ED 204). Even then what she 
says is indistinct, lost in the noise.  
 The narrative representation of a character so eclipsed by the mother, even 
while becoming a mother herself, illustrates an important connection between 
RancireÕs idea of politics, and MantelÕs preoccupation with becoming a subject. This 
is not a word Mantel uses, but can be used here fruitfully; MurielÕs character 
demonstrates the danger of staying under the yoke, of being subject to but not subject 
in oneÕs own right. The emphasis on ÔautonomyÕ (ED 27) within MurielÕs Social 
Services daycare setting is contrasted to the fused nature of her relationship with 
Evelyn. MurielÕs refusal to speak suggests that her autonomy is better served by 
 I read Every Day is MotherÕs Day in more detail in chapter three, considering MurielÕs baby as a 21
kind of delayed phantom. 
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silence, but is also connected to othersÕ refusal to hear her utterances as intelligible. 
Muriel ÔspeaksÕ through action: kicking the neighbourÕs dog, stealing a tin opener and 
leaving it for her mother to find, writing misspelled notes which fuel her motherÕs 
paranoia and obsession with ghosts.  Every Day is MotherÕs Day opens up the 
problematic of who is allowed to speak, and with whose voice: in other words, 
precisely the issue that Rancire is concerned with.  
ShakespeareÕs spectral voice  
Perhaps overlooked due to ubiquity, ShakespeareÕs spectral voice in MantelÕs work 
(Beyond Black in particular) offers an example of RancireÕs democracy of voices. 
Not only this, as Marjorie Garber suggests, in ShakespeareÕs Ghost Writers, 
ShakespeareÕs identity itself is under question, and is thus ripe for a provisional 
reading. ShakespeareÕs spectral presence makes a sneaky appearance in 2005Õs 
Beyond Black, as Wagstaffe, a ghost captured on tape alongside the voices of the 
ÔfiendsÕ. These ÔfiendsÕ are ambiguous figures, possibly figments of the damaged 
medium AlisonÕs imagination, equally possibly the ghosts of men from her 
childhood, whom we are led to believe pimped out AlisonÕs mother and in turn 
abused other women of the household, including the child Alison. There is never an 
attempt on MantelÕs part to resolve this issue, and although the reader can try, it is not 
possible. Further complications ensue when the ÔfiendsÕ begin to make material 
interventions into this world, they spill out from the spirit world into the world of 
things, causing chaos and destabilising the already shaky ground of matter.   
 Wagstaffe is doubly spectral: as the ghost of Shakespeare he is a well known 
figure from history, the quintessential English writer, the archetypal literary icon. 
However, at the same time Wagstaffe is woven into the reported and recorded 
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conversations of the fiends, and as such becomes part of AlisonÕs own landscape of 
psychodrama, abuse and trauma. Cultural knowledge of Shakespeare is passed down 
through the generations, based on textual evidence but also subject to change in its 
transmission. When in Beyond Black Princess Diana appears in AlisonÕs mirror the 
same thing occurs; the image takes precedence while the substance vanishes with her, 
hence the newspaper cuttings pinned to her dress. 
 Wagstaffe conjures up an Elizabethan idiom far removed from the rough 
speech and gutter colloquialisms of the ÔfiendsÕ, but still wedded to the textual, Ôthis 
sceptred isleÕ (BB 207), whom the ÔfiendsÕ themselves identify as Wagstaffe. In the 
final act of the novel, when Alison sets herself free from the fiends (the reveal is that 
she is the top boss NickÕs daughter, and the fiends are scared of him), a handkerchief 
is mentioned in conversation, and again Wagstaffe interjects. Mantel thus points 
directly to issues of textual creation, transmission and reception.  She has a particular 
way of figuring an intertextuality that goes beyond a self-conscious ÔquotingÕ, by 
exploring the issues of how we read and how we know.  AlisonÕs discovery of her 
own parentage emphasises her position as proto-author, paying homage to her 
forefathers (and mothers), just as Mantel does. 
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Provisionality as container  
One way of thinking about provisionality is as a container.  The idea of the container 22
could provide a frame for the boundary-crossing and transgressive potential of 
provisionality. Just as the ego takes in, or introjects, the provisional container might 
build a way of seeing the world. Sandor Ferenczi describes introjection as Ôan 
extension to the external world of the original autocratic interests, by including its 
objects in the egoÕ (Ferenczi Final 316).  The egoÕs doubleness echoes a doubleness 23
in Mantel also signalled by her name: the desire to both get to the bottom of things 
and at the same time to cover them up. This double movement of covering and 
uncovering situates Mantel as a provisional writer. To return to one of the child 
MantelÕs favoured words ÔcitadelÕ (GUG 40), so far this introduction has hinted that 
there are enclosing and protective moves contained within this ÔcitadelÕ. The 
intersections between thought and matter, between an image and its concrete 
manifestation, and the collisions that exist in the world between thought and material 
are at the heart of provisional thinking.  
 The protective moves made are provisioning for a reading. Provisions are also 
the stuff that is provided,  as one provisions for a cold winter or an army, stocking 24
up, taking stock. Provisionality then, as an etymological base from which to start; by 
provisioning ourselves to read Mantel, to read the stuff of Mantel. In terms of 
 This is Wilfred BionÕs word. He sees the container as thinking, in its most simple terms. In any case, 22
it is not a Ôstatic conditionÕ (6-7). Elements of Psychoanalysis. London: Heinemann, 1963. See also 
Ronald BrittonÕs ÒNaming and ContainingÓ in Britton ed. Belief and Imagination: Explorations in 
Psychoanalysis. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. Thomas H.OgdenÕs paper ÒOn Holding and 
Containing, Being and DreamingÓ explains it as Ôon the one hand, thoughts and feelings derived from 
lived emotional experience (the contained) and on the other, the capacity for dreaming and thinking 
those thoughts (the container)Õ (1359) International Journal of Psychoanalysis. No. 85 (2004): 
1349-64.
 FreudÕs ÒMourning and MelancholiaÓ (1917) offers a discussion of how the healthy subject, in order 23
to mourn, has to internalise the loved one as object. Without this internalisation, mourning is 
incomplete. 
 Mary Jacobus writes extensively about stuff, provisions and matter in The Poetics of 24
Psychoanalysis: In the wake of Klein. Oxford UP, 2005.
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material, what I call provisionality interrogates the boundary between matter and 
thought and thinks it through in different ways. For Mantel, literature and the literary 
are not defined in terms of pure subjectivity or consciousness. There is a bodily, 
material element to her writing that transcends the ÔfactsÕ of her various documented  
illnesses. The body and the representation of the body, in sensations such as pain, 
provide the theoretical weight of provisionality as a tool which can be used across 
disciplines. The body, far from being tamed, paraded, funnelled, refuses to be still or 
quiet. We know this from childhood, letting out wind in silent assembly halls or 
involuntarily squeaking when tickled. Mantel reaches into the stuff of the body to 
pick apart how we represent it. Provisionality contains within its definitions the sense 
of a condition, of something being provided for, a clause in a deed or will, the sense 
of property properly disposed of, the wishes of the dead acceded to. Provisionality 
evokes the materiality of provisions, stuff, and the ÔmetaphoricityÕ of matter. It 
provides a container for an understanding of matter and spirit, concreteness and 
metaphor. It gives a container in the sense of framework, which allows a 
transposition across boundaries of the physical and mental, suspended between the 
two.
Chapter Overview  
The first chapter, ÔStrange Hauntings, Uncanny Doings: Vision and the Spectral in 
Beyond Black and ÒThe Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÓÕ explores the 
prevalence of visual metaphors (including the mirror) and how these contribute to 
provisionality. I use DerridaÕs Spectres of Marx to show how the visual relates to 
spectrality, an already established corner of Mantel studies. Suggesting parallels 
between ShakespeareÕs Hamlet and MantelÕs family situation exposes Shakespeare as 
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a ghostly trope to which Mantel returns and which returns to her. I examine the 
sideways glance and the blink as a means of disruption, thinking about the 
intermittency of the blink and its relationship to the citation of Shakespeare as 
Wagstaffe in Beyond Black. The next section considers MantelÕs placement as a 
ÔvisionaryÕ writer, setting up the concluding section on the short story ÒThe 
Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÓ.  
 These explorations demonstrate MantelÕs own commitments to reading as a 
writer. The second chapter ÔMovements of Reading: Dis-Manteling RealismÕ takes on 
this theme of provisional realism as a reading practice. Beginning with a discussion 
of how MantelÕs work has been categorised (as Gothic, or Ôsuper-realÕ), I continue by 
returning to definitions of realism in order to situate MantelÕs work in relation to it. I 
then use Roland Barthes and Jacques Rancire to investigate MantelÕs particular 
brand of provisional realism in Wolf Hall and Fludd, with particular reference to the 
ideas of texture and weaving. Finally, I suggest that MantelÕs work enacts both a 
realist compromise and an illusion.  
 The following paired chapters, three and four, consist of two parts which both 
explore different aspects of the child and childhood. Chapter three, ÔMantelÕs lost 
child: A Change of Climate and Every Day is MotherÕs DayÕ begins with the childÕs 
provisional place in cultural discourse and continues with MantelÕs representation of 
the child Thomas Cromwell in Wolf Hall. Exploring the child in Every Day is 
MotherÕs Day and A Change of Climate, in relation to Abraham and TorokÕs notion of 
the crypt, I connect the child figure with the phantom. Chapter four, ÔChildhoodÕs 
Founding Fictions: Giving up the GhostÕ considers various psychoanalytical 
figurations of childhood by Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein in relation to MantelÕs 
autobiographical work Giving up the Ghost (and briefly, An Experiment in Love). 
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Drawing on theories of autobiography, I make the claim for Mantel as a writer whose 
provisionality holds possibilities for opening scholarship up to diverse voices. My 
conclusion will point towards the future of Mantel scholarship, therefore, and the 
possibilities within it.  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Chapter One 
Strange Hauntings, Uncanny Doings: Vision and the Spectral in Beyond Black 
and ÒThe Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÓ 
Introduction 
In their introduction to The Spectralities Reader, ÔConceptualizing SpectralitiesÕ, 
Mara del Pilar Blanco and Esther Peeren argue that, Ôa specific metamorphosis [has] 
occurred of ghosts and hauntingÕ (1). The ghost and its ghostliness has been 
transformed into the spectre and the spectral: it is now what del Pilar Blanco and 
Peeren call a Ôconceptual metaphorÕ (1). This Ôconceptual metaphorÕ  not only 
describes its object, in this case the spectre, but also has a hand in producing it. In del 
Pilar Blanco and PeerenÕs terms, the spectre is an Ôanalytical tool that does theoryÕ (1, 
emphasis in original). This chapter thinks MantelÕs ghosts, in their variety of guises, 
in terms of this ÔdoingÕ and its implications, specifically how Mantel employs 
spectrality to complicate the visual field in her novels. From the Latin specere, to see, 
the spectre and the visual are always already intertwined: seeing puts into question 
the presence of the ghost, just as the presence of a ghost distorts vision.   25
 Scholars such as Victoria Stewart, Wolfgang Funk, Esther Peeren and Lucy 
Arnold have already addressed the question of the spectral in MantelÕs work, 
identifying its eery quality and her recognition of things beyond the grasp of human 
sight. These scholars institute the ghost as ÔotherÕ, either by keeping strict watch on 
 As del Pilar Blanco and Peeren also point out (2). This is what Garber refers to as the Ôanamorphic 25
ghostÕ ShakespeareÕs Ghost Writers (129). 
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the dead/alive boundary, or by confining it to the metaphorical sphere.  MantelÕs 26
spectres differ; she does not allow the reader the security of consigning them to their 
proper place among the dead.  Similarly, the visual in Mantel is explored beyond a 
simple seen/unseen boundary. A straightforward look is complicated in MantelÕs 
work by the intermittency of the wink, the Ôflicker(ing)Õ, and the sideways look.  27
She employs ÔflickersÕ and ÔglimpsesÕ, to weave a narrative of the spectral which gets 
to the heart of what things ÔareÕ, that cannot be perceived by looking in an 
uncomplicated way. As Lucy Arnold trenchantly states, Ôthere is no straight path from 
an encounter with a spectre to an understanding of the implications of their 
spectralityÕ (Arnold 308). It is this path I will follow in thinking through the 
complicated permutations of MantelÕs spectrality.  
 MantelÕs spectrality is in what she writes about, of course: the mischievous 
and banal spirits of Beyond Black, the ghostly curate of Fludd, her childhood 
encounters with the Ôother worldÕ in Giving up the Ghost. But the spectral is woven 
through her writing, going beyond polysemy; her words infused with, as she puts it in 
another context, Ôthe ghosts of meaningÕ (Giving up the Ghost 222). What is singular 
to Mantel are the textual motifs she employs in thinking though the tensions between 
visibility/invisibility,  looking/seeing and reality/image. The literary motif is itself a 28
spectral presence haunting the text which shares some of the characteristics of the 
glimpse. At times visible, at others invisible, the motif is nevertheless discernible and 
 Esther Peeren, for example, in The Spectral Metaphor: Living Ghosts and the Agency of Invisibility 26
(Palgrave MacMillan 2014) suggests that ÔDerridaÕs hauntologyÉas an alternative ontology renders 
all being and meaning ghostly, and whose functions and effects are difficult to distinguish from those 
of other deconstructive notions such as diffranceÉÕ (11). I discuss the other scholars in what follows. 
 This logic of intermittency is similar to Peter Buse and Andrew StottÕs reference to Ôthe ghost as a 27
cipher of iterationÉ the anticipated return of the ghost may be mobilized on behalf of a 
deconstruction of all historicisms that are grounded in a rigid sense of chronologyÕ (11). Ghosts, 
Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History. (London: MacMillan, 1999). 
 As de Man points out, visibility as presence and invisibility as absence are foundations of 28
ontological certainty, which go to the heart of representation and art. See ÒThe Rhetoric of BlindnessÓ 
in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism 2nd ed. (London: 
Methuen, 1983),(123f).
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affects reading in strange ways. If we consider the idea of the artist as a perceptive 
ÔfilterÕ, then the writerÕs privileged relation to perception is not new to Mantel: 
indeed, Thomas HardyÕs attempt to Ôpierce the material screenÕ can be placed within a 
similar (pro)visionary tradition. MantelÕs work is infused with the spectral, not only 
because the ghost figures so prominently, but also because provisionality partakes of 
spectral logic in its disruption of the ÔrealÕ.  
The mirror  
Take the mirror as an example of one such motif. The mirror brings to the surface a 
myriad of associations within MantelÕs oeuvre and in wider culture. MantelÕs writing 
plays with the various issues that arise from thinking about the mirror: recognition, 
reflection, distortion.  If clarity is sought by looking in a mirror, the viewer must be 29
aware that this is not necessarily what they will get. Although it looks like a faithful 
reflection, reality is reversed in the mirror. The gap between the ÔrealÕ and the 
reversed image is a fertile ground for meaning to slip in.   
 Jacques LacanÕs work, for example, affirms the primacy of the real and 
metaphorical mirror in the development of the infant, its Ôjubilant assumption of his 
specular imageÕ(Lacan 76).  The infant is overjoyed at the appearance of his image 30
in the mirror and being able to take on his reflection as ÔhisÕ. The reflection of the 
small childÕs image in the mirror is for Lacan the Ôroot-stock of secondary 
identificationsÕ (Lacan 76), and the point from which the subject is instituted in 
 Eileen PollardÕs interview with Mantel ÒMind What Gap?Ó demonstrates how Mantel is ÔobsessedÕ 29
with mirrors (9).
ÔThe jubilant assumption [assumption] of his specular image by the kind of being - still trapped in 30
his motor impotence and nursling dependence - the little man is at the infans stage thus seems to me to 
manifest in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial 
form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language 
restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject.Õ (Lacan, Ecrits 76) 
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language, as it grows and learns the rules of the symbolic order. The visual image of 
oneself in the mirror is the primary identification, from which all others flow, and it 
underwrites (however imperfectly) the sense of self. For the self in culture then, 
according to Lacan, the mirror is its foundation, the apprehension of oneÕs reflection 
through a clear and focused look. The image corresponds to its real life referent in an 
uncomplicated visual relationship; the human subject is reflected faithfully back to 
itself.  31
 Mantel makes the mirror a point of complication, and in so doing subtly 
affirms the preference given to the visual in our culture (of which Lacan is just one 
example). At the same time, however, her writing works to undermine this 
dominance by disrupting the unequivocal relationship between the image and its real 
world counterpart. In the 2005 novel Beyond Black, for instance, the mirror both 
sustains subjectivity and shatters its certainty. In the first section, which takes place in 
the dressing room of a theatre in an M4 corridor town, Alison the medium is applying 
her make up as she waits to be called for the eveningÕs show. Her spirit guide, the 
irrepressibly annoying Morris, is sitting in the corner moaning because Colette, 
AlisonÕs assistant, steps on him when she walks in (not being able to see him). 
AlisonÕs image in the mirror acts as a signifier for her bodily presence: she is large 
and fills the room, ÔWhen you came into a room sheÕd left Ñ her bedroom, her hotel 
 For Donald Winnicott in Playing and Reality (new edition) London: Routledge, 2005,  the mirror is 31
the motherÕs face. The gradual differentiation between what is ÔselfÕ and what is ÔotherÕ is based upon 
the childÕs use of the mother to act out his/her omnipotence, which for Winnnicott means that the child 
perceives the object at first to be something that is created by the infant, a Òsubjective objectÓ (112). 
What should happen in this pairing is that the baby looks at the mother and sees itself reflected back: 
thus the mother looks at the baby and Òwhat she looks like is related to what she sees thereÓ (112). It is 
only if this happens regularly enough (recall WinnicottÕs famous formulation, the Ògood enoughÓ 
mother) that the motherÕs face can be described as a mirror in any meaningful way at all. Yet, if this 
doesnÕt happen often enough, in consequence the baby will cast around to find themselves elsewhere 
in the environment. If the baby looks into the motherÕs face Òand it is unresponsive, then the mirror is 
a thing to be looked at but not to be looked intoÓ (113); and Òperception has taken the place of 
apperceptionÓ (112-3). The motherÕs role is to Ògive back to the baby the babyÕs own selfÓ (118): 
Winnicott likens this task to the analytic situation; that it is the therapistÕs job to give the patient back 
what he or she brings to him (117). 
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room, her dressing room backstage Ñ you felt her as a presence, a trailÕ (BB 3-4). 
This imprint of the physically imposing Alison persists even when she is on stage: 
Ôher face Ñ cheeks glowing, eyes alight Ñ seemed to float still in the dressing-room 
mirrorÕ (4). The mirror here shores up identity, allows it to be recognised as verifiably 
Alison; while the image of the image left behind in the mirror is both uncanny and 
reassuring. For AlisonÕs assistant, Colette, the mirror functions as reassurance of her 
existence: 
 In the centre of the room Colette stooped, picked up AlÕs shoes. For a moment she  
 disappeared from her own view. When her face bobbed back into sight in the mirror  
 she was almost relieved. WhatÕs wrong with me? she thought. When IÕm gone I leave 
 no trace (BB 4).  
The mirror fixes ColetteÕs idea of herself, allows her to exist although she doesnÕt 
leave a physical trace behind. The ÔalmostÕ relief she feels at seeing herself 
demonstrates the spectral power of the mirror in the selfÕs struggle for recognition: 
recognition is always somehow mis-recognition. The reversed image in the mirror is 
only ever an approximation to the real, never a faithful reproduction of ÔrealityÕ. For 
Mantel, the mirror structures, not reflects, ÔrealityÕ, exposing the reflection of the 
mirror as a distortion. 
 MantelÕs characters often look into mirrors; what they see there is rarely an 
uncomplicated reflection. In Beyond BlackÕs retrospective parts, for example, where 
Alison recalls her childhood, she shares a memory of being commanded to look in 
the mirror by her mother. She does so, and expecting to see herself, instead she sees 
Ôa man, with a check jacket on and a tie skew-whiff; a frowning man with a low 
hairline and a yellowish faceÕ (BB 109). This man is Morris, who becomes AlisonÕs 
spirit guide. The child AlisonÕs encounter with the mirror bears a resemblance to her 
(almost) name sake, Alice, who in Alice Through the Looking Glass conjures up 
another world by looking into the mirror. Alice calls this other world the ÔLooking-
!41
glass HouseÕ, admonishing the naughty kitten and threatening to put her into the 
world behind the mirror which is Ôjust the same as our drawing-room, only the things 
go the other wayÕ (127). The surface of the mirror ÔmeltsÕ, she finds herself inside 
this other world behind the glass: 
 LetÕs pretend the glass has got all soft like gauze, so that we can get through. Why,  
 itÕs turning into a sort of mist now, I declare! ItÕll be easy enough to get throughÑÕ  
 She was up on the chimney-piece while she said this, though she hardly knew how  
 she had got there. And certainly the glass was beginning to melt away, just like a   
 bright silvery mist (Alice 127-8) 
  
The Alice/Alison correspondence suggests the importance of childhood fantasy and 
the imaginationÕs power: from seeing someone or something in the mirror, to going 
through the mirror into the other world behind it: the reading of a mirror image 
throws up complications to the visual.  
 The spectral power of the mirror image creates reality.  In A Change of 
Climate (1994), the mirror is used in a different way but this also emphasises the 
distorted relationship between the mirror and its image. Anna and Ralph are a 
missionary couple who return to England with their family after a tragedy strikes 
them in Africa. While away, their twins are abducted and only one of the twins, Kit, 
survives. MantelÕs description of AnnaÕs frantic return with Kit, who she found in a 
ditch, Ôlike a woman breaking through sheets of glass, like a woman ploughing 
through mirrorsÕ (CC 241) evokes the mirror glassÕs power. The naming of the 
character Amy Glasse, who as RalphÕs mistress has an indirect effect on the familyÕs 
fate, shows how mirrors and glass in Mantel figure as complicated surfaces. The 
splintering of these surfaces suggests the disruption of sense; broken surfaces cannot 
reflect back true images, instead showing them as fractured. When Muriel has her 
baby in Every Day is MotherÕs Day (1986), Mantel describes her as Ôcrawling up the 
side of her glassy pyramid of painÕ (ED 172). The evocation of glass and mirrors 
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allows Mantel to play with what is reflected, what comes back; the Ôother worldÕ 
existing through the mirror encroaches on this world.  
 This encroachment occurs in Beyond Black, when the ghost of Princess Diana 
manifests in the hall mirror in Alison and ColetteÕs house: 
 She [Alison] turned away. At once Diana manifested: a blink in the hall mirror, a   
 twinkle. Within a moment she had become a definite pinkish glow. She was wearing  
 her wedding dress, and it hung on her nowÉShe had pinned some of her press   
 cuttings to her skirts; they lifted, in some other-worldly breeze, and flapped (213).  
The manifestation of the dead Princess in the text demonstrates the ironic inversion 
of the fairy tale: one of the women gets their prince in the end, but he turns out to be 
Morris. What this episode also demonstrates, however, is how Mantel uses mirrors to 
connect the public image to what we might call the self-image identity. Diana is a 
ghost, a returnee from the dead, but by introducing the press cuttings into her 
haunting, Mantel is making a wider point about the spectrality of the image. The 
image of Diana in the hall mirror, shows the mirror to be a mediator of another world, 
a portal which can be entered into another reality, just as Alice enters the inverted 
world of the ÔLooking Glass houseÕ. 
 A tool of the spectral, the mirror is open to distortion: a straight look into the 
mirror yields unexpected responses. The mirrorÕs reflection is open to perversion by 
mischievous spirits: the Ôdebased, ridiculous and filthyÕ spirits that populate Beyond 
Black, Ômake streaks and fingerprints on window panes. They cloud mirrors, and 
sometimes vanish with a chortleÉÕ (BB 270). These spirits cannot be trusted; the 
unsuspecting living Ôlook into the side of an aluminium pan and see a face thatÕs not 
[their] ownÕ (BB 268). What is meant to be perceptible and clear to the vision is 
ÔcloudedÕ, and thus Mantel plays with the distinctions between clarity and opacity, in 
Beyond Black in particular. The novel abounds with images of the opaque or 
translucent surfaces which ÔflashÕ and ÔblazeÕ, acting as gates or thresholds from this 
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visible world to its other, the invisible world. The Ôlucky opalsÕ that Alison wears on 
stage change, Ôflashing fireÕ; ÔglitteringÕ (12); ÔblazedÕ (27); Òshe blazed like a planet, 
the lucky opals her distant moonsÕ (35). Other translucent surfaces act as conduits for 
the dead, ÒShe picked up her glass and peered into the fizzing liquidÉ ÔI think 
thereÕs someone coming throughÕÓ (14). The crystal ball becomes dirty, no matter 
how much Colette tries to clean it (268), and inside there are Ôshifting cloud banks, as 
if it were making its own weatherÕ (356).  
 MantelÕs exploration of the tensions between opacity and clarity demonstrates 
a greater connection between her novels and short stories than what is traditionally 
meant by intertextuality. She redraws the narrative threads which are woven tightly, 
knotted together by certain words and images. So this spectral visuality means that 
seeing is obscured by the ghosts of the dead in Mantel, but also the Ôghosts of 
meaningÕ. The act of writing the story becomes cloudy, (to re-use MantelÕs phrase) 
like the opal jewellery Alison wears. This preoccupation with clarity and obscurity 
occurs also at the beginning of Giving Up The Ghost, where Mantel sets out her ideas 
about writing in reference to George OrwellÕs famous windowpane in ÒWhy I 
WriteÓ (Orwell 7). Clarity is desirable, but as MantelÕs fiction attests, being clear can 
become obscured by spectral forces. The challenging ÔvisionÕ of provisionality, that 
things are not what they may seem, is constantly called into question in MantelÕs 
work. DerridaÕs Spectres of Marx (1994) also deals with spectral visuality, and I will 
now consider how this text provokes a response from MantelÕs fiction.  
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Spectres of Marx, Spectres of Mantel 
The previous section investigated mirrors in MantelÕs work; their implications for her 
writing and the relation to the spectral. Here the question is posed, what happens 
when we look, not into a mirror, but at a ghost?  Beyond Black could be criticised 32
for its spiritsÕ banality, but this banality is in fact all the more horrible when one 
considers the domesticity of the setting, the way the ghosts invade AlisonÕs home and 
body. MantelÕs concern with the opacity of surfaces, mirrors, and reflections all 
emphasise the limits of seeing: what happens when the ÔrealÕ and the spectral meet. 
Derrida develops this idea of a liminal space between the real and spectral in Spectres 
of Marx. He begins by thinking about the spectre of communism, and Marx himself, 
and then homes in on the famous ghost in ShakespeareÕs play. The ghost is allegedly 
HamletÕs father, but the possibility arises that the ghost is a trick, designed to scare 
Hamlet or make him mad. Who can tell if it is really the dead King? What Derrida 
emphasises here is not our gaze directed toward the ghost, but its look at us; Ôthis 
spectral someone other looks at usÕ (Derrida Spectres 7), the ghostÕs terrifying look in 
our direction. Derrida calls this the visor effect: Ô[W]e do not see who looks at usÕ(7). 
 There is something here in Derrida about disguise, which speaks to MantelÕs 
work on the tensions between obscurity and clarity. If HamletÕs fatherÕs ghost is in 
actual fact not HamletÕs father Ñ what then? The ghost has to be seen to be believed, 
but what it is cannot be perceived by sight; being dressed in the late KingÕs armour is 
not enough proof for the economy of that sight. But the disguise is the logic of the 
spectral, if there is such a thing, because we do not and cannot ÔknowÕ or ÔrecogniseÕ 
the ghost in its singularity as ghost. The Ôspectral asymmetryÕ (7) that Derrida refers 
 Julian Wolfreys suggests that Ôto ÒseeÓ something is, however precariously, to initiate a process of 32
familiariaztion, of anthropomorphizing domesticationÕ (6) Victorian Hauntings: Spectrality, Gothic, 
the Uncanny and Literature. (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2002).
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to compounds this: if the ghost cannot be recognised, it is not the ghostÕs appearance 
to us that is at issue, but our appearance to the ghost. Our opening to the ghost as the 
ultimate other makes us vulnerable. Thus the ghost is more than a literary motif in 
Mantel; she uses it to explore the limits of being and the (im)possibility of 
representing ÔrealityÕ: what is ÔthereÕ, including the spectral, capturing the experience 
of ÔseeingÕ a ghost.  
 In Spectres of Marx, Derrida writes, ÔThe spectre was there (but what is the 
being- there of a spectre? what is the mode of presence of a spectre?Õ (38) These 
questions about being and the simultaneous particularity and ubiquity of the phantom 
resonate with MantelÕs work. What is the Ôbeing thereÕ of a spectre? How can it be 
said in any way to be? Both Derrida and Mantel are interested in how it is  possible to 
ÔseeÕ a ghost Ôbeing thereÕ? In what ways do we ÔknowÕ there is a ghost ÔpresentÕ? 
MantelÕs memoir Giving up the Ghost deals explicitly with this question. Published in 
2003 and set a few years earlier, the opening sections deal with Mantel and her 
partner selling their house, purported to be haunted with the ghost of her stepfather. 
Mantel describes how she sees him one morning: 
 About eleven oÕclock, I see a flickering on the staircase. The air is still; then it   
 moves. I raise my head. The air is still again. I know it is my stepfatherÕs ghost   
 coming  down. Or, to put it in a way acceptable to most people, I ÔknowÕ it is my   
 stepfatherÕs ghost. I am not perturbed. I am used to ÔseeingÕ things that arenÕt there.  
 Or Ð to put it in a way more acceptable to me Ð I am used to seeing things that ÔarenÕt 
 thereÕ (GUG 1).  
MantelÕs use of the word ÔseeÕ in this passage opens up the possibilities for reading 
her work provisionally. More than just intertextuality, provisional reading can explore 
the tensions between the look at the ghost, the mirror, and seeing the ghost. Mantel 
qualifies the seeing of her stepfatherÕs ghost using speech marks; ÔseeingÕ things that 
arenÕt there, seeing things that ÔarenÕt thereÕ.  MantelÕs use of speech marks shows 
how she holds the experience in contradiction: she holds a view of the alternatives, 
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neither has to be the accepted ÔversionÕ. She continues by describing how she has 
greeted her stepfather on the stairs, and how, ÔIt was in this house that I last saw my 
stepfather Jack, in the early months of 1995: alive, in his garments of human 
fleshÕ (GUG 1-2). The eerie effect of this sentence is then undercut by the breezy, 
impossibly light style of the next: ÔIt may be, of course, that the flicker against the 
banister was nothing more than the warning of a migraine attackÕ (GUG 2). Both 
notions remain ÔtrueÕ in MantelÕs work; there are limits to knowledge, and there are 
ways of explaining spiritual experience as individual illness or grief. Mantel defers 
any attempt to dichotomise these two positions, for each contains within it the 
possibility for the other, and each also makes problematic what the other can mean: 
there is no ÔseeingÕ without the ÔarenÕt thereÕ. Just as spectrality is implicated in 
being, for Derrida, Mantel shows how the spectral haunts her writing practice. 
 Take the semi-colon in the quoted passage, for instance. It functions as a 
marker of the moment, and its tension. Both full stop period and comma, it also 
marks a longer pause, a space in which meaning sleeps or is suspended. The semi-
colon is integral to MantelÕs writing, and here, it marks tension and time: ÔThe air is 
still; then it movesÕ (GUG 1). As a temporal marker, the semi-colon pinpoints the 
exact moment at which the air moves, the flickering comes into view, and the spectral 
can be perceived. It is a moment of revelation: the air turns from being still, just 
there, to something else which comes from some other world. It lasts a few seconds, 
and then ÔThe air is still againÕ (1). Seeing the flickering is, from the beginning, 
inextricably bound up with perception of movement. It is dynamic and attempts to 
capture its ÔuncanninessÕ will fail. The movement of the air that presages the 
stepfatherÕs ghost is perceived via sight, not head on, but as movement, a disturbance 
of the air. The effect of the short and matter-of-fact sentences is to create a sense of 
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certainty; this is what happened. And yet, the crucial interposition of bodily 
movement ÔI raise my headÕ shows that this phenomenon is not entirely real, nor 
entirely unreal, its origin unknown and yet felt and sensed; somehow anchored within 
the physicality of MantelÕs body being at that particular place and time. Again, the 
tension arises within the writing between what is moving, an active, sensed presence 
(the ÔflickeringÕ) and what is knowable through sense perception. The ghost remains 
elusive to attempts to fix its presence. The Ôflickering on the staircaseÕ is the spectral 
movement of an identifiable human being (who is at this moment not Ôin his 
garments of human fleshÕ) but also the spectral movement of MantelÕs writing, whose 
ÔflickerÕ moves in and between worlds, perceptible in certain ways and lights and 
imperceptible in others.  The next section will explore the connections between the 33
ghostÕs ÔflickerÕ, the blink, and the sideways glance. I will explore the issues that 
arise from the use of these powerful metaphors, beginning with the work of Esther 
Peeren on spectrality in Mantel.  
The sideways glance  
As Esther PeerenÕs 2014 study The Spectral Metaphor: Living Ghosts and the Agency 
of Invisibility asserts, the glance is distinct from the gaze, the Ômasterful, unitary and 
disembodied vision associated with realismÕ (Peeren 136). AlisonÕs Ôsideways glanceÕ 
is opposed to ColetteÕs straight ahead ÔgazeÕ in the novel so that Alison can Ôglance 
beyond what is given to visibility by the gazeÕ, as Peeren asserts (136). However, this 
opposition between Alison and ColetteÕs different Ôways of seeingÕ becomes troubled 
 As Christopher Prendergast writes in ÒDerridaÕs HamletÓ SubStance special issue, Jacques Derrida: 33
A Counter-Obituary no.106. Vol.34, no.1, 2005: (44-47), ÔThe spectre is a ÒThingÓ (ShakespeareÕs 
term) and yet not a thing, not a substance. It hovers uncertainly between material embodiment and 
disembodiment. It inhabits a space of pure virtuality, and what in that space is swallowed up is the 
ontological ground of Being itselfÕ (45). In other words, the spectre flickers.
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by spirits who donÕt stay in their proper place. For instance, when Colette returns to 
her ex-husband Gavin, she discovers a sock belonging Morris,  a strong suggestion 34
that the boundaries of physical matter are also subject to change, an altogether 
weirder prospect than the fleeting ghost that flickers and disappears. Peeren discusses 
AlisonÕs chance at Ôethical redemptionÕ through helping the vagrant Mart, suggesting 
that it is a failure: ÔMart is dead, while Alison settles back into her old, comforting 
routineÕ (Peeren 140). Peeren gives two related reasons for this failure: first, the 
distinction between ÔearthsideÕ and ÔairsideÕ is fixed, and thus AlisonÕs Ôsideways 
glance has been replaced by a straight gazeÕ (140). As we have already seen with 
MorrisÕs sock, however, the distinct boundaries between the spirit ÔrealmÕ ÔairsideÕ 
and ÔearthsideÕ are made porous; AlisonÕs chance to do a Ôgood actionÕ is ultimately 
taken out of her hands by Morris. He makes a threat to Alison, ÔI can take you over, 
you cheeky bitch. I can have you away airsideÕ (she counters with a snarly, Ôthat was 
when you was earthsideÕ) (BB 245). His threat towards Alison is empty; when it 
comes to Mart, however, he is able to exert sufficient pressure to force Mart to hang 
himself. As Alison tries to shield the punters from the Ôperfidy of the deadÕ (BB 153), 
so Mantel presents a version of the spirit world as Ôeternal afternoonÕ sometime in the 
Ô1950sÕ (BB 43). But ÔThat eventless realmÕ (BB 43) is not so eventless after all: the 
sanitised version of the spirit world presented to the reader is subverted by the 
violence of the fiends and MartÕs bringing over. There is an uneasy mingling of spirit 
and physical causality which the novel is continuously negotiating. The borders of 
 See PollardÕs ÔMind What Gap?Õ in which Mantel discusses this image (9)34
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the two realms are breached constantly in the narrative situation; breaches which go 
beyond a willing suspension of disbelief.  35
 As valuable as PeerenÕs reading is, it does not take account of the ways that 
MantelÕs language plays with the oppositions of living/dead, visible/invisible, real/
unreal. How the ghost is ÔseenÕ in MantelÕs work cannot be separated from the 
spectral power of the words she uses to describe the act of seeing. Consider AlisonÕs 
attempt to explain her ÔgiftÕ to Colette: 
Alison said there was a knack to seeing spirit. It was to do with glancing sideways, not 
turning your head: extending, Al said, your field of peripheral vision (BB 36) 
Esther Peeren rightly identifies the action of ÔglancingÕ in opposition to the gaze, 
exemplified by ColetteÕs customary way of looking (Peeren 136). Her reading, 
though, does not connect MantelÕs use of the word ÔglanceÕ and ÔsidewaysÕ, both of 
which are used continually throughout the novel, with their etymological relations the 
ÔwinkÕ and the ÔblinkÕ. I will read these words together, in order to explore some of 
the ÔuncanninessÕ of MantelÕs writing, an uncanniness which is threatened with being 
occulted by other readings of the novel. For the ghost, which straddles the boundary 
of presence and absence, different ways of seeing come into play.  
 To stay with Beyond Black; shortly after the death of Princess Diana, her 
spirit appears to Alison in the hall mirror:  
 She turned away. At once Diana manifested: a blink in the hall mirror, a twinkle.   
 Within a moment she had become a definite pinkish glow (BB 213). 
Chambers gives several entries for ÔblinkÕ: 1. To close both eyes momentarily; 2. To 
wink; 3. To glance, peep; 4. To look with the eyes half closed; 5. To look with 
amazement (at); 6. To shine unsteadily or intermittently. From the meanings given for 
 In ColeridgeÕs famous phrase from Biographia Literaria: Ô[I]t was agreed, that my endeavours 35
should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer 
from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these 
shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic 
faithÕ (6) From The Collected Works of S.T. Coleridge Volume 7. Ewell, James and W. Jackson Bate 
eds. London and Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983. 
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the word ÔblinkÕ it is possible to see the clear connections between the ÔblinkÕ of the 
spirit in the mirror and the glance which sees the ghost.  These words are all related 36
in different ways; for example, the origin of blink is blench, which the Oxford 
English Dictionary defines as, ÔTo start aside, so as to elude, to swerve, shy, to flinch, 
shrink, give wayÕ. To shrink or start back, as one might shrink back from the sight of 
a ghost. Not Alison; she remains calm in the face of what Mantel calls the Ôperfidy of 
the deadÕ (BB 153), determined not to disturb the punters with her knowledge. 
Moreover, the noun form of the word blench, means a Ôsideways lookÕ and appears in 
Shakespeare, most notably Sonnet 110: 
 Most true it is that I have looked on truth  
 Askance and strangely: but by all above, 
 These blenches gave my heart an other youth  
 Far from being separate words used to describe or present seeing, the blink 
and the sideways glance are intimately related through their etymology, having 
common ancestors in the word blench, which comes from the Old English blencan, to 
cheat or deceive. AlisonÕs ÔknackÕ of Ôseeing spiritÕ is also suggestive of deception, as 
the obsolete form of knack as Ôclever contrivanceÕ shows (Chambers).  The straight 37
look is interrupted and made unstable by the blink, which has etymological origins in 
deception. Stable ways of seeing and knowing ÔtruthÕ are put into question by 
MantelÕs writing of ghosts. What purports to be the Ôspirit worldÕ could always be a 
trick, as Hamlet is only too aware. Further, then: hauntology is the logic of the blink. 
The blink as it pulsates comes in and out of existence, traversing the boundaries of 
being, making knowledge uncanny. The blink is hauntology, the being ÔthereÕ, being 
 Nicholas Royle also employs metaphors and descriptors related to sight, in his text The Uncanny, 36
which suggests that the notion of Ôseeing a ghostÕ has important resonances in wider culture. For 
example, he refers to the blink at least twice, stating that the uncanny makes Ôgenre blinkÕ (19) and 
again in ÔNight WritingÕ, Ôthe darkness or blink of the madness of the day, of the eye on the clock-faceÕ 
(123).
 In light of AlisonÕs childhood memories, ÔknackÕ also has connotations of ÔknackerÕ a slang word 37
that can be used to mean both castrate and testicle. 
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Ônot thereÕ of the spectre: Derrida refers to this as the ÒlogicÓ of the spectre (Derrida 
Spectres 30).  
 The idea of deception, and what we know or see being put into question, 
resonates with aspects of fantasy that occur in Beyond Black.  Childhood fantasy 38
intrudes at another point, where blink re-occurs in a different form, as the ÔwinkÕ. 
Going back to the Alison/Alice connection made earlier, at this point in the novel the 
narrator is telling AlisonÕs childhood memories from AlisonÕs point of view. AlisonÕs 
recollection of her childhood centres on the ÔfiendsÕ who stayed with her mother, in 
her childhood home. AlisonÕs mother Emmy and the ill-fated Gloria are prostitutes: 
the inference being that Emmy has allowed Alison to be abused and/or sold to these 
men. Leaving aside questions of whether the men are ÔrealÕ ghosts or figments of the 
damaged AlisonÕs psyche for the moment (the novel leaves it ambiguous), the wink 
and its connection to eyes continues the emphasis on sight and knowledge, and 
disruptions to the straight look. One of the ÔfiendsÕ MacArthurÕs habit of winking at 
the young Alison in a lewd and knowing way is represented as a violent act of 
appropriation:  
 He [MacArthur] stares at her, suspicious. He says to her, your mam says you need a  
lesson. He puts out his hand, grabs her right nipple and twists it. She cries out.   
ThereÕs one, he says, do you want me to do the other side? He winks at her (BB 421).  
Whenever MacArthurÕs presence is invoked it is with mention of his eye, ÔMac with 
a patch over his eyeÕ for example (BB 211). In one sense, MacArthurÕs wink is a 
reminder to Alison of her powerlessness in the face of his masculinity and her 
motherÕs inability to protect her from abuse. The young Alison is said to have Ôpaid 
outÕ the fiends who have abused her by taking MacArthurÕs eye: an eye for an eye in 
a gruesome enactment of ancient Hammurabian justice. It is, however, an Òeye for an 
 Chapter four discusses fantasy more closely.38
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IÓ in the young AlisonÕs case, as she wrests back her ÔwillÕ and struggles to gain 
control over her self and her body. Alison calls upon Mrs McGibbet, a spirit from her 
childhood, to help her piece together what has happened: 
 [Mrs McGibbet is speaking]: And therefore I couldnÕt have noticed MacArthurÕs eye  
plop off a spoon and fall into a dish Ñ surely I mustÕve dreamt it, for such a thing  
could never be. And if your little self, no more than eight, nine, ten years old, were to  
have cried out, ÒNow wink at me, can you, you bloody bastard?Ó I wouldnÕt have  
known itÉ (BB 433) 
The eye becomes a displaced metonym for the ÔIÕ; the eyeÕs entrance into the story, 
minus its rightful owner, is a signal of its magical or talismanic nature. For instance, 
when the young Alison is walking home from school, she sees MacArthurÕs eye 
rolling down the street. It gets squashed underfoot by her friends who are oblivious to 
it, but regains its Ôperfect orbÕ shape and Ôcontinues to roll alongÕ (BB 434). 
 ÒMetaphor of the EyeÓ, Roland BarthesÕ commentary on Georges BatailleÕs 
Story of the Eye connects the image of the object with the surrealist practice of seeing 
language ÔaskewÕ or devoy. The flattened ÔrealÕ eye of MacArthur, which continues 
its journey undamaged, leads us into surrealist territory. The inclusion of such details 
into the story, of an object which ÔmigratesÕ (BarthesÕ word) into places it does not 
belong, for Ôother usages than seeingÕ (Barthes ÒMetaphorÓ 120) disrupts BarthesÕ 
distinction between novel, story and pure poetic form. But, thinking about what the 
eye does in Mantel, wink, blink and so on, suggests further reference back to the 
ÔblenchÕ, as a flinching, swerving or shying away. Just as BatailleÕs story is structured 
around an eye and its exploits, so these moments in Mantel occur where she stretches 
the metonymic chain of eyes and seeing to its limits. The orb of the eye and its 
indestructible shape folds in on itself again as a circle. This circularity is replicated 
and reproduced throughout Beyond Black, and also occurs in MantelÕs spectral 
imagining of historical agency in the short story ÒThe Assassination of Margaret 
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Thatcher.Ó In order to examine MantelÕs particular ways of representing sight, the 
following aspects are all relevant in how they make knowledge uncanny: the wink, 
glimpse, the sideways look, and the ÔtailÕ of the eye. Mantel uses the motif of Ôtail of 
the eyeÕ to denote partial or incomplete ways of seeing in her novels, ways of seeing 
which do not pretend to full presence. 
Tail of the eye  
The circularity of the metonymic chain is replicated elsewhere through MantelÕs use 
of another phrase, the Ôtail of the eyeÕ. According to Chambers dictionary, both Ôthe 
outer corner of the eyeÕ and Ôthe margin of the field of visionÕ. BrewerÕs Dictionary of 
Phrase and Fable turns up nothing for this odd phrase; why use tail, when corner of 
the eye means the same thing? It appears in Virginia WoolfÕs Orlando: Orlando Ôwas 
adding a line or two with enormous labour [to his poem], when a shadow crossed the 
tail of his eyeÕ (Orlando 80).  Looking out of the tail, or corner of the eye suggests a 39
link to peripheral vision that we can refer back to AlisonÕs ÔknackÕ of Ôseeing spiritÕ in 
Beyond Black: it involves being able to make the field of vision larger, to incorporate 
those things that do not appear to sight. Thus the expression Ôtail of the eyeÕ signals 
MantelÕs preoccupation with the opacity of perception and its necessary partiality.  
 The expression is used in slightly different ways in each novel: in A Change 
of Climate, for example, only the character Julian is said to see from the Ôtail of his 
eyeÕ (CC 133). This characterÕs reading problems prompt a sight test, Ôbut his sight 
was perfectÕ (CC 142). JulianÕs apparent peculiarities and difficulties with reading 
 MantelÕs engagement with Woolf is a rich topic that has been incompletely explored. I discuss Stella 39
BolakiÕs reading of MantelÕs hospital diary which makes specific reference to WoolfÕs On Being Ill in 
chapter four (Ryan and Bolaki eds.) See also Eileen PollardÕs fascinating paper which connects Woolf 
and Mantel using the figure of ÔinvaginationÕ (24). Pollard, Eileen. ÔÒBut at second sight the words 
seemed not so simpleÓ (Woolf 1929): Thickening and Rotting Hysteria in the Writing of Hilary Mantel 
and Virginia Woolf.Õ The Virginia Woolf Miscellany 80. (2011): 24-26.
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worry his parents, but in the novel his issues demonstrate his understanding Ôbeyond 
the range of normal visionÕ (CC 143). His Ôwariness of surfacesÕ (132) might suggest 
that this character has a privileged relation to insight or knowledge, that he is a 
visionary. The Ôtail of the eyeÕ occurs in A Change of Climate where apparent 
understanding is reached, or some insight obtained. Thus, not only about looking as a 
form of insight (an activity inextricably bound with knowing), the Ôtail of the eyeÕ 
and the sideways look become ways in which forms of knowledge are discovered. 
These different forms of knowledge cannot be perceived by looking head on in the 
usual way. ÔThe tail of the eyeÕ functions in a slightly different way in Bring up the 
Bodies, and to a lesser extent Wolf Hall, in that Mantel uses it to ÔstretchÕ 
perspectives, and include other points of view within the text, shifting the emphasis 
away from Thomas Cromwell momentarily, and onto a partial view of other 
characterÕs views of Cromwell. 
Wagstaffe and Shakespeare: the spectrality of the citation 
Wolfgang FunkÕs article ÒGhosts of Postmodernity: Spectral Epistemology and 
Haunting in Hilary MantelÕs Fludd and Beyond BlackÓ asserts Ôthe ghosts in MantelÕs 
novels are indeed spectres in a Derridean sense, challenges to the imagination, calling 
from a world beyond truth and realityÕ (Adiseshiah and Hildyard 157). Putting aside 
the wider implications of this statement for a moment, I will focus on the ÔcallÕ that 
Funk identifies as a communication from the ÔDerridean spectreÕ. What is this call, 
and who is it addressed to? To call as in to name, summon or request to be present: 
Mantel ÔcallsÕ ShakespeareÕs ghost, ÔsummoningÕ it in to Beyond Black, rousing it 
from sleep. The close association between ÔcallÕ, ÔciteÕ and ÔquoteÕ (Chambers) lends 
itself to thinking about ShakespeareÕs presence in the novel as a citation. We have 
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already, in the etymology of ÔwinkÕ, seen the spectral presence of the word ÔblenchÕ 
from sonnet 110, that haunts the novel. Mantel also ÔquotesÕ ShakespeareÕs plays: 
Richard II, Hamlet, The Merchant of Venice, with a nod to Othello.  Shakespeare is 40
there, but he is also not there. WagstaffeÕs presence demonstrates the workings of the 
spectre. 
 WagstaffeÕs absent presence demonstrates how haunting works in Mantel; in 
the fabric of the narrative he pops up intermittently, like a light blinking. He 
functions as a kind of literary joke: if all times are together in spirit, why not have 
Shakespeare and Ôbloody KydÕ knocking about in ÔpantaloonsÕ with low-grade 
twentieth century criminals in Aldershot? The names are the first clue, shake spear 
and wag staff, equivalent actions and appropriately phallic, considering the company 
he keeps in Morris. According to Anthony Holden in Shakespeare his Life and Work 
(1999), the names Shakespeare and Wagstaffe would have been markers of lewdness 
or disgrace among the people of sixteenth century England: 
 William Shakespeare of Stratford upon Avon was to bring lasting lustre to a surname  
 long held to be an embarrassment. In 1487, on becoming a celibate don at Merton  
 College, Oxford, one Hugh Shakespeare had changed his name to Hugh SawndersÉ 
 records the college register, ÔHe changed that name of his, because of its base   
 repute.Õ (5) 
 Wagstaffe mixes with the fiends, his pronouncements contrasting with and 
made ridiculous by their lewdness, such that the reader wonders why heÕs there. 
Mantel plays with the ÔstoryÕ of Shakespeare/Wagstaffe through MorrisÕ telling, 
making the reader unsure whether or not a trick is being played on them. The identity 
of the ghost is a tricky business; made doubly complicated by the contestation of 
identity that takes place over Shakespeare, even now. His different names in the 
novel (Shakespeare, Wagstaffe, Crankshaft) reflect this but also suggest a trickster 
 Nicholas Royle explores the ÔnodÕ in How to Read Shakespeare (2nd ed.) (London: Granta, 2014), p. 40
106 passim.
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archetype, a deliberate attempt to evade identification. No one knows quite what he is 
doing there, least of all himself, ÔOnly Wagstaffe seemed baffled to be thereÕ (BB 
207). This feeling of dis-jointedness comes through the snippets of plays that work 
their way onto the page. By ÔquotingÕ, Mantel disrupts time: if all times exist together 
in spirit, then why canÕt Shakespeare turn up here, in the late twentieth century? The 
time is well and truly out of joint Ñ this is what the ghost does. As Marjorie Garber 
states in her ShakespeareÕs Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny Causality: 
 The Ghost is Shakespeare. He is the one who comes as a revenant, belatedly instated, 
 regarded as originally authoritative, rather than retrospectively and retroactively   
 canonized, and deriving increased authority from this very instatement, over time  
 (Garber 176).  
MantelÕs production of ShakespeareÕs possible ghost subtly undoes this authority, as 
the ghost in its turn undoes the authority of the patriarch in Hamlet and in Beyond 
Black. Not only this, the revenant Shakespeare/Wagstaffe/Crankshaft throws reality 
into disarray by refusing to stay dead, representing a contamination of the narrative.  
Wagstaffe is a citation from outside the text that doesnÕt belong, rendering the 
distinction between inside and outside meaningless. The muddle is shown by the 
confusion his presence engenders: Alison rings Emmy to talk to her and get answers 
about the past, and Emmy mentions Wagstaffe: Ôhe [Morris] said Bill Wagstaffe owed 
him, I never could see how that was, but I suppose it was a bet on the horses and boys 
will be boysÕ (BB 424). Even the permanently drugged and drunk Emmy can see that 
thereÕs something going awry with historical causality;  the ghost as Ôuncanny 
causalityÕ in GarberÕs words. When the ÔfiendsÕ are discussing the hanging of Mart 
and Aitkenside is holding Morris to account, ÔYou failed to see he was her good 
deed,Õ Wagstaffe interjects, ÔA good deed in a naughty worldÕ (BB 444) an allusion to 
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PortiaÕs speech in Merchant of Venice Act 5 Scene 1.  Evicted by Aitkenside, Morris 41
is sobbing, and Wagstaffe pops up again when a handkerchief is requested, ÔAny 
handkerchief in particular?Õ (BB 445), an allusion to Othello. Colette interviews 
Alison, who recounts the incident with Morris in an English lesson at school ÔheÕd 
come in halfway through English and said oh, William bloody Shakespeare is it? 
Bloody Bill Wagstaffe, Bill Crankshaft, I know that cove, heÕs dead he is, or so he 
claims, and he owes me a fiverÕ (132). The quotation here behaves as a ghostly 
foreign body that insinuates itself into the text, exploding the distinctions between the 
text and reality, the living and the dead.   
 These distinctions continue to be eroded and played with throughout Beyond 
Black. In an excerpt from the tapes that Colette is compiling as a record of AlisonÕs 
life, Alison hears an unknown voice calling for respect, and a second unknown voice 
reciting excerpts from John of GauntÕs speech in ShakespeareÕs Richard II, Act 2 
Scene 1: Ôthis sceptred isleÉ this precious stone set in the silver seaÉÕ (BB 207). 
Aitkenside interjects, ÔOi oi oi oi! ItÕs Wagstaffe!Õ to which Morris asks Wagstaffe if 
heÕs Ômended the bloody hole in your bloody pantaloons, yet?Õ He gets no answer, as 
Wagstaffe says, ÔThereÕs rosemary, thatÕs for remembranceÕ, a line from OpheliaÕs 
speech in Hamlet, Act 4 Scene 5. Wagstaffe isnÕt engaging in dialogue, only 
interjecting seemingly random quotations into the text which sit alongside the fiendsÕ 
low humour, creating a comedic effect: 
 WAGSTAFFE: This sceptred isleÉ 
 MORRIS: My sceptredÑ 
 É 
 WAGSTAFFE: This other EdenÑ 
 MORRIS: My sceptred arse (BB 214-5).   
 That light we see is burning in my hall 41
How far that little candle throws his beams! 
So shines a good deed in a naughty world. (Merchant of Venice Act V: i (89-91)
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Sceptre is both a metonym for monarchic authority and a baton or staff carried to 
denote the bearerÕs power. To Wag the staffe is a disruption of authority in its very 
name and identity, the wag representing another sideways movement that disturbs. 
Transpose the c and p and sceptred becomes spectred; the seat of monarchical power 
made unstable by ghosts who donÕt play by the rules. WagstaffeÕs presence not only 
exposes the spectrality of the citation, but also contaminates power by disturbing its 
straight path with a wag; both movement side to side and a person who likes to joke. 
In ÔMind what Gap?Õ when asked about Morris, Mantel refers to masculinity and 
Ômen as a collective forceÉI realised as well that a lot of this goes back to 
Shakespeare and itÕs Nym and Bardolph and ancient PistolÉthey are marauding 
through my work in all sorts of guisesÕ (9, emphasis in original).  
 Goes back to Shakespeare, Mantel says: marauding Jacobean ÔfatherÕ, who 
pops up in the novel as Wagstaffe. Disrupting narrativity, his spectre-ness forces us to 
confront, as Derrida says in relation to Marxism, Ô[t]he question of life, spirit, or the 
spectral, of life-death beyond the opposition between life and deathÕ (Derrida 
Spectres 67). The paradox being that life can only be approached through 
apprehension of death; through the spectre whose existence is in question and who 
blinks in and out of the novel. The spectre causes Mantel to pause in Giving up the 
Ghost; on the stairs, suspended between two choices, up or down. Spectre holds a 
jumbled ÔstepÕ, containing within it the mis-step of inheritance disrupted. Go back to 
that quintessential spectre, HamletÕs father, who haunts Hamlet just as Henry 
(MantelÕs ÔrealÕ father) haunts Hilary. HamletÕs fatherÕs brother is also his step-dad. 
The spectre makes weird things happen to relationships and families, a trope which 
recurs in MantelÕs novel Beyond Black. Alison gains the trust of Colette by telling her 
the truth about her family, that the man she thinks is her uncle is in fact her father; the 
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man she thinks is her father is nobody to her, no blood relation. ColetteÕs reaction to 
this information is not one of horror, or particular surprise; ÔNot surprising her aunts 
were always exchanging glances, and saying things like, I wonder where Colette gets 
her hair from, I wonder where she gets her brains?Õ (87)  
 The next section will consider the idea of inheritance in spectrality in a 
slightly different way, by thinking about Mantel as part of a visionary tradition. 
Spectrality of the image I: Wordsworth, Hardy and Mantel as Visionaries 
    Though absent long, 
 These forms of beauty have not been to me, 
 As is a landscape to a blind manÕs eye:  
 But aft, in lonely rooms, and mid the din 
 Of towns and cities, I have owed to them, 
 In hours of weariness, sensations sweet, 
 Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart, 
 And passing even into my purer mind 
 With tranquil restoration:É (lines 23 -31) 
This excerpt from WordsworthÕs ÔTintern AbbeyÕ makes the visual strange. The Ôblind 
manÕsÕ uncanny eye, his inner eye of imagination opens up the spectral feeling of 
perception and its ability to stay with the narrative voice of the poem. The world is 
something that can be apprehended, yet, much like FreudÕs uncanny, its strangeness 
cannot be explained through intellect alone. There is perception which supersedes 
sight: ÔIn which the heavy and the weary weight / Of all this unintelligible world / Is 
lightenedÉÕ (lines 40-2). The act of conjuring up an image from memory acts as a 
tonic, or balm. For Wordsworth, the human soul and body are nourished by the power 
of ÔnatureÕ, the Ôwild green landscapeÕ, the Ôpastoral farmsÕ and these memories 
which he sees in his mindÕs eye, help to ease the stress and strain of everyday 
existence which wearies and picks at the human sensibility.  
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 For Wordsworth then, the images are clear to him, the ÔÉforms of beauty 
have not been to me, / As is a landscape to a blind manÕs eyeÕ(emphasis added). 
Although away from the physical scene, the poet mentally ÔseesÕ the landscape; this 
is not an imaginative act, or an approximation as it would be if the protagonist were 
blind, and had never actually seen the sights he is referring to. There is something 
here about the image that Wordsworth is able to retain in his mind: a spectral quality, 
the sensation of an imprint. The experience of seeing a ghost transforms in some way, 
leaves a mark. This notion of the spectral quality of the image is confirmed when he 
goes on to describe the pleasure that accrues within his body, ÔFelt in the blood, and 
felt along the heart, / And passing even into my purer mindÉÕ. There is a deep and 
uncanny sense of a return here, which is not an act of imagination but almost a 
conjuring, a summoning up of deep forces to restore his spirit. The spectral quality 
here is not about a revenant, a dead person, but the ghostliness of the image and the 
effect it has upon the feeling, the sense, the deep, hidden, invisible aspects that poetry 
attempts to bring to light, to the world of the seen. The Ôpurer mindÕ enables us to 
Ôsee into the life of thingsÕ, to apprehend the real beneath the surface of the visual: to 
put it another way, to peer into the ambiguous realm of the spectre. 
      As Tim Armstrong writes, referring to Thomas HardyÕs poem ÔThe House of 
SilenceÕ, ÔÉthe poet is he who conjures up a scene of ghostsÕ (Armstrong 51). This 
conjuring is key to understanding MantelÕs spectral allegiances, the shadows and 
spirits that populate her novels. First, however, it is worth going by Hardy, to see if 
his notion of ÔÉthe visioning powers of souls who dare / To pierce the material 
screenÕ can offer us a way of thinking about Mantel, as a part of (and in excess of), a 
ÔvisionaryÕ tradition. HardyÕs poem ÔThe House of SilenceÕ is a conversation between 
a child, and an unnamed, presumably adult interlocutor. The child has remarked on 
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how ÔquietÕ the house is, Ôin the trees with the shady lawnÕ; to be told that the house 
is not a quiet place at all, it is actually the dwelling of a ÔphantomÕ, and Ôa brain spins 
there till dawnÕ. This is a surprising inversion of the cultural commonplace of the 
child visionary, who instructs the rational adult to look beyond the surface of the 
thing. When the child again says, ÔÒ But I see nobody there, - / Nobody moves about 
the greenÉ,ÓÕ the adult replies, ÔÒ Ñ Ah, thatÕs because you do not bear / The 
visioning powers of souls who dare / To pierce the material screenÕ (emphasis 
added). In these lines the reasons for the inversion of roles becomes clear, as the adult 
has powers that allow him access to an ÔotherÕ world. Being able to apprehend the 
ÔrealÕ that lies beneath the optical surface of the thing is a burden  that he/she has to 
ÔbearÕ. The power of vision that entails looking and seeing beyond the surface of 
things requires courage, as well as being a burden on the one who takes up this path.  
Hardy also taps into what might be called the spectral paradox here, in his repetition 
of ÔnobodyÕ in lines seven and eight: the ÔphantomÕ that ÔabidesÕ there is a nothing, a 
space or gap where a material body might be. As the poem progresses, the voice of 
the poem describes the rich vision that he/she perceives beyond the surface reality 
that the child can Ôsee,Õ evoking a scene of Ômusic and laughter like floods of lightÕ 
where Ôfigures dance to a mind with sightÕ (16-17). The idea of a mind with sight 
connects directly to ÔTintern AbbeyÕ, as for Wordsworth, for Hardy it is precisely the 
Ômind with sightÕ that offers a balm to the weariness of the world. Unlike the blind 
man, who has to make it up, the poet recalls with sharpness and accuracy; the 
resulting image is a spectral entity, with bodily effects, and a direct link to the Ôpurer 
mindÕ of the poet. The life of feeling that lies beneath/behind the ÔrealÕ can be 
apprehended by sight, in flashes, blinks that come and go. 
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 Catherine Maxwell quotes Hardy writing about reality in a letter dated 13 
February 1887: Ôthe material is not the real - only the visible, the real being invisible 
opticallyÉit is because we are in a sonambulistic hallucination that we think the real 
to be what we see as realÕ. Maxwell goes on to summarise, 
The imaginatively contemplative mind, a mind which naturally expresses itself in 
poetry, sees as ÔrealÕ what is normally regarded as metaphysical, abstract, 
supernatural, or unconscious. If material things can have a supernatural aspect, then 
they vary only in degree and not in kind from those spectres and visions more 
generally regarded as supernaturalÉ(Maxwell 205) 
Maxwell is acknowledging a greater truth about the visionary capacities of the writer, 
and not only this, but also the way that the writer understands the porosity of the 
boundary between ÔrealÕ and ÔunrealÕ, between ÔmaterialÕ and ethereal, concrete and 
psychic. The spectral haunts, this is its banal truth, but if this is true, then everyday 
existence is also imbued with the spectral. One must look closely enough, and in the 
right way, in order to apprehend the strangeness that dwells within things.  
 Mantel also makes use of this spectral logic in Giving up the Ghost: her 
stepfatherÕs ghost does not take up space in the physical realm, but she ÔseesÕ he is 
ÔthereÕ all the same. There are startling similarities between both these poets and 
Mantel in the representation of the ghostly, and how the ghostly connects to writing. 
MantelÕs evocation of the figure carrying bundles at the end of Giving up the Ghost 
directly links to the pastoral settings of the poetic visionaries in both ÔTintern AbbeyÕ 
and ÔThe House of SilenceÕ. She describes the sale of Owl Cottage, the house that has 
a ghost in it, and the new house where herself and her husband and their army of 
ghostly unborn children now reside, depicting how 
Sometimes, at dawn or at dusk, I pick out from the gloom - I think I do -  a certain 
figure, traversing those rutted fields in a hushed and pearly light, picking a way 
among the treacherous rivulets and the concealed ditches. It is a figure shrouded in a 
cloak, bearing certain bulky objects wrapped in oilcloth, irregular in shape: not 
heavy but awkward to carry (252).  
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MantelÕs figure Ôshrouded in a  cloakÕ has a metaphorical connection to the Ôfunereal 
shadesÕ of the poetÕs bower in HardyÕs poem. Likewise, the figure is also Ôbearing 
certain bulky objectsÕ, recalling directly both the burden of visioning powers in 
HardyÕs poem and the ÔburthenÕ of WordsworthÕs protagonist in ÒTintern AbbeyÓÑ 
ÔÉthe burthen of the mystery, / In which the heavy and the weary weight / Of all this 
unintelligible world / Is lightenedÉ (39-42). The ÒvisionaryÓ, for all these writers, 
bears this load, for he/she alone is able to interpret the Ôunintelligible worldÕ, to make 
sense of its ÔmysteryÕ. Hardy is concerned with the ÔrealÕ, and how it differs from 
what is commonly taken to be reality. To return to Catherine Maxwell, she writes thus 
on ÔThe House of SilenceÕ: 
Éwe find out that the house of the title, which seems to the observing child Ôa quiet 
placeÕ, but is said to teem with phantasmal life, is actually Ôa poetÕs bowerÕ, the 
implication being that the poet is one who has ÔThe visioning powers of those who 
dare / To pierce the material screenÕ, but also that the phantoms are of his perception 
and creationÉThe Ôghost spaceÕ of the house is here directly linked to the ghost 
space of poetry writingÉ (Maxwell. Second Sight. Manchester UP: Manchester, 
2008, 216). 
 MaxwellÕs exegesis shows how Hardy symbolises the poetÕs ability to delve into 
things as they Ôreally areÕ by representing a house in which a Ôbrain spins until 
dawnÕ (presumably the poetÕs brain). Again, what connects Hardy with Mantel is the 
physicality of that same Ôphantasmal lifeÕ and its dynamism. There is a contrast 
between the ÔuncannyÕ and Ôfunereal shadesÕ of the ÔpoetÕs bowerÕ and the life 
contained within it, where ÔFigures dance to a mind with sight, / And music and 
laughter like floods of light / Make all the precincts gleamÕ. The dynamism of this 
description exposes spectral logic at work, the strange crossings and re-crossings that 
occur across the boundaries of the mental and physical. Mantel imagines this 
boundary continually, and the physicality of the packages she describes in the above 
passage demonstrate this. Their awkwardness is a testament, perhaps, to the 
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incompatibility of life and art, but there is also something here about being a woman 
who writes, as well as an evocation of a primeval time, with its ÔoilclothÕ wrappings 
and cloaks. The hesitation in the words ÔI think I doÕ is MantelÕs provisional stance, 
which is never stronger than when she is writing about spectres, perception and what 
constitutes the ÔrealÕ. By drawing a direct link here between Wordsworth, Hardy, and 
Mantel, I am arguing that the provisional aspect of MantelÕs writing includes her 
ÔvisionÕ. When the Ôvisioning powersÕ of the poet are taken up by Mantel in her 
fiction, as spectral presences which Ôsee into the heart of thingsÕ (in WordsworthÕs 
words), the world of everyday appearance is made strange and uncanny. Mantel does 
what Hardy claims poets must do: Ôpierce the material screenÕ. 
Spectrality of the image II: ÔThe Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÕ 
There is a famous photograph of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 on the steps of 10 
Downing Street. Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister 1979-1990; the first 
woman to hold the office. The blue suit jacket, tempered by the schoolgirl softness of 
the pleated skirt, hints at the woman beneath the Iron Lady. She seems to have been 
reviled and adored equally. YouÕve heard the sayings Ñ her cabinet calling her 
ÔmummyÕ, for example Ñ the politicians who had a crush on her. Her right arm is 
held aloft, straight up, palm open; her left clutches what would become her 
trademark, the handbag. Spitting Image loved the handbag; I faintly recall her 
grotesque puppet hitting fellow puppets Geoffrey Howe and Douglas Hurd with it, a 
strange inversion of the Punch and Judy show. But actually, when I chase the 
reference it is even better than my hallucination Ñ sheÕs presiding over her cabinet 
like a school maÕam, hitting them with rulers, Ôspeak up Geoffrey IÕm sure the whole 
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cabinet would like to hear itÕ.  Perhaps we ought to feel sorry for her, caught in a 42
gender double bind. She can only ever play the roles ascribed to women who take too 
much power Ñ brusque primary school teacher, public school Matron. She is either 
pilloried for Ôout-manningÕ the men, or for her Ôfake femininityÕ as MantelÕs narrator 
categorises it (AMT 220). 
 The story takes place in August 1983, when the Prime Minister is in Windsor, 
recovering from an eye operation. The unnamed narrator, who is expecting a 
plumber, lets a would-be assassin into her flat, which overlooks the hospital grounds. 
The narrator and assassin co-exist in an uneasy truce-like state; the narrator hates 
Thatcher as much as he does, and will do nothing to stop him. In fact, she offers to 
help the assassin by showing him the fire door between the flats which represents the 
possibility of him emerging from another flat a bit further down the street and getting 
away. 
 Mantel conjures the spectre of Margaret Thatcher back from the dead, 
resurrecting her in order to kill her again. To conjure, meaning to call on or summon; 
to perform a magic trick by sleight of hand. Thatcher exists in this story as surface, 
spectral image, down to the Ôpussy cat bowÕ and Ôthe glittering helmet of hairÕ (AMT 
242). Mantel does both of these, exploding the distinctions between the inside and the 
outside of the story; the image of Thatcher that she evokes is the image of Thatcher 
reproduced an infinite number of times, hated and adored. The aforementioned 
Ôpussy cat bowÕ and Ôglittering helmet of hairÕ; the heels, bag, Ôtailored suitÕ (AMT 
242), all exist in the actual and the imagination, such that she isnÕt dead, not really. 
Thatcher is alive, living on in a neoliberal ideology which Ôworships the richÕ (AMT 
 ÒSpitting ImageÓ TV. Series 1 Ep.3 (1984) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jINZBOxdja8 42
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220) and places profit above the social good. Derrida identifies the jubilation in this 
right-ward march, writing: 
 This dominating discourse often has the manic, jubilatory, and incantatory form that  
 Freud assigned to the so-called triumphant phase of mourning work. The incantation  
 repeats and ritualizes itself, it holds forth and holds to formulas, like any animistic  
 magic. To the rhythm of a cadenced march, it proclaims: Marx is dead, communism  
 is dead, very dead, and along with it its hopes, its discourses, its theories and its   
 practices. It says: long live capitalism, long live the market, hereÕs to the survival of  
 economic and political liberalism! (Derrida Spectres 64) 
But what he also identifies here is the magical basis of the thought, the ÔincantationÕ 
that is used to create and sustain this power. Mantel takes this power and subverts it: 
the telling conjures up the image of Thatcher, her legacy, but also creates a spectral 
moment in history. The spectral moment is a religious ceremony in which Thatcher 
can be ritually killed; Ôonce more I am reminded of something priestlyÕ thinks the 
narrator about the assassin. She is Ôa sacrificeÕ (AMT 241). Her fantasied death 
functions as an expiation of the sins of the Ôdominating discourseÕ, a shot in the arm 
for the resistance.  
 Perhaps we are getting ahead of ourselves, but the point remains: ÒThe 
Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÓ is not just a story. There is no such thing as just 
a story. Those who say, ÔitÕs just a storyÕ are more wrong in their assessments than 
those who pilloried Mantel and called for the police to investigate. At least those 
people understand the story's power. All those who rejoiced at ThatcherÕs death miss 
the point as spectacularly as those who called for the police to investigate Mantel. 
Matters of verifiable record: Mantel lived close to where the Prime Minister had her 
eyes operated on (more on eyes later) in 1983. She says she Ôdetested herÕ. Mantel is 
interested in symbols, we have already established, and particularly symbols of 
nation building and power. In this story she draws together Empire, the Union flag, 
the Army, the government and the Queen. All these symbols are presented apart from 
the everyday yet intrinsically linked with it: 
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 The Holy trinity church, islanded, is hung with garrison flags. Looking from a high  
 window over the town (as I did that day of the killing) you feel the close presence of  
 fortress and castle. Glance to your left, and the Round Tower looms into view,   
 pressing itself against the panes. (AMT 208) 
 The narrator belongs to the ÔbourgeoisieÕ (AMT 226): Perrier water, chat 
about plumbers, the Ôglass of warm white wine in the Arts centreÕ. She resides 
comfortably within south-east England, in which Ôall causes are the same, all ideas 
for which a person might care to dieÉare nuisances, a breach of the peace, and likely 
to hold up the traffic or delay the trainsÕ (AMT 223). Within this suburban 
description, MantelÕs irony hints at the shadow of Thatcherite policies: ÔIn the early 
1980s, England has not succumbed to the smell of burning. The carbonised reek of 
the weekend barbecue was unknownÉÕ (AMT 209). MantelÕs gentle mocking of 
suburban life hides the darker side of monetarism and the shadow of Thatcherism: 
economic policies that laid waste to whole communities in the North, leading to the 
subsequent demonisation of the working class. While Thatcher is having her minor 
operation in a Windsor hospital, insulated from the damage she has caused, parts of 
the country had Ôsuccumbed to the smell of burningÕ, in the race riots of London, 
Leeds and Liverpool.   43
 Mantel employs markers of memory and resistance in this story which place it 
in a specific moment in historical discourse, while at the same time playing with the 
idea of tradition: Ôname an Irish martyr, go on, you canÕt can youÕ(AMT 231). ÔItÕs 
about Ireland. Only Ireland, right?Õ the assassin tells the narrator, citing vengeance for 
the hunger strikers as his motivation. ÔYouÕre no nearer the old country than I am,Õ 
the narrator retorts, to which the assassin replies, ÔI was brought up in a 
traditionÉ.And look, it brings us hereÕ (AMT 229). The narrator thinks, Ônot that my 
 For an authoritative socio-historical account of the Ôrace riotsÕ see Paul GilroyÕs 1987 study of race 43
in Britain, There ainÕt no black in the Union Jack (Revised ed for Routledge Classics) London: 
Routledge, 2002.
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visitor had named his affiliation, but I had spoken it aloud in my mindÕ (AMT 227). 
Later she wonders if he is IRA after all:  Ôhe may not be a ProvisionalÕ (AMT 229).  44
The assassin is a Provisional, regardless of his ÔaffiliationsÕ, due to his relation to 
history, and the event. As a disruptor of ÔprogressÕ who can slow time down, he exists 
outside of time.  
The event 
Having tricked his way into the narratorÕs flat, the assassin studies his watch: ÔHe 
kept looking at his watch, though he said he had no certain time. Once he rubbed its 
face with his palm, as if it might be fogged and concealing a different time 
underneathÕ (AMT 219). The assassin has Ôno certain timeÕ in that he will wait for the 
right moment. But he also has no certain time, as he does not belong to time. Even 
the moment exists outside of time; if there is all the time in the world, time ceases to 
have meaning. To have all the time one could need removes the boundedness of the 
real, and without any time, the story becomes impossible to tell. By emphasising the 
inevitability of the shooting, Ônow that we are here at lastÕ (AMT 242), Mantel takes 
the story out of history and into the realms of pure event, the event that shatters time.  
 The moment in which all this takes place is out of time, not in the sense of 
Òrunning out of timeÓ, but is somehow physically displaced. The decision has been 
made, the finger resting on the trigger, the hands steady and the eye engaged; Mantel 
writes of that moment, and ThatcherÕs ÔtoddleÕ towards it. (ÔSheÕs making efforts, but 
getting nowhere very fastÕ 242) The narrator foresees the suit, the assassin focuses his 
eye on the foresight of the gun. The barrel of the gun letting out Ôone easy wink of the 
 For a brief overview of the Provisional IRA see Tim Pat Coogan The IRA (Palgrave: London, 2002). 44
For an alternative and more in-depth view, see Tommy McKearneyÕs The Provisional IRA (2011). 
McKearney emphasises both the civil rights basis for dissent in Northern Ireland, and the oppressive 
nature of Westminster attitudes towards the Catholic minority.
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worldÕs blind eyeÕ. ÔForesightÕ connects the event with MantelÕs unique ways of 
writing about the visual, tapping into the obsolete meaning of provide, Ôto make 
ready beforehandÕ or Ôprepare for future useÕ. Contained within the visual are 
references to sight, blindness and therefore justice.  
 In order to explore the idea of blind justice, Mantel evokes the image of the 
hunger strikers; their poor treatment at the hands of the British government and their 
subsequent martyrdom: 
 WhatÕs a dozen Irishmen to them? WhatÕs a hundred? All those people, theyÕre   
 capital punishers. They pretend to be modern, but leave them to themselves and   
 theyÕd gouge eyes out in the public squares. (AMT 231) 
The narrator remarks of the hunger strikers, ÔThey may have been blind at the end, 
but their eyes were open when they went into itÕ (230). To have the eyes open is to 
understand; lack of knowledge is denoted by blindness. When Margaret Thatcher 
finally leaves the hospital her eyes are covered, not with bandages, but with Ôbig 
goggle glasses. Shading her, no doubt, from the trials of the afternoon.Õ (242). The 
narrator asks, ÔWill they have to lead her? Will her eyes be bandaged?Õ (232), 
conjuring up a picture of the prime minister helpless and blinded. After all, she is 
protected from the ÔtrialsÕ of the afternoon by being subjected to summary justice; 
executed by the assassin. The Ôbandaged eyesÕ foreshadow her eyes ÔshieldedÕ by 
dark-glasses, and thus the monstrous image of Ôeyes being gouged out in the public 
squaresÕ (231) surfaces metonymically. MantelÕs reference to summary justice, to 
punishment being meted out on the body of the perpetrator conjures the power of Ôan 
eye for an eyeÕ. The act of blinding evokes the Oedipal story in which metaphorical 
blindness or the refusal to know (at least to acknowledge what you already ÔknowÕ) is 
punished by the putting out of OedipusÕ eyes, while the blind Tiresias displays 
wisdom and understanding. Eyes stand in for the question of knowledge, in this short 
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story. The would-be assassin remarks, ÔIÕm here for your sightlines. I donÕt care about 
your affinitiesÕ (AMT 222). Justice wears a blindfold. Christopher Prendergast, in his 
ÒDerridaÕs HamletÓ, describes the consequence of Ôseeking to establish justice by 
reference to a final solutionÕ as a Ôreign of tyranny.Õ He continues: 
 At both ends of the temporal chain, the political intervenes to impose a form of   
 self-legitimating closure, called the Just, whereas Derrida wants to break that chain  
 in the name of time as permanently and incorrigibly out of joint, disjointed,   
 disadjusted, off its hinges, or if you prefer, spectralized, offering no site for the   
 embodied manifestation of the Just. (Prendergast 47) 
Mantel presents a textual chain of gruesome associations which disrupt any 
opposition between ÔseeingÕ and ÔblindnessÕ. What she seems to recognise is the 
futility of the ÔembodiedÕ in the struggle for justice, suggested by allusions to 
hanging, eye-gouging, and blindness as a punishment.  
 Ultimately, the ÔworldÕs blind eyeÕ is impervious to humanity. ÔWhat happens, 
happens all the sameÕ states medium Alison in Beyond Black (91). The glimpse of 
uncanny causality in Wagstaffe continues in MantelÕs telling of the AlisonÕs fore-
knowledge of Princess DianaÕs death. Alison wakes Colette up, sometime in August 
to tell her that Princess Diana is dead, although it emerges that the Princess isnÕt 
actually dead yet:  
         ÔIÕm sure it will be clearer,Õ Al said, Ôwhen it actually happens.Õ 
          ÔWhat do you mean? You mean it hasnÕt happened yet? Colette ran a hand through 
 her hair, and it stood up, a pale fuzzy halo. ÔAl, we must do something!Õ 
          ÔLike?Õ  
          ÔWarn somebody! Call the police! Telephone the Queen?Õ 
          Al raised a hand. ÔQuiet, please. SheÕs getting in the car. SheÕs putting on her   
 seatbelt Ñno, no she isnÕt. TheyÕre larking about. Not a care in the world. Why are  
 they going that way? Dear, dear, theyÕre all over the road!Õ (145).  
Alison is an observer, God-like in her view but powerless to stop Ôwhat happensÕ:  
 She looked without surprise as the Twin Towers crumbled, as the burning bodies   
 plunged through the air. Alison watched till the news looped itself around again and  
 again and the same pictures were played. Then she left the room without comment.  
 You feel as if you should say something, but you donÕt know what it is. You canÕt say 
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 you foresaw it; yet you canÕt say no one foresaw it. The whole world has drawn this  
 card. (255)    45
Unlike the assassin in ÒThe Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÓ, whose presence 
disrupts causality and takes the event out of time, Alison is a bystander. A bystander 
who knows, but is unable to have any effect on events. AlisonÕs ability to foresee, her 
ÔknackÕ, is of little use when it comes to action. The assassin, however, not only 
tricks the narrator into opening her front door by sleight of hand, but has the door to 
the other flat at his disposal. The narratorÕs suggested move sideways or swerve of 
leaving the flat via another door connects to the origins of trick in blencan, the 
swerve ÔWhat if I could buy you a moment?Õ (AMT 234): suggesting that he could go 
out of another flat and Ôwalk out like a boiler man, the way you came inÉÕ (234). 
The assassin thus has a chance to influence events without personal danger. The 
narrator leads the assassin through the liminal space between the households: 
 Neither in nor out of the house, visible but not seen, you could lurk here for an hour  
 undisturbed, you could loiter for a day. You could sleep here, you could dream.   
 Neither  innocent or guilty, you could skulk here for decades, while the aldermanÕs  
 daughter grows old: between step and step, grow old yourself, slip the noose of your  
 name. One day Trinity Place will fall down, in a puff of plaster and powdered bone.  
 Time will draw to a zero point, a dot: angels will pick through the ruins, kicking up  
 the petals from the gutters, arms wrapped in tattered flags. (236) 
The door is the threshold through which people pass, a door to another place. As the 
switch in vocabulary suggests, this in-between space is another time and another 
history; ÔÉyou could skulk here for decades, while the aldermanÕs daughter grows 
oldÉ.Õ  What Mantel describes as the Ôzero pointÕ of time connects the space 46
between the two flats to the moment of the killing: the elliptical hole of the Ò0Ó 
depicting the shape of the eye at the point of its ÔwinkÕ, almost too quick to catch. 
Stepping through the door, the marker of provisional space, means a step out of time 
 In a painful reminder of the spectrality of history, its repetitions and strange coincidences, as IÕm 45
writing this about causality the Grenfell tower disaster happens. 
 The significance of the Anglo Saxon ÔaldermanÕ in the context of a story which is at least in part 46
about the struggle of Irish republicanism. 
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into the logic of the moment and its momentariness, also suggesting the circularity of 
history and its painful repetitions 
 This Ôzero pointÕ recurs in Beyond Black as the ÔloopÕ which figures history as 
both cyclical and concurrent to itself, all happening at once. Alison ÔreadsÕ ColetteÕs 
return to Gavin in a tarot spread and seems to predict it, ÔWheel of Fortune, 
reversedÉ.The Chariot, reversed. IÕm not sure I like to think of wheels turning 
backwardsÉÕ (BB 232). The wheel of fortune figures in this novel as a reminder of 
fate; luck; redemption and justice. At the beginning of the novel, ÔIt is a time to let go 
of expectation, yet not abandon hope; to anticipate the turn of the Wheel of Fortune. 
This is our life and we have to lead it. Think of the alternativeÕ (2). Connecting also 
with the Ôzero pointÕ and the loop, this novel has its own Ôblind eyeÕ, the M25.   
Functioning as a loop, the novel begins with the drabness of the orbital road and ends 
with it too: a loop within a loop. While travelling around the M25, AlisonÕs body also 
contains the M25, its vastness and bleakness inside her, not just as an echo but as 
manifestation, ÔThe car flees across the junctions and the space the road encloses is 
the space inside her: the arena of combat, the wasteland, the place of civil strife 
behind her ribsÕ (BB 2). The ÔwastelandÕ inside Alison, a medium travelling the M25 
for work, maps in physical space the lacuna in the circle, the nothing at the centre 
typified by the letter o. She is enclosed by the road, enclosed by the liminal space of 
the outer limits of the suburbs, the ÔrejectsÕ and ÔanomaliesÕ of which she is one 
herself, the orbital ÔoÕ, the space inside it a blank or nothingness.  The loop offers a 47
 Catherine Spooner, in ÔÒ[T]hat Eventless Realm:Ó Hilary MantelÕs Beyond Black and the Ghosts of 47
the M25Õ suggests that MantelÕs Ôvision of the M25Õ is Ôa comic and partially affirmative one that 
accommodates the domestic, interior, and privateÕ (80-1). She comes at the issue of AlisonÕs body and 
ghosts from a different angle, arguing that ÔInner and outer space are impenetrable, AlisonÕs ghosts 
manifesting physically in the landscape she inhabitsÕ (83). In London Gothic: Place, Space and the 
Gothic Imagination. Lawrence Phillips and Anne Witchard eds. London and New York: Continuum, 
2010.  
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double figuration of that space, recurring almost constantly throughout the novel. As 
Colette helps Alison by hanging her clothes, she Ôlooped the black skirt onto a 
hangerÕ(BB 4); she is in charge of the stage dressing and has to drape a piece of 
material that Alison calls her ÔsilkÕ, just so ÔAt first sheÕd had trouble draping it, 
getting the loops just right, but now sheÕd got it off pat Ñ a twist of her wrist made a 
loop over the top of the portraitÉÕ (9). As Alison is preparing to go on stage, she 
takes a mint out of her mouth so she can drink her G&T: ÕShe wrapped the mint in a 
tissue, looked around, and looped it hesitantly towards a metal bin a few yards 
awayÕ (13-14). When Morris comes back, bringing the fiends with him, he Ôwould 
talk, reprising the Aldershot days, running them back on a kind of loopÉRound and 
round it wentÕ (390-1). The spirit Mrs McGibbet asks the child Alison if she wants 
her Ôround and aboutÕ (102). The homeless man Mart camps out in AlisonÕs shed, and 
when Colette sees him on the lawn outside ÔHe was walking around it in circles, as if 
under an enchantmentÕ (285). Alison thinks Mart is her new spirit guide, as Ôthe 
creature smiled shyly and continued to circleÕ (285). Mart describes to Alison how he 
managed to hide out in the garden centre: ÔThey thought I was off the premises but I 
looped back.Õ When he is describing his treatment or lack of it at the hands of the 
authorities he calls himself an ÔoutloopÕ, dropped out and unreachable, out of the 
loop. AlisonÕs penultimate act of the novel is to flee from Admiral Drive and rid 
herself of the ÔfiendsÕ, gaining some new and gentler spirit guides in the process. At 
the height of MorrisÕ rambunctiousness she left the tape ÔunspoolingÕ (BB 393); now 
in a kind of rebirth, ÔShe seesÉthe tape unspooling in the empty house; her past 
unspooling, back beyond this life, beyond the lives to comeÕ (442). The final act, 
having finally rid herself of Morris (the implication being he has moved on with 
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Colette), she is riding the M25 with her new spirit guides. The novel functions as a 
loop, goes full circle. 
 Loops, spool: running backwards as well as forwards, like the wheel of 
fortune and the concurrence of history. This loop is not regular, however: it suffers 
from breaks, it turns backwards, is unpredictable. For example, the womenÕs 
relationship. Having split from her husband and finding herself in need of guidance, 
Colette goes to AlisonÕs psychic demonstration. Alison picks her out from the crowd, 
seeing a Ôbroken wedding ringÕ (BB 75). The women meet the next day, and Alison 
reaches out to Colette, ÔShe [Alison] spoke as if she had her life before her. She 
spoke as if her feelings and thoughts could be mended; she imagined popping into the 
dry-cleanerÕs, and getting the broken zip replaced, the zip that joined her thoughts to 
her feelings and joined her up insideÕ (75). ColetteÕs interior monologue has already 
described her inner self in terms of an unzipped zip, Ôa peculiar disjointed, unstrung 
sensation occurred in her head, as if her thoughts and her feelings had been joined 
together by a zip, and the zip had brokenÕ (73). The slang meaning of zip, Ônothing, 
zeroÕ, adds evidence to what we already know about Colette. She is empty inside, and 
transparent outside; pale, colourless, beige. She leaves nothing of herself behind her. 
Zip. ColetteÕs ring, her loops and the zero-nothingness in the centre of her life echo 
AlisonÕs space within. But while AlisonÕs body expands to enclose the liminal space 
of the M25, ColetteÕs body is reduced to zero, or ÔzipÕ. 
  
Spectral angels, historical spectres   
MantelÕs invocation of the ÔangelsÕ recalls both the earlier Beyond Black and Bring up 
the Bodies. As a being which is transcendent, the angel is a creature of in-
betweenness, intervening in the destiny of the human world, but unable to connect to 
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it. With God, but without his omniscience; a servant, a messenger (the 9th definition 
on the list in Chambers puts angel as Ô a radar echo of unknown originÕ, connecting it 
to the wink and blink): 
 Angels are messengers. They are creatures with a mind and a willÉ They hardly   
 visit men nowadays. Though in Rome he knew a man, a turnspit in the papal   
 kitchens, who had come face to face with an angel in a passage dripping with chill,  
 in a sunken store room of the Vatican where cardinals never tread; and people bought 
 him drinks to make him talk about it. He said the angelÕs substance was heavy and  
 smooth as marble, its expression distant and pitiless; its wings were carved from   
 glass. (348-9)  
The angel manifests itself to humanity not as living, breathing, matter but as a 
ÔsubstanceÕ which is cold, Ôsmooth as marbleÕ. There is no chance of a connection 
with this angel, hard as it is, with its distant expression suggesting lack of 
engagement. This lack of connection occurs in Walter BenjaminÕs ninth of the 
ÔTheses on the Philosophy of HistoryÕ (Illuminations 249): the ÔpitilessÕ expression 
on the angelÕs face, and the conjuring of angels which exist outside of time reminds 
us of Benjamin's description of Paul KleeÕs painting, Angelus Novus: 
 His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one   
 pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a  
 chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon  
 wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. (249) 
The Angel whose wings stretch across the world, who Ôwould like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed,Õ instead finds itself propelled into the 
future, from which it is facing away. This angel of history is the being Ôwith a mind 
and a willÕ as Mantel writes; unlike MantelÕs ÔpitilessÕ and ÔdistantÕ angels, though, its 
intention is to help. KleeÕs angel of history, according to Benjamin at least, desires to 
make good the damage caused, but is unable to do so. Far from existing underground, 
in the Ôpapal kitchensÕ, manifesting but unwilling to assist, BenjaminÕs angel is 
deeply affected by the catastrophic and chaotic human world and its own inability to 
Ômake whole what has been smashedÕ. The angel shows us that history does not chart 
a linear path, or function as a causal state, but is disaster piled on disaster, each event 
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a moment as strong and powerful as the last; yet each unconnected to its predecessor 
and the events that come after it. MantelÕs angels pick over the wreckage, are 
powerless to help; only able to drape rags over their arms and kick up the scattered 
petals. The outcome is the same for BenjaminÕs angel: despite its good intentions, 
Ôthe pile of debris before him grows skywardÕ (249).  
 MantelÕs use of the moment as the Ôeasy wink of the worldÕs blind eyeÕ thus 
makes common cause with the Benjaminian idea of the angel of history. Each 
momentÕs disaster is a rupture of the angelÕs desire to make whole, to Ômake goodÕ. 
The assassinÕs joy in violence, ÔFucking rejoice!Õ (echoing ThatcherÕs Ôrejoice!Õ in the 
epigraph to the story) is really the obverse of the desire to heal exhibited by the angel. 
Heal, or kill, it is all the same to the ÔworldÕs blind eyeÕ which continues blinking 
regardless of the interventions of angels. Consider the ending of Beyond Black: 
 Alison checks her rear-view mirror. She pulls out to over-take a truck, she puts her  
 foot down. She moves into the fast lane, half hidden by the spray. Unmolested,   
 unobserved, they flee before the storm. If the universe is a great mind, it may   
 sometimes have its absences (451).  
For Mantel, the ÔabsencesÕ (the lacuna of timeÕs Ôzero pointÕ comes to mind here) of 
the universeÕs Ôgreat mindÕ are the interstices where it is possible to be ÔunobservedÕ. 
In the same way, the ÔworldÕs blind eyeÕ takes no notice of the skulking assassin 
between the flats in ÔThe Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÕ, or at least the 
possibility that he might dwell there, staving off his inevitable death.  
 When the protagonist presents this possible solution to the assassin he is 
scornful, but she persuades him, ÔTry it. Do not put on the light. Do not speak. Step 
throughÕ (AMT 239). The moment in which the assassin is invited to Ôstep throughÕ 
into the darkness represents the stepping outside of history, the rupture of the moment 
that culminates in the winking of the ÔworldÕs blind eye.Õ The assassin and the 
narrator replicate the worldÕs blindness in the space between the flats: the leap of 
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faith required, in darkness and silence, represents the illuminating power of the 
spectral, its power to expose what is Ôreally thereÕ to the perception. Mantel conjures 
this spectral power through her use of the door. The door is the threshold to and from 
this world, but is also a symbol of visionary power, a solace to the human world in 
the continual state of crisis that we designate ÒhistoryÓ: 
     Who has not seen the door in the wall? It is the invalid childÕs consolation, the  
 prisonerÕs last hope. It is the easy exit for the dying man, who perishes not in the   
 death-grip of a rattling gasp, but passes on a sigh, like a falling feather. It is a special  
 door that obeys no laws that govern wood or iron. No locksmith can defeat it, no   
 bailiff kick it in; patrolling policemen pass it, because it is visible only to the eye of  
 faith. Once through it, you return as angels and air, as sparks and flame. That the   
 assassin was a flicker in its frame, you know. (239) 
The door offers matter the chance to become spirit, to Ôreturn as angels and air, as 
sparks and flameÕ: to evade the forces of law ÔlocksmithÕ, ÔbailiffÕ, or  ÔpolicemenÕ. 
The door is the threshold of spirit and matter, the place of possibility, of opportunity, 
Ôthe invalid childÕs consolation, the prisonerÕs last hope.Õ As Christopher Prendergast 
suggests, ÔDerridaÕs re-reading of Marx rests, fundamentally, on a critique of 
entrenched versions of Marxism that locate Justice historically in some material 
embodiment or otherÕ (Prendergast 46). The assassin, then, is a ghost who functions 
as spectral justice, being neither bound by flesh, or spirit, but combining an element 
of both. When Mantel writes about how, as Ôflicker in its frameÕ, the assassin is able 
to escape, our view of Ôwhat really happenedÕ can continue unsullied: youÕve never 
seen anything about an assassin on the news, Thatcher carried on living until she 
actually died. Real events can be restored to their rightful place, as authorities on life, 
on living. ÔThat the assassin was a flicker in its frame, you knowÕ(AMT 240): the 
multiple meanings of the word frame here, pile upon each other. The door frame, the 
threshold which if you pass through it you return, as Ôangels and air, sparks and 
flameÕ as the ontological certainty of being anchored into a particular place, time in a 
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particular story. But being in the frame means being accused of something; being in 
the frame means having an image made of oneself; and finally, the narrative frame 
which the assassin breaks free from, because heÕs there, but not there, all at the same 
time. The spectral ÔflickerÕ in the frame undercuts its solidity. A frame has borders, a 
clear outline, it knows where it begins, where it ends. Unlike the spectral flicker, 
which has no clearly defined outline, no ontological certainty about where it belongs, 
what it even is. The social and material basis of the story, its anchor in the urgency of 
the class struggle for the Ôdirty scouserÕ, emblematic for so much of the North at this 
time, suggests another prism through which to read the Ôflicker in the frameÕ: as a 
Ôdialectical imageÕ or Benjaminian battle cry. Benjamin conceived of the dialectical 
image as a flash, a fleeting image of potential historical upheaval which heralds the 
coming of justice for he masses. One must always heed the lessons of history: in 
MantelÕs alternate universe the worst excesses of Thatcherism are curbed, and social 
justice rather than monetarism takes precedence. But yet: the suburban petty 
obsessions with car parking, driveways, and sweeping up leaves from the gardens 
betray the ending. Thatcher never was assassinated, and middle England goes on as 
before.  
 We can read the assassin, as ghostly justice, again invoking BenjaminÕs 
ÔTheses on the Philosophy of HistoryÕ. The eighteenth thesis provides the basis for 
reading MantelÕs short story as a Messianic call to arms. The Irish assassin is a 
saviour for the working class, a hero who rids the world of the Thatcherite menace. 
MantelÕs writing of time echoes BenjaminÕs insistence that, Ôfor every second of time 
was the strait gate through which the messiah might enterÕ (Benjamin 255).  But even 
as the messiah is preparing to deliver his people, pull the trigger, Mantel knows that 
justice wonÕt be served, that another will spring up in her place who Ôlives on the 
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fumes of whisky and the iron in the blood of her preyÕ (AMT 232). The final page of 
the story, ÔNow that we are here at last, there is all the time in the worldÕ, and the 
invocation of the deed in Ôone easy wink of the worldÕs blind eyeÕ (242), however, 
suggest a somewhat different resonance with Benjamin, that of the Ôdialectical 
imageÕ. Again in this moment, as in the moment of apprehending the spectre in 
Giving up the Ghost, the air is still, yet the movement here is a movement of the 
ÔeyeÕ, of the worldÕs eye which is history itself: everything that has ever happened 
and can ever be retold. For Benjamin, Ôthe true picture of the past flits byÕ and Ôthe 
past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be 
recognised and is never seen againÕ (Benjamin 247). The ÔseizingÕ of the past is 
momentary, fleeting; like the seconds long flicker in the air, it is there to be 
apprehended briefly, or not at all. When Mantel writes, Ôhistory can always be 
otherwiseÕ the phrase echoes with the fleeting, winking power of the dialectical 
image. The brief point at which the story can change: other voices and ways of seeing 
can Ôflash upÕ. ÔBut,Õ she continues; 
 Énote the door: note the wall: note the power of the door in the wall that you never  
 saw was there. And note the cold wind that blows through it, when you open it a   
 crack. History could always have been otherwise. For there is the time, the place, the  
 black opportunity: the day, the hour, the slant of the light, the ice-cream van chiming  
 from a distant road near the bypass. (239-40) 
This is provisionality: the possibility of a door opening out onto another world, the 
possibility of stepping through the mirror. The provisional space is imaginative; the 
place where fiction dwells, where truth is stranger than fiction and life imitates art. 
Provisionality is the place where the English suburban, middle class bourgeois 
woman can make common cause with the Irish working class Provo man, while also 
being aware that the common cause exists via the threat of death. ItÕs not simply a 
case of things being ÔtrueÕ in the imagination, or that one can make dreams come true. 
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Provisionality is about the recognition of ÔrealityÕ, ÔimaginationÕ, ÔtruthÕ as to some 
extents being fictional in themselves.  
 Mantel is laying all these things out in front of us, making the connections. 
On the one hand it doesnÕt matter at all if these details are ÔtrueÕ, but on the other itÕs 
the only thing anchoring the reader, shielding them from the irresistible step through 
the door. The door is the metaphor of provisionality here in this story. ItÕs not about 
uncertainty, itÕs about the decision. The moment which provides the wink of the 
worldÕs eye, the flash of an image.  The strength of feeling in the story is the ÔdaggerÕ 
which cuts time; the ÔdoorÕ that ruptures history, allows us to step out of it. 
Provisionality does not mean ontological and epistemological uncertainty. 
Provisionality is a special virtuality, the prerequisite for living life open to all paths, 
all eventualities: that takes heed of the cold wind that blows through the ÔdoorÕ, and 
knows Ôhistory could always be otherwiseÕ (240). 
!81
Chapter Two 
Movements of reading: Dis-Manteling Realism 
Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the spectrality of MantelÕs fiction precludes 
reductive attempts at categorisation. This chapter will investigate how MantelÕs work 
questions the possibilities and limitations of realist fiction. By realist I mean, broadly, 
the suggestion that writing has a relationship to ÔrealityÕ and can tell us something 
about that reality.  Using MantelÕs novels Fludd (1994) and Wolf Hall (2009), this 48
chapter will suggest what that relationship could be. How realist ingredients such as 
character and omniscient narration, are subjected to a Ôdis-MantelingÕ.  Surrounded 49
and shaped by the play of language, which is the play of diffrance, the internal logic 
of the text is also subject to diffrance. Any attempt to codify form or style is always 
subject to a logic that undermines it; in a similar way, Mantel insinuates her texts into 
realismÕs internal logic, turning it inside out. The importance of DerridaÕs diffrance 
lies with its notions of the trace and spacing, which suggest a spatiality and a 
movement. The novel is Ôin timeÕ  but it also exists in space as a physical object and 50
as networks of meaning. These movements in reading and webs of meaning suggest a 
dynamism that is present in MantelÕs work, as this chapter will show through an 
exploration of texture, character, and narration. First, though, I will identify some of 
 BelseyÕs classic Critical Practice is useful on assumptions of realism, Ônaturalism as a 48
commonsense approach to readingÕ (4) as she calls it. See Critical Practice 2nd ed. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002. 
 A conscious echo of the title of Peter Ivor KaufmanÕs ÒDis-Manteling MoreÓ. Moreana. Vol. 47. 49
(179-80). 1-2, 2010: 165-93.  http://www.euppublishing.com/toc/more/
47%28Number+179-180%29/1-2 
 See for example Paul RicoeurÕs discussison of the novelÕs Ôuncriticized temporal frameworkÕ (170) 50
in ÒNarrative Time.Ó Critical Inquiry. Vol 7 no.1 (Autumn 1980) 169-190 
and Mark CurrieÕs idea of the novel as a Ômoving nowÕ ÒThe Novel and the Moving Now.Ó Novel: A 
Forum on Fiction. Vol 42, no.2 (Summer 2009): 318-325. 
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the elements in MantelÕs fiction that make her hard to categorise, showing also how 
the label of Gothic is inadequate.  
Gothic, super-realism, uncanniness: the spectre complicates realism  
In a recent review, Timothy Morton suggests: ÔWe have trouble with art, because we 
have trouble with being spooked, and because being spooked might be how things 
workÕ (Morton 139). Things and people are subject to this spookiness in Mantel; 
movements are subject to unknown whims and malignities. The spookiness of 
MantelÕs work leads to issues of categorisation: she causes genre trouble. Critics who 
attempt to fit her work into one generic mode fail. Or critics will write on one or two 
novels such as Every Day is MotherÕs Day or Eight Months on Ghazzah Street, 
suggesting that these novels put her into the Gothic category.  As Sara L. Knox 51
writes: Ôthe Gothic seems too small a handle for MantelÕs work. It might better be 
defined as super-realist Ñ as fantastically realÕ (Knox 313). Knox rejects the idea of 
a magical realist categorisation, using MantelÕs own words as evidence: ÔMantel 
registers her dislike for the Òclumsy borrowing of fantastic techniqueÓÕ (313), and 
goes on to say: Ôshe is no writer of the Gothic. By writing a world that includes the 
dead, Mantel is simply (though I use that word advisedly) deepening her themes of 
belonging, exclusion and exileÕ (314). Mantel uses fairy tale, occult or otherwise 
obscure tropes in her work. The theme of the changeling in Every Day is MotherÕs 
Day; the explicit reading of CinderellaÕs slipper in Giving up the Ghost; alchemy in 
Fludd; the tarot in Beyond Black. 
 There have been recent attempts to place Mantel into new sub-genres of Gothic, such as Catherine 51
SpoonerÕs comprehensive essay on Beyond Black and the M25 in London Gothic. See also Avril 
Horner and Sue Zlosnik ÔÒReleasing Spirit from MatterÓ: Comic Alchemy in SparkÕs The Ballad of 
Peckham Rye, UpdikeÕs The Witches of Eastwick and MantelÕs Fludd. Gothic Studies 2, 1 (2000): 
136-47.
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 In The Fantastic, Tzvetan Todorov argues that, Ôthe fantastic is that 
hesitation experienced by a person who knows only the laws of nature, confronting 
an apparently supernatural event.Õ (Todorov 25) This definition of course allows for 
ÔsupernaturalÕ events to be portrayed in literature, but therein lies the point; the 
supernatural is refracted through a traditionally ÔrealistÕ prism. TodorovÕs strict 
criteria do not allow for reading in a ÔpoeticÕ or ÔallegoricalÕ way (33). Following on 
from Todorov, Knox posits the idea of a Ôsuper-realistÕ (313) mode of telling that 
gives the ghost its due; exposing the spectral goings-on beneath the surface of the 
ostensibly unexciting suburban world, but at the same time including those features 
which one would expect to see in a realist novel. KnoxÕs suggestion has the 
advantage of giving the reader more tools to explore the spookiness of Mantel than 
the Gothic, the fantastic or the horror genre. The Gothic is not the only mode in 
which a spooky story can be told. 
 Although Knox recognises that Mantel Ôis no writer of the GothicÕ, the 
idea of the Ôsuper-realÕ is not fleshed out, and the moments she analyses in MantelÕs 
texts point back towards either Gothic, or realism. For example, by casting a 
definitive causal chain of events in Every Day is MotherÕs Day, Knox  has to omit the 
uncanniness of the novelÕs temporal structure. This temporal structure and the effects 
of the strange shifts in time and relationships on the reader go beyond Gothic. 
MantelÕs texts expose spectral goings on, but use them in order to shape, interrogate, 
and transform realism into a mode that can accommodate this Ôother worldÕ without 
domestication.  For Mantel, the ghost is real, and as such deserves its own genre.  52
 Provisional reading practice, to re-invoke DerridaÕs Spectres of Marx, 
needs to learn to speak with the ghosts of MantelÕs work, not try to tame them. Her 
 To borrow Julian WolfreysÕ term from chapter one.52
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work resists definition as a particular mode of telling, or another; it is, like the spectre 
itself, a hybrid. FreudÕs 1919 text ÒThe UncannyÓ (Das Unheimlich), in which what 
is familiar (heimlich, homely) becomes unfamiliar, will assist in providing a reading 
of MantelÕs texts that resists definitive closure to meaning. As Nicholas Royle writes 
in his meditation on FreudÕs text: 
 [F]reudÕs essay teaches us that the uncanny is Ôsomething one does not know 
 oneÕs way about inÕ and that this is where thinking must begin. It is not a  
 question of giving oneself up to a sense of mere aimlessness or alienation,  
 but rather of trying to follow a path as carefully and critically Ñ in a certain  
 sense as rationally Ñ as possible, uncertain nevertheless, of where it began  
 or appears to end. (Royle Uncanny 8) 
Royle presents a necessarily incomplete guide to the reading experience. The 
(un)certain sense of rationality that Royle here describes is precisely the feeling of the 
reader who must find their way, not knowing where to go or what will happen. This 
sense of having no certain way to go resonates throughout MantelÕs works. The 
uncanny inhabits her texts; the rationally defined and clearly delineated plot point is 
undermined by her workÕs strangeness. At the same time, she is concerned with the 
possibility of representing this uncanniness. MantelÕs readers must also grapple with 
the (im)possibilities of MantelÕs work: the crossings over that occur between spirit 
and matter in Fludd and Beyond Black, for example. Take the single grey sock that 
appears in Colette's washing machine in Beyond Black, after she moves back in with 
her ex-husband, Gavin: Ô[a] woolly sock, the kind you darn; the heel had gone into 
holesÕ (BB 438). This ordinary object is so nondescript, and yet at the same time 
terrifyingly specific. It doesnÕt belong to Gavin, but to Morris, AlisonÕs spiteful ex-
spirit guide. Through an everyday object, Mantel weaves a whole world of terrifying 
possibilities: playing with the ÔrealÕ in multiple ways allows her to keep the 
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ÔothernessÕ of writing to the fore. The next section will explore the idea of realism 
and its relationship to reality.   53
Realism 
This section will investigate attempts to define realism; and how those attempts 
provide unsatisfactory accounts of the relationship of realism to the real. The 
ÔclassicalÕ accounts of realism have a lot to say about ÔwhatÕ is being represented, but 
tend to come unstuck when describing ÔhowÕ it is done. Chambers dictionary 
describes realism as Ô[a] style in literature, art that seeks to present an unglamorized 
and unromanticized view of the worldÕ. For this dictionary at least, the world as-it-is 
is the object of the realist portrayal. The definition goes on: Ôliteralness and precision 
of detail, with the effect of realityÕ. So far, so unilluminating, and the Oxford English 
Dictionary does not fare much better. It records that the first known use of the word 
realism was in 1797, going on to state:  54
 [with] reference to art, film, and literature: close resemblance to what is real; 
 fidelity of representation, rendering the precise details of the real thing or  
 sceneÉit also suggests a deliberate rejection of conventionally attractive or  
 appropriate subjects in favour of sincerity and a focus on the unidealised  
 treatment of contemporary life. (OED) 
What does realism mean? ÔClose resemblance to what is realÕ; ÔsincerityÕ; 
Ôunidealised treatment of contemporary lifeÕ. A realistic ÔrenderingÕ to show the 
world as it really is, not as it should be, or one would want it to be. How does this 
ÔrenderingÕ take place? Implicit in the OEDÕs definition is the idea of writerly choice: 
who decides what is appropriate, or sincere? How is its fidelity judged? How is it 
 As Leigh Wilson suggests in ÒHistorical Representations, Reality Effects: The historical novel and 53
the crisis of fictionality in the first decade of the twenty first centuryÓ contemporary writers are Ôriven 
with anxiety about the use of realismÕ (148). I would add MantelÕs interrogation of realism here. in 
Nick Bentley ed. The 2000s: A Decade of Contemporary British Fiction. London: Bloomsbury, 2015. 
 Ian WattÕs Rise of the Novel, for example, suggests that realism and the novel are linked 54
inextricably; dating the novel proper to the eighteenth century, the matching of dates is not a 
coincidence (10-11).
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even possible to measure the ÔrenderingÕ against its reality, in order to judge its 
effect?  Most fundamentally, both of these definitions make assumptions about the 55
status of the ÔtextÕ and the ÔrealÕ. Unsatisfactory as these admittedly general 
definitions are, they expose some of the aspects to be explored.  
 AristotleÕs argument in the Poetics can assist here. The implication of both 
previously discussed dictionary definitions is that realism is the imitation of ÔrealÕ 
life. AristotleÕs work investigates the connection between poetry and imitation. For 
him, the purpose of poetry is imitative, and therefore natural because it is instinctive: 
Ô[i]mitation comes naturally to human beings from childhoodÉso does the universal 
pleasure in imitationsÕ (Heath ed. 6, 3.1). Malcolm HeathÕs introduction explores 
how, for Aristotle: Ô[p]oetry and painting are rooted in basic instincts shared by even 
the least intellectually sophisticated peopleÕ (Heath xiv). HeathÕs note on the 
translation of mimesis (Chambers: imitation or representation in art) helps to identify 
possible routes to clarification. Heath uses imitation because he argues that 
representation is ÔunhelpfulÕ for two reasons:  
 [R]epresentation fails to capture the full range of AristotleÕs concept. The use of a  
 quasi-technical term of modern aesthetics may tend to obscure the continuity which  
 Aristotle perceives between mimesis in painting, poetry and music and in other, non- 
 artistic forms of activity such as the mimicry of animal noises and other sounds and  
 childrenÕs play acting (xiii). 
For Aristotle, mimesis is an instinct, and thus goes far further than a reflection of 
reality. For example, Heath says: Ô[representation] fails to capture an essential 
elementÉa similarity which does not rest wholly on conventionÕ. (xiii) The idea of a 
likeness of something you canÕt see, of an amorphous idea, seems to be at odds with 
a more materialist understanding of the idea of realism which somehow imitates the 
grittiness of everyday existence.  
 Questions also posed by Pam Morris in Realism. London and New York: Routledge, 2003, 5-6.55
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 Take Ian WattÕs groundbreaking Rise of the Novel (1957) for instance; by 
bringing together the formation of the novel and the rise of empiricism, Watt has 
influenced generations of scholarsÕ thinking about the naturalistic novel.  But his 56
emphasis on empirical reality also suggests the positioning of artist as mediator. The 
artist Ñ going back to Aristotle, who includes painting, poetry and music Ñshapes 
the ÔstuffÕ of life that perceived directly might horrify or disturb. There is a 
representational ÔlayerÕ that does not exist independently of art or of the artist. This is 
what leads to the confusion engendered by the terminology of representation, 
imitation, mimesis and so on. Mimesis describes how we represent the world to 
ourselves, the artist as a mediator of experience. As Pam Morris states: Ôthe term 
realism almost always involves both claims about the nature of reality and an 
evaluative attitude towards itÕ (Morris 2). There is no ÔtrueÕ reality that can be verified 
objectively, only an approximately shared experience: there is no such thing as 
realism which can represent reality without shaping it. A realistic text suggests a 
presupposed relationship to reality, as Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle argue in 
their Introduction to Literature, Criticism and Theory (3rd ed. 2004): 
 This distinction [between the text and the world]Éis implicit in a certain  
 understanding of mimesis or imitation, and in notions of realism and naturalism, and  
 of representation, as well as in metaphors which figure literary texts as offering a  
 window on to the world or (in HamletÕs words) as holding a mirror up to nature.  
 (Bennett and Royle 27) 
I suggest that this shaping explodes the strict binaries upon which realism is based, 
but so often, these binaries are exploded from within those very texts that would be 
defined as ÔrealistÕ. This quote demonstrates two related ways of thinking about a 
textÕs relationship to the ÔrealÕ. Both rely on visual elements which efface themselves, 
 In a similar move, Pam Morris links Victorian realism in particular with a Ôburgeoning modern 56
secular materialist understanding of reality.Õ (3) Catherine BelseyÕs seminal Critical Practice also 
teaches us that ideological investments of who is speaking in narrative are contested and shaped, 
through her use of AlthusserÕs term interpellation. See also Michael McKeonÕs excellent Origins of the 
English Novel 1600-1740. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987, in which he updates 
WattÕs thesis (80-87).
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on showing rather than telling. This attention to the visual hides the moves that the 
writer has to make in order to present their version of the world. When M. H. 
Abrams, for example, describes the Socratic idea of making art in The Mirror and the 
Lamp, he suggests that the poet makes art by Ôholding up a mirror and turning 
itÕ (Abrams 30). If the mirror is turned away from himself, what happens to the artist? 
If the mirror takes in the reflection of the artist with world as background, what 
happens to the world? The turning of the figurative mirror in either direction 
demonstrates the choices made by the artist: the mirror acts as a line between artist 
and world, reinforcing the logic of binaries.  
 The turning of the mirror also demonstrates that realismÕs apparent attempts 
to fix meaning, or to enable a frozen or suspended language, actually conceal a 
movement. Turning to Fredric JamesonÕs exposition of realism, it is possible to 
capture another sense of realismÕs movements that are not immediately apparent. In 
The Antinomies of Realism, Jameson describes what happens when attempts at 
definition are made: 
 It is as though the object of our meditation began to wobble, and the attention to it to  
 slip insensibly away from it in two opposite directions, so that at length we find we  
 are thinking, not about realism, but about its emergence; not about the thing itself,  
 but about its dissolution (Jameson 1).  
Difficulties of definition lead Jameson to resolve this ÔaporiaÕ (Jameson The 
Antinomies of Realism 6).  He posits a dialectical understanding of the Ôhybrid 
conceptÕ of realism (5); a cycle incorporating the Ônarrative impulseÕ  in conjunction 57
with the ekphrastic, descriptive moment of the suspension of the temporality of the 
plot (8). For Jameson moreover, both of these moments are temporal: the telling of 
the tale of events already finished (rcit), and the Ôaffective investmentÕ in the Ôscenic 
presentÕ of the literary text, Ôthat secretly abhors the other temporalities which 
 Cf Peter BrooksÕ Reading for the Plot 198457
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constitute the force of the tale or the rcit in the first placeÕ (11). This is a temporal 
dialectic of realism, and a dialectic of mortality and eternity: the insertion of the 
mortal human subject into the eternal moment of the novelistic descriptive image. 
Jameson calls this Ôdestiny versus the eternal presentÕ (26), continuing:  
 What is crucial is not to load one of these dies and take sides for the one or the  
other as all our theorists seem to do, but rather to grasp the proposition that realism  
lies at their intersection. Realism is a consequence of the tension between these two  
terms; to resolve the opposition either way would destroy itÉ (26)  
JamesonÕs dialectical resolution is interesting for thinking through Mantel in two 
ways. Firstly, it echoes the tension that is worked through and played with in her 
novels between the energies of experience and their expression in writing. More 
importantly, however, JamesonÕs ÔwobblesÕ and ÔslipsÕ demonstrate the movements of 
reading that efface themselves in the making of the text. Like the turning of the 
mirror, these movements are part of Mantel calls ÔtextureÕ. The next section will 
consider BarthesÕ reality effect and how it relates to textu(r)al movements in MantelÕs 
work.  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The Reality Effect 
The attention to detail in order to Ôgive the effect of realityÕ (Chambers) is not and 
never can be neutral.  In his famous essay, ÒThe Reality EffectÓ, Barthes homes in 58
on what he calls the Ôuseless detailÕ (Barthes Rustle 143), in this case a barometer that 
appears in FlaubertÕs short story ÔA Simple HeartÕ. For Barthes, the barometer has no 
function; it does not Ôconstitute some index of character or atmosphereÕ and is thus 
ÒsuperfluousÓ (141). In the quest to Ôaccount for the totality of the narrative fabricÕ 
this detail is ÔscandalousÕ according to Barthes: figured variously as ÔluxuryÕ (141, 
emphasis in original), Ôinsignificant detailÕ (142) and more than once referred to as 
useless (141-3).   
 Within a system that must account for structure, the excess mark of detail 
constitutes a troubling of structureÕs validity. BarthesÕ solution to this problem is to 
switch this detail, that apparently serves no function, from the side of denotation to 
connotation; a linguistic sleight of hand that serves only to move the problem from 
one place to the other. Thus: 
 [t]he very absence of the signified, to the advantage of the referent alone, becomes  
 the very signifier of realism: the reality effect is produced, the basis of that  
 unavowed verisimilitude which forms the aesthetic of all the standard works of  
 modernity (148).  
The superfluity of the Ôuseless detailÕ thus produces the Ôreality effectÕ, precisely 
because it is stripped of meaning as it moves from connotation to denotation; it has 
no meaning, according to Barthes, within the textual fabric and so must connote 
reality. Barthes can only settle the argument by forcing the detail out of structure 
completely, into the sign ÔhistoryÕ, or to paraphrase, the singularity of Ôhaving-been-
thereÕ (147). Moreover, the spectre of the scandalous narrative luxury of the 
 As Audrey Jaffe states in The Victorian Novel Dreams of the Real: Conventions and Ideology New 58
York: Oxford UP (2016), Ôrealist effects, as Roland Barthes calls them, are the result of conventionsÉ
such structures carry with them a host of ideological imperativesÕ (2). 
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barometer presides over the undoing of BarthesÕ system: the having-been-there 
providing illegitimate extra-structural support for this apparently useless detail.  
 I slow over Barthes, not only because his references to textual ÔfabricÕ suggest 
connections with MantelÕs preoccupation with texture. Jacques RancireÕs rejoinder 
to the reality effect, ÔMadame AubainÕs barometerÕ (in The Lost Thread: The 
Democracy of Modern Fiction), suggests another reading move that could be 
employed. Whereas the useless detail in FlaubertÕs A Simple Heart represents a 
scandal of representation for Barthes, which pits the action of narrative against the 
facts of Ôbare lifeÕ, for Jacques Rancire the barometer signifies Ôthe texture of this 
real, that is to say, the type of life that the characters liveÕ (Rancire 12). For 
Rancire, the barometer is not there to Ôattest that the real really is realÕ (12) but 
Ôencapsulates an entire sensible worldÕ (13). For Rancire, BarthesÕ tautological way 
of looking at texts doesnÕt work; it denies the democratic power of the literary. How 
can we read such details in Mantel? In some respects, the Ôuseless detailÕ in MantelÕs 
Wolf Hall signifies the Ôhaving been thereÕ of historical fact, as Barthes suggests. 
MantelÕs inclusion of objects, for example the family prayer book, lends weight to the 
account she gives of Cromwell. There is a strange reverse parallel in the ways that 
Mantel has been treated by history scholars to the way Barthes characterises Flaubert 
in his essay. Historians see luxury and scandal in MantelÕs Tudor novels; she has been 
charged with not being historical enough, or misunderstanding history. Of course, this 
is about convention. The conventions of the historical novel differ from the academic 
historical textbook: but at the same time there is a paradoxical quality in the reading 
of detail in the Tudor novels that puts historical reconstruction and reimagining into 
question.  
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 Reading Mantel against and alongside Barthes and Rancire, the Ôuseless 
detailÕ serves no excess or luxury; it is not ÔscandalousÕ. Take the death of the 
Cardinal Wolsey in Wolf Hall, for instance: Cromwell hears of it second-hand from 
George Cavendish, one of WolseyÕs servants, who recounts in great detail all the 
events leading up to the CardinalÕs demise: 
 It was eight the next morning when he drew his last breath. Around his bed, the click  
 of rosary beads; outside the restive stamp of horses in their stalls, the thin winter  
 moon shining down on the London road (WH 263). 
The sound of Ôrosary beadsÕ suggests a luxurious detail that serves little purpose; why 
would we need to know that people are praying over a CardinalÕs bedside? Mantel 
uses sound here to link the inner world of the death bed with the outer world of 
CromwellÕs journey to reach that death bed. The ÔclickÕ of the beads converges with 
the concurrent ÔstampÕ of the horseÕs feet that Cromwell would be hearing as he 
saddled his horse to reach the Cardinal. Everything in the ÔworldÕ of this novel is 
refracted through MantelÕs re-imagining of CromwellÕs perceptions. But she also 
writes into this re-imagining a simultaneity, which suggests what Rancire calls the 
Ôdistribution of the sensibleÕ. When Cromwell is thinking about the CardinalÕs death 
and what will happen to his clothes, the narrator says: ÔAnother man would have 
trouble imagining it, but he has no troubleÕ (WH 266). This short sentence contains 
the clue to reading the exorbitant detail: Mantel is sharing with us her imagining of 
CromwellÕs imagining. This sharing is utterly bound up with the democratisation of 
literature.  
 To recap, Jacques Rancire assesses BarthesÕ argument in ÒThe Reality 
EffectÓ as tautological: Ô[s]tructural analysis has to account Òfor the entire surface of 
the narrative fabricÓÕ. So it has to account for superfluous details, which amounts to 
showing that they are not superfluousÕ (Rancire Lost 4-5). Barthes sequesters Ôthe 
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realÕ off outside the text, where it continues its troublemaking. Although he does not 
use the word ÔtroubleÕ, this is what Rancire would call the democratic potentiality of 
literature: as he says, Ôthere is no Òreality effectÓ that stands in as a substitute for old 
verisimilitudeÕ (16). The old representational order which only admits certain types of 
people into their hallowed portals has to make way for Ôa new texture of the real 
produced by the transgression of boundaries between forms of lifeÕ (16). RancireÕs 
problem with BarthesÕ dismissal of the Ôinsignificant detailÕ rests on the commitment 
to structure which is Ôdependent on the organic model that governed the 
representational orderÕ (17). It is this dependence on a natural totality, the 
Ôsubordinating [of] the parts to the wholeÕ (17), which excludes a good proportion of 
the population from taking part in the sensible order, of which literature is a part. As 
he says: Ôthe chain of perceptions and affects that weaves these thoughts themselves. 
This weaving is what defines the new textures of novelistic episodesÕ (16). I want to 
shift gears slightly here, and think more about this totality, so-called, before I move 
onto the connection between Mantel and these Ônew texturesÕ.  
 Rita FelskiÕs The Limits of Critique (2015) proposes a new type of reading, 
and in so doing also suggests connections with RancireÕs critique of realism as 
verisimilitude: 
 A text is deciphered as a symptom, mirror, index, or antithesis of some larger social  
 structure Ñ as if there were an essential system of correspondences knotting a text  
 into an overarching canopy of domination, akin to those medieval cosmologies in  
 which everything is connected to everything else. (Felski 11) 
What Felski calls the Ôlarger social structureÕ is akin to RancireÕs critique of Barthes, 
which Ôcontrasts descriptive excess to an idea of structure as the functional 
arrangement of causes and effects subordinating the parts to the wholeÕ (Rancire 
Lost 17). What is figured as useless detail, even exorbitance, is thus part of realismÕs 
and verisimilitudeÕs undoing. The luxury of the superfluous detail provides leverage 
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to undermine the structure by exposing its weaknesses and unacknowledged 
assumptions. The barometer and the click of the rosary beads are not there to signal 
whether the Ôreal is really realÕ. They are there to sound a death knell for the realist 
system of subordination of parts to the whole. This is also the subordination of the 
ÔsubalternateÕ, those with Ôsouls of ironÕ in RanciereÕs words: the poor. The excesses 
of detail undercut any notion of life, the world, and the text as parts of a systemic 
whole, and at the same time disrupt the logic of metonymy. The part can no longer be 
made to stand for the whole; the part undermines the whole by its very existence. 
Rancire calls this democracy in literature (which isnÕt the same as social 
democracy): a new distribution of the sensible which demonstrates the previously 
ordered and tidy world as chaos, movement, dynamism.  This exists in movements of 
reading, as Felski suggests. For Rancire, writing this new Ôregime of the sensibleÕ is 
movement; the appropriation of the impersonal writing through what he calls 
ÔdecompositionÕ and ÔrespirationÕ (Rancire Lost 21). These ÔimpersonalÕ movements 
of writing fragment into millions of tiny pieces, Ôthe dust of impersonal micro 
eventsÕ. At the same time, what Rancire calls the Ôrespiration of the sensible 
fabricÕ (21), later calls the Ôcommon breathÕ (23) and Ôthe egalitarian power of the 
common respiration animating the multitude of sensible events.Õ (23) Literature takes 
part in the Ôdistribution of the sensibleÕ; who, what, and how things, objects and 
people are brought about to be seen and heard. Cromwell (and Wolsey) are models of 
this democratisation in Wolf Hall, and MantelÕs imagining of CromwellÕs imagining 
takes part in what we have already called ÔsharingÕ. I will continue the consideration 
of how MantelÕs writing partakes in this distribution of the sensible, by reference to 
texture in the next section.  
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Texture in Fludd  
This section thinks about how MantelÕs reference to texture proposes a unique way of 
seeing the world, and how she engages in the ÔshapingÕ of the world. How can we 
read the diffusion of the sensible fabric with and through Mantel? I will consider how 
her writing engages with the idea of texture, with reference to Fludd (1989). Based 
loosely on a historical figure associated with alchemy, the character of Fludd comes 
to transform the village of Fetherhoughton, in the guise of a curate. As the narrative 
unfolds, Fludd is revealed to be someone altogether unworldly, no curate at all, and 
possibly not even human. MantelÕs inscription of the alchemical, as a metaphor for 
thinking about matter, is closely related to the idea of texture: what Rancire, via 
Barthes, calls the weave of the narrative fabric.  
 MantelÕs take on texture, in her lecture ÔCan these bones live?Õ from the 2017 
BBC Reith Lectures, is woven into the idea of lived experience and the writerÕs 
recreation of that experience. She speaks of the role of the novelist as opposed to the 
historian: 
 But your real job as a novelist, is not to be an inferior sort of historian, but to  
 recreate the texture of lived experience: to activate the senses, and to deepen the  
 readerÕs engagement through feeling (Reith Lectures, emphasis added 3). 
ÔTo recreate the texture of lived experienceÕ suggests an approach to writing that is 
tethered firmly in realist notions of the story as a faithful reflection of experiences. 
But her attention to Ôthe sensesÕ and ÔfeelingÕ demonstrates that the story is not only 
about Ôwhat happenedÕ, in what order, or to whom, but the sensual and emotional 
investments that the reader brings to the story. The etymological movements of 
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ÔtextureÕ and ÔtextÕ can also propose interesting ways of thinking about what Mantel 
refers to as Ôlived experienceÕ.  59
 Chambers defines ÔtextureÕ as: the general quality of a material to the touch; 
the structure, appearance and feel; general Ôquality, character or tenorÕ of something. 
ÔTextureÕ and ÔtextÕ are related etymologically, with a common root in texere, to 
weave, from which we get ÔtextureÕ, via Latin textura, or ÔwebÕ, and ÔtextÕ from the 
Latin textus. Texture as the perception of an objectÕs quality evokes the sensation of 
how things Ôreally areÕ. To perceive things as they really are is not only a possibility, 
then, but that perception, feeling, sensation is woven into objects themselves. The 
weave of matter occurs in MantelÕs writing as texture, an attention to the web and 
weave of objects and people, of lives. In Fludd, the eponymous curate arrives 
suddenly in Fetherhoughton to stay with the current vicar, Father Angwin, whose 
housekeeper is a woman named Miss Dempsey. MantelÕs description of Miss 
Dempsey evokes this sense of texture as weave, of objects and lives co-mingling. She 
begins with an instruction to the reader, and continues by exploring Miss DempseyÕs 
actions and appearance: 
     Consider Agnes Dempsey: duster in hand, whisking it over the dustless bureau. In  
 recent years her face had fallen softly, like a piece of cotton folding into a box. Her  
 neck too fell in floury, scalloped folds, to where her clothing cut off the view. Her  
 eyes were round, child-like, bright blue, their air of surprise compounded by her  
 invisible eyebrows and her hair, a faded gold streaked with grey, which sprang up  
 from her hairline as if crackling with static. She had pleated skirts, and short bottle- 
 shaped legs, and pastel twin-sets to cover the gentle twin hummocks of her bosom.  
 (Fludd 7) 
Miss DempseyÕs ageing is evoked by falling, folding, and finally, the box which 
suggests her coffin. She not only ÔholdsÕ a duster, ÔwhiskingÕ it, but she is in some 
way part of the dust: being mortal, she Ôfelt her mortalityÕ, as Mantel tells us on page 
43. The Ôfloury foldsÕ of Miss DempseyÕs neck take part in her general dustiness: the 
 Compare E.M. Forster here, ÔThe artist aims at truth and succeeds if he raises the emotions.Õ Aspects 59
of the Novel. (London: Penguin, 2005) (174).
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powderiness of pastry being rolled, the dough. Miss DempseyÕs Ôtwin hummocks of 
bosomÕ and her face Ôlike cotton folding into a boxÕ tie her incontrovertibly to the 
landscape: cotton is FetherhoughtonÕs industry, Mantel describing the Ôfolds of the 
hillsÕ and the ÔhummocksÕ on the same page (Fludd 11). Miss Dempsey is matter, 
dust, emblematic of  mortality and decay. The movement in the passage indicates the 
mortal falling down into old age, while the childlike aspects of her demeanour, eyes, 
hair, are moving upwards, her hair Ôsprang up from her hairlineÕ (7). The ÔfoldingÕ 
foreshadows Miss DempseyÕs reaction to FluddÕs arrival, which ÔIn later years, when 
she talked about it she would always say, Did you ever see a pile of pennies pushed 
over? Did you ever see a house of cards fall down?Õ (43, emphasis in original). One 
of the many meanings of ÔfoldÕ is to place cards face down, in order to withdraw from 
play in a card game.  
 Things and people are folded throughout this novel, in all senses. Miss 
DempseyÕs creased face and the folds of the hills, as we have already seen; paper, 
handkerchiefs, nunsÕ habits. People are folded up, parts are laid over on another, 
Mother Perpetua and Philomena, Fludd and PhilomenaÕs relationship as she ÔyieldsÕ 
to him, also an obsolete meaning of ÔfoldÕ. The figurative meaning of ÔfoldÕ as 
Ôchurch or congregationÕ weaves a further strand into the textu(r)al fabric, a nod to 
the religious notation of the novel. The movement of folding  in Fludd that weaves 60
the narrative fabric connects Miss DempseyÕs understanding of mortality with the 
organic matter of her body and the landscape. Not only this: FluddÕs presence and his 
stated aim of Ôreleasing spirit from matterÕ (106) show that the use of folding relates 
 See also Gilles DeleuzeÕs employment of folds and folding, in his volume Foucault, chapter 60
ÔFoldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation).Õ University of Minnesota Press, 1998. Ebook. 
Accessed 14th October 2017. The Ôcontinuous process of foldingÕ, (198) in Simon ConleyÕs words, is 
what constitutes the subject. In Charles J Stivale ed. Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts. Cambridge UP 
online, 2011. https://www.cambridge.org.
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to the relationship between spirit and matter, body and soul. This is also shown by 
Miss DempseyÕs enactment of a mini Ôalchemical weddingÕ  in which she eats a 61
chocolate and twists the wrapper into a ring which she places on her wedding finger 
(Fludd 8). The ceremony concludes with her throwing the foil onto the fire, a clear 
foreshadowing of FluddÕs aim.   
 MantelÕs weaving of the textu(r)al fabric encompasses both a sensuous 
understanding of the quality of matter and how movements of writing are shot 
through with this material of life. What Rancire insists is a compromise in The Lost 
Thread, between Ônarrative logicÕ and Ôthe power of his [FlaubertÕs] sentencesÕ, starts 
to be broken down in Mantel, as she employs figures such as the fold to erode such 
distinctions. He writes, with reference to Flaubert: 
 But the operation that abandons the character of new fiction to the old representative  
 logic also turns this fiction into a compromise. Flaubert was the first to raise the  
 problem of modern fiction: what system of relations between characters and  
 situations can constitute the fictional work when the hierarchy of forms of life that  
 defined the space of fiction and commanded its unity is ruined? How are we to  
 reconcile the new world of perceptions and sensations that this ruin liberates with the 
 necessity to construct a whole comprising a beginning, a middle and an end, that is to 
 say also a history of wills and actions leading to successes or else to failures? (24) 
The movements of matter in MantelÕs writing break down the classic mimetic 
distinction between action (as the narrative force of the story) and description (there 
to provide ÔuselessÕ background information). For example, in MantelÕs use of verbs: 
she creates a dynamic sense of identity for her characters, while also perceiving the 
tension between movement and stasis, portrayal as fixity. Mantel homes in on the 
bishop after he delivers his injunction to Father Angwin to modernise his parish (and 
Miss Dempsey is listening at the keyhole). ÔTwo strides carried the bishop through 
the hall, a thrust of his arms carried him into his cape, and he threw open the front 
 The idea of alchemy can also be linked to Jungian ideas of individuation in Fludd, the pretend curate 61
acting as the agent allowing the human material to change and grow.  See for example Susan 
RowlandÕs C.G Jung and Literary Theory: The Challenge from Fiction, 1999 and Jung: A Feminist 
Revision, 2002. 
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door, tussling on the path with the damp, windy dayÕ (Fludd 25). Of course, this 
description of the bishopÕs movements Ñ leaving the room, putting on his cape, 
opening up the front door Ñ is meant to remind the reader of his modernity, his 
briskness, his love for driving around the diocese in his fast car. But what MantelÕs 
writing also does is to create a sense of the dynamic, a movement of the writing that 
thrusts itself onwards into the future like the bishop putting on his cape.  
 However, the force to compel the narrative on through beginning, middle and 
end, to obey a realist imperative, somehow comes to a standstill in the figure of the 
mysterious Fludd. Father Angwin, who senses modernity in the bishop and resists it 
as hard as he can, welcomes the ÔcurateÕ into his home, where they have a 
conversation about how the Father Angwin has lost his faith. Fludd says: 
 But faith, Father Angwin, is like a wall, a big, blank, brick wall. One day some fool  
 comes along with a hairpin, and chooses some inch of it, and begins to scrape away  
 at the mortar. When the first dust flies up, the wall falls down (52). 
Fludd is referring not only to faith, but to the disintegration of physical material in 
the alchemical process of Ôreleasing spirit from matter.Õ The collapse in Fludd is an 
example of one of the moments that Mantel discusses, Ôwhere the texture of normal 
life is faithfully described Ñ then something slips, minutely but consequentiallyÕ. 
The consequences in MantelÕs fiction of these minute ÔslipsÕ is that nothing is ever 
the same; Ôafter which life can no longer be lived on the old termsÕ (Message to the 
author, Appendix i).  It is not only life that is subject to these slips, but fiction as well: 
the hairpin scraping away at the wall suggests BarthesÕ excess of exorbitant detail 
taking down the edifice of the structurally ÔrealÕ. Modern fictionÕs faith in the real is 
undone by the hairpin of insignificant detail.  
 Considering the realÕs shaky foundations, it is no coincidence that both 
Mantel and Rancire refer to dust as the micro-matter of life, its residue. Both 
!100
conjure the image of millions of particles circulating, seemingly at random, in order 
to evoke the chaos of ÔlifeÕ: while at the same time maintaining narrative order. This 
ordered randomness is also a concern of Henry James. Consider his reference to 
experience in ÒThe Art of FictionÓ (1884): a Ôkind of huge spider-web of the finest 
silken threads suspended in the chamber of consciousness, and catching every air-
borne particle in its tissueÕ (James 388). Experience consists of this ÔtissueÕ as James 
calls it; the fiction writerÕs job is to capture in words the movements of this tissue as 
it seizes and envelopes the micro-particles of life that surround it. This capture in the 
web of experience is a function of realism, in its attempts to ÔrepresentÕ life in art; 
what Mantel calls texture also does this job, and in so doing enacts what Rancire 
calls a compromise. As he suggests in relation to Virginia Woolf, this compromise 
between narrative succession and the diffuse texture of the narrative fabric has to be 
negotiated for intelligible realism. Although this is not new to Mantel, what she does 
is to bring these issues a fresh slant, a look otherwise, in order to renew narrativeÕs 
potential.  
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Painting consciousness: free indirect discourse 
Mantel draws on the traditions of Woolf and James with their painstaking 
representations of the flow and dynamic movements of consciousness. Writing thus 
becomes an attempt to ÔfixÕ or freeze consciousness, capture its intensity in language. 
The suggestion that a characterÕs consciousness can be represented is the ÔmarkÕ of a 
realist novel. This mark has its expression in free indirect discourse, as Rimmon-
Kenan asserts:   62
 The concept of free indirect discourse is meaningful only within mimesisÉ  
 because the need to attribute textual segments to speakers, as well as the urge 
 to account for apparently false statements and reconcile seeming   
 contradictions exists only when the text is grasped as in some sense  
 analogous to (mimetic of) reality (115-6). 
This suggests that free indirect discourseÕs problematic relationship to ÔrealityÕ is the 
ÔmarkÕ of realism, and attempts to write it only make sense within mimesis. The 
speakers in a novel are assigned Ôgiven speech features or attitudesÕ and free indirect 
discourse acts as a convenient vehicle for interior monologue (Rimmon-Kenan 
114-5). In the exposition of free indirect discourse Rimmon-Kenan inadvertently 
demonstrates MantelÕs use of realism  to question reality; in other words, her 
provisionality. 
 One example of MantelÕs preoccupations with CromwellÕs 
consciousness is shown in her references to painting. In Wolf Hall, when Cromwell is 
invited to Chelsea to dine with Thomas More, he comes face to face with a Holbein 
family portrait. Over dinner he ponders the portrait and its relationship to the real 
characters in front of him:  
 David Lodge describes it, Ôfree indirect style allows the narrative discourse to move freely back and 62
forth between the authorÕs voice and the characterÕs voice without preserving a clear boundary 
between themÕ (Consciousness and the Novel 45). Paul Cobley see it as Ôan extension of the mixed 
mode of mimesis and the poetÕs or narratorÕs voiceÕ (Narrative. London and New York: Routledge 
2001, 231). For general discussions of free indirect discourse and what it means for narrative fiction, 
See also H. Porter Abbott. The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2008, 77. Ronald Carter and Peter Stockwell eds. The Language and Literature Reader. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2008, 278-86. 
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 He prefers their host as Hans painted him; the Thomas More on the wall, you 
 can see that heÕs thinking, but not what heÕs thinking, and thatÕs the way it  
 should be (WH 230).  
CromwellÕs portrait also fails to yield any clue as to his thoughts. When the painting 
is revealed CromwellÕs internal discourse thinks about what he was thinking at the 
time of painting: ÔYou cannot trace those thoughts behind his eyesÕ (WH 526). The 
writer is able to capture the thoughts of a character, their interior, where the painter is 
not. MantelÕs narrative is an attempt to do just this; trace the thoughts that occur 
behind the eyes of Cromwell, and in so doing conjure an interiority into being, an 
interiority that painting can only hint at. The ÔinteriorÕ offers something akin to the 
reality effect, in that MantelÕs attempts to ÔrepresentÕ consciousness create the effect 
of interiority. The illusion of interiority, just like the illusion of reality, is sustained by 
the realist novelÕs mimetic necessity.  
 Mantel employs what could be called classic free indirect discourse in 
Wolf Hall and Bring up the Bodies. In the following example there is an alignment 
between the narratorÕs voice and the characterÕs voice, and Cromwell is the focalised 
character through whom the narratorÕs voice is refracted. We read the mind of 
Cromwell and in effect, see everything that happens through his eyes: 
 There are some people in this world who like everything squared up and  
 precise, and there are those who will allow some drift at the margins. He is  
 both these kinds of person. He would not allow, for example, a careless  
 ambiguity in a lease, but instinct tells him that sometimes a contract need not 
 be drawn too tight. Leases, writs, statutes, all are written to be read, and each 
 person reads them by the light of self-interest (WH 228). 
The reader learns about CromwellÕs flexibility; he is adaptable, lives by his instinct. 
The layered consciousness in this passage shows Cromwell from both ÔoutsideÕ and 
ÔinÕ: the reference to some people could be made by anyone, but the reference to 
ÔinstinctÕ comes from ÔwithinÕ Cromwell. The final sentence moves to generalisation 
again, a ploy that Mantel uses not only to emphasise the particularity of CromwellÕs 
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consciousness but to capture the essence of thought: how it switches, twists, turns and 
concerns itself all the time with thousands of different things at once. For example: as 
Cromwell leaves York Place (latterly the CardinalÕs residence, before his fall) after 
meeting Anne Boleyn for the first time, the reader again reads his private thoughts: 
    There was a moment when Anne gave him all her attention: her skewering  
 dark glance. The king, too, knows how to look; blue eyes, their mildness  
 deceptive. Is this how they look at each other? Or in some other way? For a  
 second he understands it; then he doesnÕt. He stands by a window. A flock of 
 starlings settles among the tight black buds of a bare tree. Then, like black  
 buds unfolding, they open their wings; they flutter and sing, stirring  
 everything into motion, air, wings, black notes in music. He becomes aware  
 that he is watching them with pleasure: that something almost extinct, some  
 small gesture towards the future, is ready to welcome the spring; in some  
 spare, desperate way, he is looking forward to Easter, the end of Lenten  
 fasting, the end of penitence. There is a world beyond this black world.  
    There is a world of the possible. A world where Anne can be queen is a  
 world where Cromwell can be Cromwell. He sees it; then he doesnÕt. The  
 moment is fleeting. But insight cannot be taken back. You cannot return to  
 the moment you were in before (WH 205). 
In this passage Mantel charts CromwellÕs thoughts, and his intuitive, almost felt 
insights into his situation. The punctuation allows Mantel to weave together insight, 
thought, feeling seamlessly within the narrative: focalised with Cromwell but also 
detached from him. ÔKnowing how to lookÕ suggests an intra- and inter-textual world 
of perception between the characters, the author and the reader. In the sentences that 
begin ÔThere isÉÕ, for example, the narration is ambiguous: this Ôworld of the 
possibleÕ is somehow beneath the conscious awareness of Cromwell, who remains 
the focalised character.  Mantel stretches the boundaries of free indirect discourse,  63
with Cromwell referring to himself in the third person. This narrative device, where 
the narration begins focused on Cromwell and then seems to move outwards, 
suggests an ambiguity within the textÕs focalisation but also attests to an intuition: Ôhe 
sees it; then he doesnÕtÕ. This is MantelÕs attempt to capture what it is like to intuit 
something, as well as present to the reader CromwellÕs grasp of this Ôworld of the 
 See Mieke Bal who takes up GenetteÕs idea of focalisation, as it helps to explain how Ôlanguage 63
shapes vision and world-viewÕ (19). Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative 2nd ed. 
Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994. 
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possibleÕ. His handle on the thoughts, feelings, intuition, is ÔfleetingÕ; it comes in 
flashes and blinks, itÕs there, then itÕs gone.  This referentiality of free indirect style 64
means that Cromwell is almost writing himself. The use of third person creates 
distance and exposes the alignment between author and character. This illusion of a 
character writing himself shows the seamless focalisation and the narratorÕs near-
invisibility.  
 An ÔIÕ intrudes into the third person narration, at the place of 
CromwellÕs switch of allegiance, when he survives the downfall of his master: 
 Very well. I dry my tears, those tears from All Hallows day. I sit with the  
 cardinal, by the fire at Esher in a room with a smoking chimney. I say, my  
 lord, do you think I would forsake you? I locate the man in charge of  
 chimneys and hearths. I give him orders. I ride to London, to Blackfriars.  
 The day is foggy, St. HubertÕs Day. Norfolk is waiting, to tell me he will be a 
 good lord to me (WH 162). 
Mantel uses the ÔIÕ here to point out CromwellÕs actions, where the ÔIÕ is usually 
reserved for thought and dialogue. Mantel is demonstrating the power of CromwellÕs 
consciousness through the use of ÔIÕ, how he directs the action, but this anomalous ÔIÕ 
is also used to explore the boundaries of free indirect discourse. Mantel employs a 
ÔweÕ in this narrative for the same reason. For example, when Mantel describes 
CromwellÕs son Gregory, Ô[H]e has plenty of growing to do, and we hope he will 
grow tallÕ (36), the reader asks Ôwho is speaking here?Õ This sentence is at once a 
reference to GregoryÕs terrible Latin, and at the same time a nudge at the limits of 
free indirect discourse and its ability to represent the multiplicity of consciousness.  
 This multiplicity of consciousness, of voices, seems to break out of the 
confines of free indirect discourse and becomes something altogether stranger than 
the realist text.  In Telepathy and Literature, Nicholas Royle advances the argument 65
 Discussed more fully in chapter one; I return to the idea of intermittency in the conclusion.64
 See also Clare ConnorsÕ paper ÒFree - Indirect - Style (Derrida and Bowen)Ó which explores the 65
form in interesting ways.
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of the literary text being a Ôreading machineÕ, or Ôreading effectÕ that complements its 
Ôtelepathic structureÕ. The reader is invited to read the minds of the characters within 
this created world of the authorÕs devising. Nicholas Royle asserts the openness of 
this gesture ÔÉwithout knowing where it is going, who is speaking or who is 
listening, or at what distanceÕ (Royle Telepathy 26). Mantel employs this openness in 
her use of free indirect discourse by stretching the bounds of focalisation; letting the 
focaliser refer to himself in the third person and blurring the observations made by 
Cromwell, and the narrator/author.  This blurring further occurs with Cromwell 66
carefully noting othersÕ mannerisms and behaviour; for example, Ôhe studies Dr 
Cranmer: his way of blinking, the cautious finger he lays to his chin, his eloquent 
eyes and his pale praying handsÕ (WH 249). CromwellÕs practice of the novelistsÕ art 
of observation is noticed by the other characters. EmperorÕs man Eustache Chapuys, 
for example, exclaims at the unveiling of CromwellÕs portrait, Ôone never thinks of 
you alone, CremuelÕ (WH 527). CromwellÕs observing consciousness organises the 
appearance and behaviours of the other characters. Like the writer, he is an 
exemplary reader, of people and situations, a master of words. The description of the 
Duke of Norfolk, Ôlean as a gnawed bone and cold as an axe-headÕ (WH 162) bears 
the mark of MantelÕs writing (with shades of Dickens, Ebenezer Scrooge being Ôhard 
and sharp as flintÕ in A Christmas Carol) and CromwellÕs own determinations of the 
Duke as a personality to deal with. Mantel continues:  
 He [the Duke] thinks book-reading an affectation altogether, and wishes  
 there were less of it at court. His niece is always reading, Anne Boleyn,  
 which is perhaps why she is unmarried at the age of twenty-eight (163). 
 As Fludernik points out on page 6 of The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The 66
Linguistic representation of speech and consciousness. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. Ôon 
account of the close relationship to deixis, free indirect discourse is now seen to be crucial to the 
discussion about narrative point of view and the linguistic representation of subjectivity.Õ
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The DukeÕs dislike of reading and writing marks him off as a philistine. He is 
presented as the man of action, whose Ôjoints seem knitted together of supple chain-
linksÕ (WH 162); who eschews intellectual labour for the craft of war. What this 
subtle distinction also does is to further align Cromwell with the author and the 
novelistÕs craft.  
 This connection of Cromwell with the author is demonstrated earlier, 
when Liz questions Cromwell if the gossip is true (that Henry wants to divorce 
Queen Katherine because she cannot have a son): 
 So this morning Ñ waking early, brooding on what Liz said last night Ñ he  
 wonders, why should my wife worry about women who have no sons?  
 Possibly itÕs something women do: spend time imagining what itÕs like to be  
 each other. 
 One can learn from that, he thinks. (WH 44) 
If we take Nicholas RoyleÕs model of telepathy into account, isnÕt this precisely what 
the writer does? Mantel not only imagines what it is like to be Cromwell, but reads 
his mind and speaks for him as well. This is precisely what Mantel does, spends time 
imagining what it is like to be Cromwell. The ironic Ôpossibly itÕs something women 
doÕ enfolds within itself multiple meanings: the author as a woman who does just 
this; the novel as a domestic product and ÔwomenÕs businessÕ;  and the putting into 67
question of CromwellÕs status as a literary and historical figure. Thus Cromwell 
demonstrates MantelÕs commitment to the provisional, exemplified by her 
representation of his interiority.  
 The provisional is the possible, a word which occurs time and again as 
Cromwell explores the possible in the world Mantel creates for him. The cardinal has 
been forced out to Esher, and Lady Anne has taken over York Place. The cardinal is 
not yet dead, but he is out of favour with the King.  The moment in which Cromwell 
 As Clare Connors puts it Ô Éthe novel is the literary genre which, from its very bastard origins, has 67
been written by womenÕ ÒFree- Indirect- Style (Derrida and Bowen).Ó (16)
!107
perceives the ÔpossibleÕ comes after his first meeting with the Lady Anne in the 
cardinalÕs old house. The perception of this possible world for Cromwell connects 
him to Anne Boleyn, ÔA world where Anne can be queen is a world where Cromwell 
can be CromwellÕ (WH 205). The somewhat tautological phrase ÔCromwell can be 
CromwellÕ leaves a blank; as other characters enquire of him, what is he? What is he 
made of? Any gaps in the historical record are exploited by Mantel to create this 
mysterious picture:  
 A manÕs power is in the half-light, in the half-seen movements of his hand  
 and the unguessed-at expression of his face. It is the absence of facts that  
 frightens people: the gap you open, into which they pour their fears,  
 fantasies, desires (WH 359). 
CromwellÕs blankness is the source of his power, in terms of MantelÕs 
characterisation and historically. As she describes him in Bring up the Bodies: Ô[H]is 
expression is as blank as a freshly painted wallÕ (BUB 16). CromwellÕs blankness is 
employed by Mantel to express the contingent and provisional; his allegiances are 
mysterious and questionable, his opinions ÔflexibleÕ. For example, Gardiner and 
CromwellÕs conversation after Anne is installed as Marquess of Pembroke: ÔWell,Õ 
Gardiner says, Ôif your mind is infinitely flexible. As yours, I see, would have to 
beÕ (390). CromwellÕs flexibility of mind speaks to possibility and thus the 
provisional.  
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Free indirect discourse in Fludd 
The idea of possibility takes a different form in MantelÕs novel Fludd. While it is also 
a novel based on a historical figure, the character is written into the text as an 
absence. One of the nuns in the parish that Fludd (who does not pose as a curate but 
is assumed to be the threatened curate by Father Angwin) has ÔtransformedÕ, Sister 
Philomena, runs away with Fludd. Her transformation from nun back into her 
previous identity of Roisin OÕHalloran takes place with Sister Anthony dressing her 
from an old chest of pre-convent clothing, as elsewhere Father Angwin muses on 
Fludd, asking Agnes: 
 ÔWhere is Father Fludd?  
 ÔIn his room. I think I heard him go up.Õ 
      ÔI thought I heard him come down. Still, both are possible.Õ 
 Both at once, he thought. (Fludd 154) 
Angwin, the angry agnostic alcoholic priest, is shown by Mantel to understand the 
nature of the curious Fludd, who the reader knows is an alchemist, come to effect 
transformations. A creature who appears, angel-like; who does not eat, or sleep, or 
drink, he transcends the boundaries of physical matter, has the secret of spirit and 
matter. Agnes and Angwin discuss the possible whereabouts of Fludd. This lengthy 
and circuitous dialogue tells the reader one thing while showing another, as both 
interlocutors ÔknowÕ that Fludd is not upstairs but persist in the assumption that he is 
there. ÔI did not positively see him go up,Õ said Miss Dempsey. ÔOr come 
downÕ (156). MantelÕs narrator intrudes here, focusing out from the domestic scene in 
the vicarage, and back: 
    They knew, though, that the upper storey was empty, quite as certainly as they had  
 ever known anything. Ashes rustled softly through the grate; on the walls twisted  
 Christs continued dying; in the church grounds, yellow leaves floated in darkening  
 air, birds huddled in the trees of the terraces, and worms turned. 
       ÔShall I put the kettle on?Õ Agnes said (157) 
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There is an omniscient narrator in MantelÕs Fludd, who sees into the private thoughts 
of a character but is otherwise effaced from the text. The narrator is effaced, as they 
should be in classical realism, allowing the reader to pretend to a neutrality which is 
anything but. Whereas in Wolf Hall and Bring up the Bodies we have an alignment 
with Cromwell, such that the choice of third person seems to have an estranging or 
detaching effect, in Fludd the narratorÕs invisibility belies a viewpoint which is 
presented by the author, who invites the reader, in turn, to share it. Take MantelÕs 
characterisation of Miss Agnes Dempsey. The reader already understands that she is 
Father AngwinÕs housekeeper: timid, not too bright, thinking that sycophants Ôare a 
kind of deaconÕ. She is deferential, calling the BishopÕs secretary ÔMy LordÉ
although in retrospect she knew that the secretary did not merit thisÕ (5). The 
revelation of Miss DempseyÕs busybody status invites the reader to judgement: 
 Might - if she had thought that anyone needed to know. She herself was the judge of  
 what anyone needed to know. For Miss Dempsey occupied a special mediatory  
 position, between church, convent and everyone else. To acquire information was her 
 positive duty, and then what she did with it was a matter for her judgement and  
 experience. Miss Dempsey would have eavesdropped on the confessional, if she  
 could; she had often wondered how she might manage it (7). 
Miss DempseyÕs eavesdropping on the confessional suggests an unscrupulousness at 
odds with her status within the community, as helpmeet to the beleaguered Father 
Angwin. The irony is that Mantel opens up Miss DempseyÕs mind to the reader, 
eavesdropping on her private thoughts and actions. She describes her eating a 
chocolate, twisting the wrapper into a ring shape and slipping it onto her finger. A 
miniature wedding ceremony, conducted by herself but also an alchemical wedding 
with the throwing of the material onto the fire: Ôthis was Miss DempseyÕs private 
habit, which no one had ever seenÕ (8). Mantel concludes the description of Miss 
Dempsey: Ôabove her upper lip, on the right hand side, she had a small flat wart, 
colourless as her mouth itself. It was hard for her not to touch it. She was afraid of 
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cancerÕ (8). Traditional omniscience is employed by Mantel here, not only to 
introduce the important plot devices of ring, wart and alchemy, but also to lay bare 
realist tools and open them up to questioning.  
 At the same time as the tools of realism are laid bare, there is also a 
concealment. Despite the use of a traditionally omniscient narrator who reads a 
characterÕs private thoughts, there is something incomplete and incomprehensible 
about Miss Dempsey. The description we get of her asks more questions than it 
answers; also seeming to conceal and twist even as the reader reads the mind of the 
character. The openness of the reading gesture informs MantelÕs writing, in Fludd 
and elsewhere, and allows the reader to embrace an unenclosed ending, an ending 
which is also a beginning, as for example in the more recent Bring up the Bodies. 
This openness to reading invokes RoyleÕs sense of ÔtelepathyÕ, the telepathic reading 
experience suggesting the irony of the mind-reading narrator; a technique so Ôanti-
realÕ is used to present a narrative which is ÔrealÕ.  
 The realist construction of this novel is contrasted to the almost magical 
events it recounts. Miss DempseyÕs wart disappears, the morning after she assists in 
disinterring the statues the bishop ordered to be removed from the church: ÔSheÉ
caught sight of herself in the oval looking glass. Her face was dead white, weary; her 
eyes looked sore. But all the same, her wart had goneÕ (145). The ring and wart are 
devices which ÔringÕ the plot, allow it to come full circle and for divine justice (not 
the same, in MantelÕs writing, as belief in the Catholic Church) to be done. Agnes 
makes a ring, from a gold toffee paper wrapper, which is put into an envelope and 
delivered to Sister Philomena, formerly Roisin OÕHalloran, who is plotting her 
escape from the convent. At the same time, the bullying Mother Perpetua (ÔPurpitÕ) 
has discovered a wart on her face. The alchemical transmutation that Fludd effects is 
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diffuse, spread throughout the characters. Knowledge transcends the physical world, 
while also being part of it. FluddÕs final parting ÔmiracleÕ (as Agnes calls his 
manifestation later on, 184) is to burn the grotesque Mother Perpetua; to punish her 
for her sins, to stop her from getting to Roisin, or both. Roisin escapes with Fludd 
and they spend the night together. When Roisin wakes in the hotel and Fludd is gone, 
she finds that he has left her 
 Éthe railwaymanÕs kerchief, which he had torn from the fence pole as he crossed the 
 allotments on his way to the station. ÔI left them something of my own,Õ he had said.  
    ÔI did not wish to go from the parish having made no markÕ (180). 
Mantel writes about the mark that Fludd has made, through free indirect discourse, 
and through the effaced narrator who is able to read the private thoughts of all the 
characters, but also offer an ÔobjectiveÕ account of their behaviour. The burning of 
Mother Perpetua, however, is attributed in Father AngwinÕs mind to the tobacconist 
Judd McEvoy: 
     ÔThey call it spontaneous combustion,Õ the bishop said. He looked wild-eyed at the 
 thought.  
     ÔCombustion, certainly,Õ Father Angwin agreed. Personally he doubted the  
 spontaneity of it; he had doubted it at once, when he learnt that McEvoy was on the  
 scene. It is a wise man, he thought, who can tell the firefighter from the arsonist  
 (174). 
Mantel cuts away between the scenes, writing two different ÔversionsÕ like the 
dialogue between Agnes and Angwin, in which one thing is known but another is 
said: both ÔversionsÕ are true in their own way.  The many transformations Fludd 
brings about have the effect of destabilising the villageÕs certainty of faith, while also 
redressing the balance in a moral sense. Those who are deserving are rewarded, those 
who are not are punished. In this way a text ostensibly about religion is a much more 
magically secular fairy tale. Nevertheless it is clear that MantelÕs textuality wants to 
bend and extend realist practice; she appears to be setting the reader up for a kind of 
ÔrealismÕ, when the novel offers something altogether stranger. 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Character and Cromwell 
MantelÕs exploration of free indirect discourse in Fludd pushes at the borders of 
realism, just as she does in her attempt to occupy Thomas CromwellÕs 
consciousness. In this section I wish to consider how Mantel operates within 
and pushes at the boundaries of another marker of realism: character. In her 
essay ÔMr Bennett and Mrs BrownÕ, Woolf refers to character as a Ôwillo the 
wispÕ and shape changer, it being the novelistÕs job to Ôsomehow reconstruct a 
habitable dwelling-place; it is from the gleams and flashes of this flying spirit 
that he must create solid, living flesh-and-blood Mrs BrownÕ (Woolf Selected 
Essays 35). Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle (with reference to 
Middlemarch), suggest that: Ô[w]hile realist conventions of character may rely 
on the opposition between inner and outer, mind or spirit and body, and so on, 
EliotÕs description of Dorothea also shows how this opposition can be 
questioned from within the realist tradition itselfÕ (Bennett and Royle 65). 
 Character and its ÔportrayalÕ is one of the signals that what we are reading is 
ÔrealistÕ; ideas about characterÕs ÔdepthÕ suggest assumptions of motivation and an 
adherence to depth psychology, for example.  We are invited into a particular way of 68
reading by characters which will on some level make us ÔlikeÕ, Ôidentify withÕ or have 
ÔsympathyÕ for them. Realist characters, as Bennett and Royle write, should have Ôa 
certain complexityÕ but the complexities Ôshould cohere in a single identityÕ (62). 
They continue: ÔRealist characterization presupposes a ÒmimeticÓ model of literary 
texts whereby what is primary or original is a real person, and a character in a book is 
simply a copy of such a personÕ (Bennett and Royle 62). 
 See for example, E.M. ForsterÕs differentiation between flat and rounded characters in Aspects of the 68
Novel.
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 To read character in this way is Òto assume a ÔdepthÕ, a truth that is hidden but 
discoverableÓ (Cixous 385), which closes off the potentiality of character which is 
Ôopen, unpredictableÕ (385). Character is the insurance of a readerÕs investment, and 
without it Ô[N]o one to talk to, to recognise, to identify with. The reader is loath to 
venture into a place where there is no mirrorÕ (Cixous 387). By reminding us of the 
etymology of character, kharattein, to engrave, Cixous is also reminding us of the 
force of identification that underscores assumptions of character. Character marks us 
off as singular, unique: we are like this, they are like that. By exploring character we 
can Ôdismember the marionette, cut the strings, distort the mirrorÕ (Cixous 389), in 
other words experience the strangeness and otherness of character, of the subject 
within ourselves. This subject takes part in what Cixous calls the fiction of a stable 
subject, a fiction that is bought into by discourses of character and underpinned by 
reading practices that bolster the illusion.  
 MantelÕs Wolf Hall suggests exciting ways of reading characters, 
particularly Thomas Cromwell. Thinking back to BarthesÕ reality effect, I 
suggest that Mantel treats interiority in a similar way. By creating Thomas 
CromwellÕs inner life, she conjures a powerful interiority effect which aligns 
the authorÕs consciousness with the characterÕs consciousness. This 
seamlessness between author and character effectively kills the narrator, thus 
transforming the use of free indirect discourse. The use of the term 
ÔseamlessnessÕ is not coincidental: Mantel uses weaving in the Tudor novels as 
a metaphor for the stitching together of the narrative fabric. For example, 
Thomas More is described as ÔunravellingÕ (WH 227), as is the cardinal (60). At 
crucial points in the novel the tightly wound textu(r)al weave appears to be 
unspooling. Thomas CromwellÕs inspection of MoreÕs carpet yields a flaw in 
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the weave, Ôhe walks forward, puts a tender hand on the flaw, the interruption 
in the weave, the lozenge slightly distorted, warped out of trueÕ (WH 228). 
Stephen Gardiner, also present at dinner, is another character of low birth 
whose illegitimacy is an open secret. Gardiner is reluctantly connected to 
Cromwell by his fabric trade family. The weave of textual fabric and 
Cromwell's appraisal of it connects to the social fabric and an understanding of 
CromwellÕs (and GardinerÕs) outsider status. His character is the flaw in the 
weave, his out of place-ness a notch in the seamless social fabric of the time. 
Mantel thus not only uses painting to demonstrate her characterisationÕs 
interiority effect, but also the trope of weaving to describe the construction of 
the narrative and social fabric. As Fludd uses ÔfoldingÕ as a movement of 
texture, so Mantel employs the idea of ÔweaveÕ in the Tudor novels to 
complicate realism.   
 Mantel uses the word ÔpersonÕ to demonstrate CromwellÕs peculiar and 
provisional status as flaw, notch in the social fabric. According to Chambers, a 
person is: ÔA living soul or self-conscious being; A character represented, as on 
the stage; A capacity in which one is acting; A personality; A human being, 
sometimes used contemptuously or patronizinglyÕ. The latter definition, it is 
safe to assume, covers what the Duke of Norfolk thinks about the upstart 
Thomas Cromwell: ÔDamn it all, Cromwell, why are you such a É person? It 
isnÕt as if you could afford to be.Õ (WH 163) NorfolkÕs pause and the ellipses 
suggest that Norfolk has trouble categorising Cromwell, he is trying to work 
out what he is and where he belongs. A self-made man of low birth, Thomas 
CromwellÕs position was unusual in 1529. Mantel also subverts realist 
characterisation by incorporating the term ÔpersonÕ into the text at various 
!115
points: by doing so she exposes the connection that Cixous makes between the 
Ônature of fictionÕ (Cixous 383, emphasis in original) and the fiction of 
subjectivity. She continues: Ô[w]here the term ÒfictionÓ should not be taken 
simply (in the sense of borne in mind) as part of a pair of opposites, which 
would make it the contrary of Òreality.ÓÕ (Cixous 383, emphasis in original). 
The constructions of character that are written show the fictionality of what we 
call our ÔrealÕ selves. How does Mantel employ the word ÔpersonÕ in Wolf Hall, 
and in what ways does it undermine realism? 
 Firstly, as just outlined, she uses ÔpersonÕ to suggest CromwellÕs low 
birth and the reaction to it from the old aristocracy; Norfolk in particular. 
Mantel gets comic mileage out of NorfolkÕs frustration with CromwellÕs 
seeming smoothness, his nonchalance. There was little terminology to describe 
the sixteenth century man of Ôlow birthÕ that would mark him out from the 
cattle he farmed. The term ÔgentlemanÕ was exclusively reserved for the high 
born, the noble. Both Cromwell and Wolsey upset this idea, through their low 
parentage, unsettling the social status quo; God, King, nobles and at the 
bottom, peasants and everyone else. Norfolk continues his vitriol towards 
Cromwell: ÔThe duke stabs a forefinger into his shoulder. ÔYou É person,Õ he 
says; and again, Ôyou nobody from Hell, you whore-spawn, you cluster of evil, 
you lawyerÕ (WH 187). Again the ellipses, although this time Norfolk has added 
more insults to the repertoire. Cromwell refers to himself as a person, talking to 
Stephen Gardiner:  
 ÔI suppose heÕs tired of churchmen. He wants to know what he can learn  
 from É whatever it is you call yourself, these days.Õ ÔA person,Õ he says  
 placidly. ÔThe Duke of Norfolk says IÕm a person.Õ (WH 232)  
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Mantel is alert to the complexity of the word ÔpersonÕ as it relates to character in 
literary texts, the fictional construction of the historical figure, and indeed the 
fictional construction of the idea of the self. When Cromwell is invited to dine with 
the merchant Antonio Bonvisi, Spring 1530, his position at court is looked at with 
humour: ÔÒWhat do you think, now you are a courtier?Ó There are smiles around the 
table. Because, of course, the idea is so ridiculous, the situation so temporaryÕ (WH 
189). The temporary nature of CromwellÕs position is echoed by his dealings with the 
cardinal, as he says to Wolsey, ÔÒIÕll come to fetch you, the minute the king summons 
you back.Ó He believes and does not believe that this will happenÕ (212). The reader 
is poised, aligned with Cromwell, for the fall, the rise, and this speaks again to the 
idea of possibility, and the provisional stance; the temporary nature of his position, 
just at the cusp.  
 Mantel does much to make Cromwell an attractive character, 
particularly against the ascetic and heartless churchmen Stephen Gardiner and 
Thomas More: the provisional stance she takes up aligns the reader with his ÔselfÕ, in 
all its constructed-ness. As readers, we feel and think along with him; we feel 
sympathy for him. Although the movement of the realist characterisation is strong 
here, and pulls the reader along with it, at the same time, we are alerted to the 
construction of Cromwell as not just a ÔpersonÕ but a persona. Etymologically closely 
related to person, the persona adds a layer of suggestion, meaning ÔSocial facade or 
public imageÕ. The meaning of person as Ôbodily presence or actionÕ (Chambers) 
connects MantelÕs writing of the person of Cromwell, her imagining of his lived 
experience. The many uses of the word person that she employs allows her to explore 
the ÔbeginningsÕ of something, the individual, the nation, in all its multiplicity 
without simple recourse to an origin. This is demonstrated when he teases 
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Christophe, the servant, Ôyou can come Christophe, youÕre not a personÕ (WH 473). 
When he is at York Place, with Anne, and she tells him: ÔÒMy father says, one can 
never be sure of that person, one can never tell who heÕs working for. I should have 
thought - but then I am only a woman - that it is perfectly obvious that youÕre 
working for yourself.Ó That makes us alike, he thinks: but does not quite say.Õ (237) 
 The word ÔpersonÕ thus seems to connect Cromwell and Anne Boleyn, 
in the sense of persons of presence, and as in personas. The masks that Mantel makes 
each of them put on are meta-fictionally alluded to, ÔWe are breezing in to push our 
luckÕ (WH 531). Princess Mary refers to Anne as Ôthe personÕ twice on page 290, and 
again on 555: the word is used where the speaker cannot categorise the subject of 
their conversation within the strict parameters of social life at the time. Only the 
King, interestingly, is able to voice what others say about Cromwell: ÔYou see this 
councillor of mine? I warn you, never play any game with him. For he will not 
respect your ancestry. He has no coat of arms and no name, but he believes he is bred 
to winÕ (WH 407). CromwellÕs lack of ÔbackgroundÕ is no disadvantage to him, but 
his provisional place affords him hitherto unthought of privileges of access to the 
King. Not only is CromwellÕs place among his betters a temporary one, but Mantel 
also weaves in gossip and slander in order to show CromwellÕs place in society: 
 He is a good friend and master; this is said of him everywhere. Otherwise, it  
 is the usual abuse. His father was a blacksmith, a crooked brewer, he was an  
 Irishman, he was a criminal, he was a Jew, and he himself was just a wool  
 trader, he was a shearsman, and now he is a sorcerer: how else but by being a 
 sorcerer would he get the reins of power in his hand? (WH 585) 
Consider also Jane RochfordÕs description of Mark Smeaton:  
 ÔHe sticks like a burr to his betters. He does not know his place. He is a  
 jumped-up nobody, taking his chance because the times are disordered.Õ  
 Cromwell replies, ÔI suppose you could say the same of me, Lady Rochford.  
 And IÕm sure you do.Õ (WH 507) 
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The sticky burr that catches on the clothes of CromwellÕs betters reminds us of 
JamesÕ web that catches experience in its grasp, drawing the connection between 
fictional captures of experience and the characterÕs brushes with the real. The 
construction of CromwellÕs character intersects with the ÔrealÕ in the etymology of 
ÔpersonÕ. This two way movement of character and subject allows Mantel to develop 
a more fluid relationship than that suggested by realist conventions of character 
construction. This fluidity is alluded to by Leo Bersani in conversation with Nicholas 
Royle, as he says, ÔI think questions of character are precisely a kind of petrification 
of the ability to moveÕ (Royle ÒConversationsÓ 266).  Just as the subject in the world 69
becomes fixed and stale through questions of character, so MantelÕs feat consists of 
capturing some of the dynamism of the real while also questioning realismÕs 
conventions. MantelÕs narrative uses apparent historical authenticity in order to 
expose the fictionality of the ÔrealÕ itself. The fictionality of the real also points to the 
fictionality of the idea of ÔcharacterÕ as a unified or discrete entity. 
The realist compromise: Woolf, Mantel, and Rancire  
Virginia Woolf desires that the novelist depicts life as it is, beyond the surface detail. 
The ability to ask the question, Ôis life really like this?Õ is the constant negotiation for 
the novelist, whose craft is subject to frameworks of unconscious assumptions about 
the text and the world. The strange happenings of MantelÕs work, their ÔothernessÕ 
connects back to Jacques Rancire's thesis on the ÔcompromiseÕ between narrative 
force and the diffusion of energies that constitutes the sensible world. To return to 
Virginia Woolf, we find another version of the ÔcompromiseÕ which can be usefully 
 See also his notion of Ôpsychic mobilityÕ in A Future for Astyanax: Character and Desire in 69
Literature. Toronto: Little, Brown, 1969 (9). 
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related to Mantel. Critical of writers who adhere to an unnecessarily constrained 
novelistic form, in her 1919 essay ÒModern FictionÓ Woolf writes: 
 The mediocrity of most novels seems to arise from a conviction on the part of the  
 writer that unless his plot provides scenes of tragedy, comedy and excitement, an air  
 of probability so impeccable that if all his figures were to come to life they would  
 find themselves dressed down to the last button in the fashion of the hour, he has  
 failed in his duty to the public. (Woolf Essays 33)  
The dedication to an Ôair of probabilityÕ and the writerÕs desire to give the public 
what they want combine to strangle attempts at creativity. The writer, though, in 
WoolfÕs view, must at some point ask the question Ôwhether life is like this after 
all?Õ (33). She continues: 
 Is it not possible that the accent falls a little differently, that the moment of  
 importance came before or after, that, if one were free and could set down what one  
 chose, there would be no plot, little probability, and a vague general confusion in  
 which the clear-cut features of the tragic, the comic, the passionate, and the lyrical  
 were dissolved beyond the possibility of separate recognition? (33) 
WoolfÕs argument here is that to impose novelistic order, essentially a realistic order, 
does not produce art that is life-like but stilted forms that stifle the life of the writerÕs 
mind, Ôblotting out the light of the conceptionÕ (33). Moving away from the 
constraints of the novel form, WoolfÕs realism consists of the writerÕs attempt to 
reproduce lifeÕs minutiae as it is: not only the appearance of the writerÕs room, but 
the consciousness of the writer within that room. Not only the material aspects and 
appearances that can be described, but something akin to what might be called spirit. 
The status of the visual in realism is complicated by both Woolf and Mantel; both 
realists in the sense that their attempts to capture the ÔrealÕ go beyond what is seen, 
beyond the directly perceptible: ÔThe mind, exposed to the ordinary course of life, 
receives upon its surface a myriad impressions Ñ trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or 
engraved with the sharpness of steelÕ (33). It is the Ômyriad impressionsÕ that WoolfÕs 
novelist must capture, and these ÔimpressionsÕ that constitute the ÔrealÕ to which her 
kind of realism refers. WoolfÕs attention to what is Ôreally thereÕ is a preoccupation of 
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MantelÕs, also concerned with how to represent Ôthe vision in our mindsÕ (Woolf 
Essays 33).  
 Having only the Ôformal railway lineÕ of the sentence to express experience 
leads to limitations. An indisputably linear form; in MantelÕs words, Ôyou do a little 
sentence and then another little sentenceÉÕ  (Boylan ed. 39). The sentence as 
analogous to the flow of time reveals the time-boundedness of narrative but also 
obscures the myriad ÔmomentsÕ that make up its construction. These ÔmomentsÕ are 
not time-bounded; they allow for the possibility of movement across, within and 
around time. If what is going on in the notion of traditional realism we looked at 
earlier is an adherence to a model of time that flows, (aided and abetted by the 
sentence and its Woolfian railway line), then what happens in MantelÕs brand of 
realism? The process can be metaphorised in different ways; as weaving, for one, 
which fits with the trope of the needle (and also provides us with domesticity and 
female-centred narrative). Or as a ÔtelescopingÕ of time, or a nesting within and 
between frames, which fits within the frame of vision, and the image. Adherence to 
timeÕs arrow is called into question by MantelÕs Tudor novels, by their commitments 
to reading and the connections Mantel explores between painting, writing and 
ÔrepresentationÕ. This causality upends the idea of the ÔselfÕ as independent actor in 
the drama of life; pointing instead to its ultimate fictionality. 
 Virginia WoolfÕs correspondence with Jacques Raverat, discussed by 
Quentin Bell in his biography of Woolf,  suggests an interesting connection between 70
writing and painting, and the tension between linear succession and the texture of 
experience. He asks her what she is writing at that moment, and Woolf playfully but 
 Also pointed out by David Lodge in Consciousness and the Novel, where he states: Ôthe primary 70
limitation is this: that verbal language is essentially linear. One word or word-group comes after 
another, and we apprehend their syntactically cumulative meaning linearly, in timeÕ (62)
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firmly rebuffs his request. His reply to her points out that writing is Ôessentially 
linearÕ (qtd Bell 106), that the writer can only write or read one thing at a time, 
whereas the painter is able to employ images that radiate out all at once, not one after 
another. This seems counter-intuitive; surely the flatness of a painted surface cannot 
express the multiplicity of language and its richness in narrative? WoolfÕs reply 
acknowledges the constraints of the linear form, while also being clear that the writer 
must Ôgo beyond Òthe formal railway line of the sentenceÓÕ(Bell 106). As Bell puts it, 
Ôshe is claiming for herself the ability, or at least the intention, to see events out of 
time, to apprehend processes of thought and feeling as though they were pictorial 
shapesÕ (107). This is only partly the point. The tension arising between the linearity 
of the sentence and the form or quality of experience, rendered in writing (what we 
have been calling texture) is the driving force of the dynamism of writing.   
Successiveness is at stake in the need to create intelligible discourse; we use language 
in a linear way, a ÔcumulativeÕ way, as David Lodge puts it (Lodge Consciousness 
62).  The sentence is the building block of the novel, Ôa complete grammatical 71
structureÕ, according to Chambers. Put together, sentences build narrative. What 
Woolf is trying to do (as Bell suggests she does in her later work) is to work this 
tension between linearity and texture, incorporating a self-conscious understanding of 
successiveness in writing and how it can be manipulated into showing things how 
they Ôreally areÕ.   72
 The thought about successiveness is echoed by Ann BanfieldÕs choice of epigraph for her 71
final chapter of Unspeakable Sentences, a quote from FoucaultÕs Order of Things, the 
relevant part excerpted here, Ôlanguage cannot represent thought, instantly, in its totality; 
it is bound to arrange it, part by part, in linear orderÕ Banfield, Ann. Unspeakable 
Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction. London: Routledge 
Kegan Paul, 1982 (256). 
 On the other hand, Brian Richardson argues in ÒLinearity and Its Discontents: Rethinking 72
Narrative Form and Ideological ValenceÓ (College English July 2000 no. 62 vol 6 pp 685 - 
695) that the self-consciously experimental Mrs Dalloway, which wants to represent Ô[a] 
single consciousness moving through time Ñ actually necessitates a linear sequence; time 
and consciousness both move unidirectionally, and to mimetically recreate the flow of 
thoughts a chronological order is indispensableÕ (Richardson 686).
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 WoolfÕs commitment to exploring how things Ôreally areÕ suggests a 
way of thinking about MantelÕs ÔTudorÕ novels and the attention given within these 
novels to painting. CromwellÕs sitting for Holbein is an enduring interest of MantelÕs 
and demonstrates the interweaving of painting and writing in her attempts to 
ÔcaptureÕ the feel and texture of CromwellÕs consciousness. This is a matter of Ôtight 
little facts and figuresÕ (Appendix i 241), but also a question of how historical novels 
can expose the illusions of fiction.  One example of how historical novels are 73
presented is given by Jerome de Groot in his book Consuming History (2009). He 
suggests that:  
The point and the attraction of the historical novel as a form are this dynamic  
 between the ÔauthenticÕ or factual and the rediscovery of untraceable experience  
 which is the keynote of fiction. The reader of the historical novel inhabits both a  
 discourse of history and a discourse of fiction, and the interplay between the two is  
 the dynamic crucial to the genre (de Groot 223-4). 
Where and how is it possible to rediscover Ôuntraceable experienceÕ? If it is 
ÔuntraceableÕ it doesnÕt exist to be rediscovered; the novelist must make it up. 
De Groot is correct that the historical novel occupies an interesting position 
with regard to both fictional and historical narratives. The historical novel is, by 
definition (running with de GrootÕs notion for the time being), a realist novel. 
The rediscovery that de Groot refers to (and which I am questioning here) is the 
rediscovery of predictable processes and outcomes; causality is pressed into the 
service of historical and realistic plausibility. Cause and effect are employed by 
realism to arrive at the already forgone conclusion of history. De GrootÕs 
dichotomy of ÔauthenticityÕ and Ôrediscovery of untraceable experienceÕ seems 
 For a different view, see Rosario AriasÕ ÒExoticising the Tudors: Hilary MantelÕs Re-Appropriation 73
of the Past in Wolf Hall and Bring up the Bodies.Ó in Rousselet, Elodie. ed. Exoticising the Past in 
Contemporary Neo-Historical Fiction. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. See 
also Sara Knox ÒHilary Mantel and the Historical Novel.Ó Bianca Leggett and Tony Venezia eds. 
Twenty-First Century British Fiction. Canterbury: Gylphi, 2015. Knox places MantelÕs work within a 
ÔmomentÕ of historical fictionÕs resurgence (129f).  
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to be false, or at least based on the exclusion of any aspects which donÕt fit 
neatly into those categories.  
 Indeed, de Groot's argument seems to be better geared towards a writing 
of history that takes historical accuracy to be entirely the point. MantelÕs 
historical novels, however, are alert to and conscious of the historical record, 
being based on solid research, while suggesting that history could always be 
otherwise. Mantel plays with the idea of traces that de Groot explores, by using 
the metafictional ÔmotifsÕ of reading, writing, and drawing; by doing so, her 
historical works disperse claims to authenticity and complicate notions of 
historical accuracy. In this model, how we read the novel and how we read 
history merge. The reader traces meaning from what is left. Not only this: 
signalling the ÔrealÕ takes on a new dimension if the ÔrealityÕ being written has 
in some senses already happened. What if we can read forwards, as well as 
backwards? Traceability suggests reconstruction, which contains construction: 
by this we can infer that Mantel is creating this for the first time, not attempting 
to capture some form of lost story. Mantel throws the idea of reading into sharp 
relief, all the time, in the Tudor novels: her engagement with historical fiction 
allows a two-way reading which makes familiar history, familiar patterns 
strange, and puts causality into question. We can read several episodes in this 
way, putting into practice Rita FelskiÕs suggestions about a reading that doesnÕt 
ÔsymptomatiseÕ or attempt to uncover some hitherto hidden bias (Felski 22).  
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The realist illusion   74
This final section will consider what I will call the Ôrealist illusionÕ. This realist 
illusion or conjuring trick is the attempt to make something that has already 
happened appear as if it is happening for the first time, right now.  In effect, 75
however, the attempt to write the ÔrealÕ is constantly beset by issues of 
causality.  Reading always occurs in retrospect. For example, in Wolf Hall, 76
there has been an incestuous scandal in the Seymour family. Cromwell learns 
of the disgrace through Anne, during Lent of 1531, when enquiring as to the 
whereabouts of Jane: 
 ÔPasty-face? Gone down to Wiltshire. Her best move would be to follow the  
 sister-in-law into a nunnery. Her sister Lizzie married well, but no one wants  
 Milksop, and now no one will.Õ Her eyes fall on his present; she says,  
 suddenly anxious, jealous, ÔWhat is it?Õ  
 ÔOnly a book of needlework patterns.Õ  
 ÔAs long as it is nothing to tax her wits. Why would you send her a present?Õ 
 ÔI feel sorry for her.Õ More now, of course. 
 ÔOh. You donÕt like her, do you?Õ The correct answer is, no, my lady Anne, I  
 only like you. ÔBecause, is it proper for you to send her a present?Õ (297)  
When Anne is given the title of Marquess of Pembroke in September 1532, however, 
Jane Seymour is in her train, as lady in waiting. The suggestion with Jane Seymour is 
that she has a special place: her return to court is swift and against Anne BoleynÕs 
wishes. It is strange that Cromwell, who knows everything before everyone else, is 
the Ôlast to knowÕ about the disgrace at Wolf Hall: the possible implication being that 
AnneÕs politicking has caused the scandal to come out into the open, her desiring for 
Jane to be shut up in a nunnery.   77
 Genette refers to an Ôillusion of mimesisÕ in Narrative Discourse: An Essay on Method. Ithaca, New 74
York: Cornell UP, 1983 (164). 
 As Peter Brooks says in Reading for the Plot ÔIf the past is to be read as present, it is a curious 75
present that we know to be past in relation to a future we know to be already in place, already in wait 
for us to reach itÕ (23).
 See Brian RichardsonsÕ Unlikely Stories: Causality and the Modern Narrative. Associated 76
University Presses, 1997. 
 As we later find out in the sequel to Wolf Hall, ÔThe queen and her confidantes had spread the story 77
around the courtÕ (BUB 12), ÔBut it is forgiven, it is forgiven. The flesh is frail. This royal visit seals 
the old fellowÕs pardon.Õ (BUB 12)
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 The informed reader knows that Jane Seymour becomes queen after 
Anne: what interests Mantel are the myriad machinations, paths taken and not taken, 
that result in JaneÕs coronation. Mantel describes Jane, walking behind her sister 
Lizzie: ÔJane whispers in her wake; her eyes are the colour of water, where her 
thoughts slip past, like gilded fishes too small for hook or netÕ (WH 502-3). With 
Cromwell, Mantel ensures we are witnesses to his thinking; with Jane Seymour, 
speculation will have to do. Jane is at court as a lady-in-waiting, and our first glimpse 
of her is when Cromwell goes to plead his CardinalÕs case for reinstatement: ÔBack in 
the shadows there is another girl, who has her face turned away, trying to 
hideÕ (200-1). Cromwell, ÔCremuelÕ  as Anne calls him, attempts to reason with 78
Anne: they tussle over whether to speak English or French, and as he entreats Anne 
to choose one language or the other, ÔHe sees a movement from the corner of his eye; 
the half-hidden girl has raised her face. She is plain and pale; she looks 
shockedÕ (202). Cromwell leaves the chamber, his cause no further along, and he is 
waylaid by Mary Boleyn. Once Mary is needed again by Anne: ÔÉthe door opens 
and the small hiding girl manoeuvres herself around it. Her face is grave, her reserve 
complete; her skin is so fine that it is almost translucentÕ (204). As Lady Carey (Mary 
Boleyn) flounces off, Jane Ôcatches his glance; behind the retreating back of Mary 
Boleyn, she raises her own eyes to heavenÕ (204).  
 Later, as the CardinalÕs case is continuing to weaken, Cromwell is 
called by Anne to court: ÔWe like to know where you areÕ (237) and is again entreated 
by AnneÕs uncle, the Duke of Norfolk, to visit her. On this visit, he meets Dr Cranmer 
for the first time: ÔThey embrace cautiously: Cambridge scholar, person from PutneyÕ 
(WH 241). On this visit, Anne shows him a piece of paper which she found in her 
 Cremulator - bone grinder78
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bed, consisting of three figures: ÔThe central figure is the King. He is large and 
handsome, and to make sure you donÕt miss him he is wearing a crown. On either 
side of him is a woman; the one on the left has no headÕ (242). Anne is convinced that 
the paper portrays an image of herself, ÔAnne sans tteÕ (241) with Katherine and the 
king, and is also convinced that the Ôsickly milk-faced creeperÕ who Ôcries if you look 
at her sidewaysÕ had put it in her bed, while turning down the sheet (242). Anne 
interprets the paper as a warning to herself from one of KatherineÕs followers, that 
Katherine will continue to be queen and her ambitions will be thwarted, ÔAinsi sera,Õ 
she says. ÔNever mind who grudges it, it will happen. I mean to have himÕ (243). 
There are strange things occurring with language here: the words of the ambassador 
on page 519, Ôla ana is enceinteÕ is a play on the sound of Ôanne sans ttesÕ. Also 
appearing in Bring Up the Bodies, on page 392: ÔAnne the Headless. Anne sans 
ttes.Õ  
 Later, however, when Cromwell and Cranmer are leaving AnneÕs 
chamber, they meet Jane Seymour; Cromwell confirms that she has been spying, and 
agrees to keep his talk with Anne in English, if he can: 
   Every rising family needs information. With the king considering himself a  
 bachelor, any little girl can hold the key to the future, and not all his money  
 is on AnneÉ. 
   He turns to watch her as she patters off in the direction of Anne Boleyn. A  
 small suspicion enters his mind, about the paper in the bed. But no, he  
 thinks. That is not possible. (WH 244)  
CromwellÕs Ôsmall suspicionÕ is never stated out loud, so the reader is left to speculate 
on the (im)possibility the paperÕs discovery has left in his mind. What if the blinkered 
and wilful Anne has misinterpreted the drawing, as depicting Queen Katherine and 
herself, when the drawing could imply AnneÕs headless position in relation to Jane, 
who will be AnneÕs successor as Queen. The suggestion of historical cause and effect 
also comes into play here, by opening up the possibility of JaneÕs scheming (belying 
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her innocent and sickly appearance). Another possibility is that JaneÕs scheming is 
brought into being by the drawing; attesting to the power of the visual and the 
importance of painting.  If this Ôlittle pale girlÕ (WH 243) and her ambition or even 
her desire to be queen is Ônot possibleÕ then this impossibility is undercut: as Mantel 
states through Cromwell, Ôany little girl can hold the key to the futureÕ. The notion of 
what is possible pervades the text, whether it is voiced or remains unspoken.  
         What this episode does is to bring cause and effect into question, as Mantel 
does more explicitly in Bring up the Bodies, through a metafictional reference to 
reading and writing. For example, Cromwell is able to use George Boleyn, Lord 
RochfordÕs vanity and arrogance against him to outwit him in the court. Words are 
used to try the ÔguiltyÕ, although the guilt is not for the deeds that they are being tried 
for; the guilt is for another matter entirely, and whether the deeds he is arraigned for 
happened or not, it doesnÕt matter. Cromwell hands Boleyn the piece of paper during 
the trial and states, 
 Certain words are written here, which the queen has said to have spoken to  
 you, and you in your turn passed them on. You need not read them   
 aloud. Just tell the court, do you recognise these words? (BUB 376) 
George Boleyn, unable to resist the temptation to play to the crowd in the 
courtroom, Ôrelishing the momentÕ, reads the words on the paper: ÔThe king 
cannot copulate with a woman, he has neither skill nor vigourÕ (BUB 376). 
Outmanoeuvred by Cromwell, George Boleyn effectively tries himself, 
facilitated by Master Secretary. 
 Similarly, at the denouement of Bring up the Bodies, gentlemen Francis 
Weston, George Boleyn, Harry Norris, William Brereton and the commoner 
Mark Smeaton are all charged with Ômeddling with the queenÕ (BUB 340). We 
can read CromwellÕs desire to catch these men and make them pay as motivated 
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by personal animosity. All of them were involved in a play called ÔThe 
CardinalÕs Descent into HellÕ, the gentlemen taking Ôone limb each of the dead 
manÕ (WH 266). Reading cause and effect forward in the usual way, 
CromwellÕs need to take the men down is motivated primarily by his desire to 
please the King, who pays his wages, and secondarily as a means of revenge 
towards those who insulted the cardinal. MantelÕs references to ÔthoughtÕ and 
ÔdeedÕ at first suggest cause and effect: the thought gives birth to the deed, 
gives mental contents a physical shape: ÔWe call it ÒimaginingÓ his death: the 
thought is father to the deed, and the deed is born raw, ugly, prematureÕ(BUB 
260).  
 Invoking the idea of birth, the action comes into being before the 
expected time. In the next passage, though, the ÔdeliveryÕ of the deed becomes 
ÔuntimelyÕ; eventually the action loses its parents altogether: 
     The design against Anne is unhallowed in its gestation, untimely in its   
 delivery, a mass of tissue born shapeless; it is waiting to be licked into shape  
 as a bear cub is licked by its mother. You nourished it, but you did not know  
 what you fed: who would have thought of Mark confessing, or of Anne acting  
 in every respect like an oppressed and guilty woman with a weight of sin upon 
 her? (BUB 369) 
     Intrigue feeds on itself; conspiracies have neither mother nor father; and yet  
 they thrive: the only thing to know is that no one knows anything (370). 
Mantel moves from a world in which thoughts exist prior to deeds to a world where 
cause and effect are made strange, put into question. The punishment has already 
been decided, as the phrase Ôbring up the bodiesÕ (i.e., take the prisoners to execution) 
suggests. Cromwell has to make the crime fit the punishment; as alluded to in the 
passage above, this is made easier for him by the behaviour of the other ÔactorsÕ. 
When he is interrogating Weston, for example, Mantel writes Cromwell musing on 
why he felt the need to go outside: 
 Perhaps it was when the boy said Ôforty-five or fiftyÕ. As if, past mid-life,  
 there is a second childhood, a new phase of innocence. It touched him,  
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 perhaps, the simplicity of it. Or perhaps he just needed air. Let us say you are 
 in a chamber, the windows sealed, you are conscious of the proximity of  
 other bodies, of the declining light. In the room you put cases, you play  
 games, you move your personnel around each other: notional bodies, hard as  
 ivory, black as ebony, pushed on their paths across the squares. Then you  
 say, I canÕt endure this anymore, I must breathe: you burst out of the room  
 and into a wild garden where the guilty are hanging from tress, no longer  
 ivory, no longer ebony, but flesh; and their wild lamenting tongues proclaim  
 their guilt as they die. In this matter, cause has been preceded by effect.  
 What you dreamed has enacted itself. You reach for the blade but the blood  
 is already shed. The lambs have butchered and eaten themselves. They have  
 brought knives to the table, carved themselves, and picked their own bones  
 clean (BUB 341). 
This strange passage brings different aspects into play. The chamber as a 
representation of consciousness; images of a chess game; the grotesquerie of 
the bodies hanging in the wild garden. The most crucial aspect here is the 
suggestion of an entirely different way of thinking about causality. The thinking 
of cause and effect has evolved even in the course of the same book. The deed 
has overtaken the thought, and on its own brings action into being, Ôthe dream 
has enacted itselfÕ. Mantel shows how time functions as a loop, endlessly 
unspooling, and thus exposes the fictionality of life itself. 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Chapter Three 
MantelÕs lost child: A Change of Climate and Every Day is MotherÕs Day 
Introduction: contemporary ideas about childhood  
This chapter begins with an overview of current thinking about the child and 
childhood, identifying problems from a cultural and historical perspective. Fiona 
Tolan, in New Directions: Writing Post-1990 (2010), identifies an upsurge in interest 
about childhood and its construction in contemporary writing. She connects this to 
the status of childhood in twentieth-century culture, particularly the anxieties around 
child protection, sexuality and the perceived dangers of the internet (Tolan 258). She 
suggests a common cultural reference point: the murder of two-year-old James 
Bulger by two ten-year-olds, Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, in 1993.  Children 79
who commit such evil acts can no longer be considered to be children, despite 
physical evidence to the contrary. Diana Gittins, in The Child in Question (1998), 
also refers to the Bulger case and contemporary discussions about the age of criminal 
responsibility; Ôwhether the boys understood adult morality and, implicitly, when 
they effectively ceased to be childrenÕ (4). She returns to the Bulger case to cement 
At the time the case induced outrage on a mass scale, and the tabloid media whipped up public fears 79
and confusions. The mood was one of punitive measures required, as Diana Gittins points out, The Sun 
even printed a coupon for its readers to fill out demanding the Home Secretary pass a long sentence on 
the perpetrators. Blake Morrison, author of As If, part memoir and recollection of childhood, part 
discussion of the Bulger case, points out in an interview by Jan Dalley ÒTrue Crime: interview of 
Blake MorrisonÓ Feb 9th 1997. Independent. Books (6th July 2016) that the only balanced writer on 
this case is Gitta Sereny. I concur with Morrison on this Ñ her two part piece in the Independent 
calmly outlines the boysÕ family situations, deficiencies in the law, and the need to balance punishment 
with rehabilitation and compassion with strict sanctions for wrongdoing. See Gitta Sereny. ÒRe-
examining the Evidence.Ó Independent. Sunday Review 6th Feb 1994, and ÒApproaching the Truth.Ó 
Independent. Sunday Review 13th Feb 1994. (Both accessed 5th July 2016). Sally Shuttleworth in The 
Mind of the Child: Child Development in Literature, Science, and Medicine, 1840-1900 Oxford UP, 
2010, argues that the ÔmindÕ of the child is a relatively recent idea that gathers pace throughout the 
Victorian era, feeding into anxieties about children and their ÔnatureÕ. These anxieties are closely 
connected to insanity, and it is interesting that Shuttleworth also cites the Bulger case in her 
introduction.
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the point: ÔÉVenables and Thompson were eventually defined not as Òbad childrenÓ, 
but as Ònon-childrenÓÕ (8).  The category of non-child is necessary, because otherwise 
the child is Ôaccorded independence, agencyÕ (8).  To be a child means to conform to 80
ideal notions of what childhood should be: Ôgood, innocent and happy Ñ and, most 
important, dependentÉÕ (8 emphasis in original).   81
 The discourse of innocence connected to cultural perceptions of childhood, 
however, seems to invite its opposite, in novels that deal with the abuse, murder and 
kidnap of children, for example Donna TarttÕs The Little Friend (2002). Tolan also 
identifies a parallel vein, one that endlessly works over the notion of children being 
ÔmadeÕ or ÔbornÕ evil: Lionel ShriverÕs 2003 novel We Need to Talk about Kevin, for 
example.  The child is simultaneously venerated and denigrated in culture. The 82
idealised child therefore exists alongside the monstrous, abjected child in our cultural 
 Although it is interesting that the boys were tried in an adult court and sentenced to fifteen years. A 80
subsequent successful appeal was made to the European Court, which as Shuttleworth notes resulted 
ÔÉin pressure being put on the British government to change policy with regard to placing juveniles 
on trial in an adult courtÕ (Shuttleworth 9, n.28). 
 Hugh Cunningham makes this point in Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500, 81
aiming to Ôtrace the development of this late twentieth century belief that children are real children 
only if their life experiences accord with a particular set of ideas about childhood.Õ (1)The conception 
of childhood as qualitatively different, marked off from ÔadulthoodÕ is brought into question by 
childrenÕs agency, as Michael Wyness suggests in the sociological study Childhood, Polity Press, 
2015: ÔHitherto, agency has been viewed as a property or disposition that children acquire once they 
have successfully progressed along a developmental pathway into adulthoodÕ(2). Contemporary 
childhood studies, however, recognise ÔchildrenÕs capacities as agents very early on in childhoodÕ (2). 
See for example, Allison James and Adrian L. James Constructing Childhood: Theory, Policy and 
Social Practice (Palgrave, 2004); Theorizing Childhood Allison James, Chris Jenks and Alan Prout 
(Polity, 1998); Chris JenksÕ Childhood 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2005). The 1989 UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child shows that the the rights, agency, and legal status of childhood are being taken 
seriously. See www.unicef.org.uk/Documents/Publication-pdfs/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf. 
Accessed 6th July 2016. 
 Evil, creepy, ghostly children abound in film and horror, Henry JamesÕ Turn of the Screw, Susan 82
HillÕs The Woman in Black, to name two examples. See also the Literature Interpretation Theory 
special issue no. 22, on ÒEvil Children in Film and LiteratureÓ 2011. Particularly Wandless, William 
ÒSpoil the Child: Unsettling Ethics and the Representation of Evil.Ó 134-154, and Karen J RennerÕs 
introduction, ÒEvil Children in Film and Literature: Notes Toward a Genealogy.Ó 79-95. 
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and literary representation.  The child in its contrariness is hard to pin down. 83
Helpless but powerful, innocent and wise, intrinsically good and blank slate,  all at 84
the same time, the child is a contradiction. The existence of the young of the human 
species contains a challenge. This chapter will consider the possibility that we 
ÔadultsÕ remain children despite being Ôgrown upÕ, creating false discourses of 
adulthood and majority in order to fence children off, and keep them at bay. 
 It is clear that the notion of childhood as a separate state of being is a cultural 
and historical construction, tied up with complex social factors and historical 
conditions, a construction of the modern world. Phillip AriesÕ Centuries of Childhood 
(1962) is the first to challenge the view that childhood is a biological, pre-existent 
entity, arguing that childhood and the family as we know it is born in the eighteenth 
century.  It is clear that childhood, and particularly its pedagogical implications, did 85
become a pressing issue in the eighteenth century, when philosophers began to 
question in earnest, what is to be done with this child? 
 The truism that we were all children once fills the vacuum left by our inability 
to define what childhood consists of. One certainty: the childÕs existence exerts 
 Hysterical characterisations of childhood and the child abound: Lloyd de MauseÕs interjection in The 83
History of Childhood (London: Souvenir Press, 1976): Ôthe history of childhood is a nightmare from 
which we have only recently begun to awakenÕ (1). Alison Lurie, in DonÕt Tell the Grown Ups: 
Subversive ChildrenÕs Literature (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), somewhat hyperbolically calls children 
Ôan unusual, partly savage tribe, ancient and widely distributedÕ (Lurie ix), although her subsequent 
discussion of subversive childhood texts is entertaining. Patricia Holland, in the 2006 book Picturing 
Childhood: The Myth of the Child in Popular Imagery (New York: IB Tauris) suggests a reason for the 
current preoccupation: ÔThe crisis over childhood, reflected in the popular media, is real. Children are 
getting older younger. But it could also be seen as a crisis over what it means to be an adult at a time 
of rapid social change. In my view, repressive attitudes may well represent a panic stricken and 
sometimes vicious response to the increasing power and visibility of children in the public 
worldÕ (xiv). 
 The idea of the mind as tabula rasa or blank slate is derived from LockeÕs An Essay Concerning 84
Human Understanding (c.1700) which sets out to determine the innateness of ideas, which was the 
dominant opinion of the human mind at the time. In Book Two, Chapter 1.2 ÔLet us suppose the mind 
to be, as we say, white paper void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished?Õ 
Raymond Wilburn ed. John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. J.M.Dent, 1947. 26. 
See also WilburnÕs introduction in this volume. 
 This view has been refuted by David F. Lancy, for example, in The Anthropology of Childhood: 85
Cherubs, Chattel, Changelings Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2008. Lancy provides numerous examples 
of depictions of childhood in the ethnographic and historical record.
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powerful influence over us. We cannot handle its demands. We find its doubleness 
strange, spooky.  On the one hand the child grows and matures, is a model of 
progress; on the other hand it continues to exist, somehow arrested or suspended. 
Doubling is expressed throughout MantelÕs fiction, with Chambers defining doubling 
as Ôthe act of making double; a turning back in running; a trick; a plait or 
foldÕ (Chambers). The trick and the fold are both well known figures from previous 
chapters: somewhat neatly, doubling also has the obscure meaning of ÔmantlingÕ, 
from heraldry. Thinking about the childÕs doubleness takes us to the heart of MantelÕs 
literary project, allowing us to further explore the idea of lifeÕs fictionality.  
 This chapter takes the fictional child as its point of departure. The child we 
encounter in MantelÕs novels is so often the traumatised child, the child who in its 
state of helplessness is let down and damaged. The childÕs existence in MantelÕs 
fiction mirrors the existence of real children; by growing up, the child passes into 
memory, is fleeting and transient. How can we read the fictional child, without 
wanting to explain or diminish its power? How does Mantel write her child figures, 
in order to make the childÕs experience intelligible? The fictional child provides a 
crossover between the adultÕs Ôinner childÕ and the child in reality, often bruised and 
traumatised, and questions the demarcation between them. The same demarcation 
applies within the idea of child; at once a sign of progress, it grows up and out of 
things, and at the same time the child is a marker of something unfulfilled and 
unexplored within all of us that resists categorisation. If philosophy cannot handle the 
child, is it only the literary writer that has the tools available to make this lived 
experience intelligible, legible to others? In the following two chapters I will consider 
how psychoanalysis has theorised and treated the child. 
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 For philosophy the child is a taken for granted fact, sequestered off from the 
adult world. Associated with the mother as a self-evident being, the child has been 
swept aside along with her in an act of philosophical denial.  In 1762, Jean Jacques 86
Rousseau writes in the preface to mile: 
 We know nothing of childhood; and with our mistaken notions the further we   
 advance the further we go astray. The wisest writers devote themselves to what a   
 man ought to know, without asking what a child is capable of learning. They are   
 always looking for the man in the child, without considering what he is before he  
 becomes a man. (Rousseau 33-4) 
Here then is one answer: allow the child to educate himself according to nature. As 
far as Rousseau is concerned nature is a greater guide for the child than any educative 
program or child rearing practice. Let the child be free, in other words, free from 
constraint and cruel child-rearing practices, free in order that he might grow up to 
exercise his freedom. Although it is worth noting that this was only available to men 
of a certain class,  and girls were clearly born to another destiny entirely.  87
 G.W.F. Hegel, in the 1821 Philosophy of Right, also decries cruelty to the 
child.  He questions the Roman practice of the head of the household treating the 
child as a slave, calling it a Ôgangrene of the ethical order at the tenderest point of its 
innermost lifeÕ (118). But, in opposition to Rousseau, he advocates a strict education. 
He writes:  88
 The necessity for education is present in children as their own feeling of    
 dissatisfaction with themselves as they are, as the desire to belong to the adult world  
 whose superiority they divine, as the longing to grow up. The play theory of   
 education assumes that what is childish is itself already something of inherent   
 worthÉ (118) 
 Luce Irigaray, for example, suggests that the entire Western philosophical tradition is being 86
nourished by an Ôunpaid debtÕ (126-7) to the maternal. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. London: The 
Athlone Press, 1993. For overviews on philosophyÕs exclusion of the maternal and the feminine, see 
also Michelle Boulous WalkerÕs Philosophy and the Maternal Body: Reading Silence and Lynne 
HufferÕs Maternal Pasts, Feminist Futures: Nostalgia, Ethics and the Question of Difference, both 
1998.
 Andrew OÕMalleyÕs excellent study The Making of the Modern Child: ChildrenÕs Literature and 87
Childhood in the late eighteenth century (Routledge: London, 2011) charts the importance of 
pedagogy in the invention of the child, arguing that the child is a bourgeois creation. 
 Michael Inwood suggests that Hegel is reacting to the prevalence of the idea of a natural education, 88
and to RousseauÕs ideas in particular. See n.2 ¤395, p.336 of A Commentary on HegelÕs Philosophy of 
Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.  
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It is precisely that the child is not yet what he wants or needs to be that causes him to 
want to grow up. There is nothing of value as yet in the childÕs existence, apart from 
the ethical imperative that the helplessness of the child engenders in the adults 
surrounding him. The child exists as potential, a potential that needs to be nurtured 
by discipline.  His definitive and revised statement in The Philosophy of Mind of 89
1830 Ñ Ôthe most rational thing a child can do with his toys is break themÕ (¤396, 
57) Ñ cements the dismissal of childish play. The childÕs worth is in its potential to 
grow up and be educated, in order to conduct itself as a proper citizen.  The 90
empirical and epistemological state of childhood for Hegel is a transition point to 
elsewhere, to majority and full rights, and his demonstration of what is right and 
proper to philosophy.  
 We began by talking about the child, and we get talk of rights, majority, 
nature, education, anything but what the child actually is. The inability to define the 
child leads us to suspect that there is more at work than the emotions that the child 
inspires. Thus Derrida writes of the supplementarity of childhood in Of 
Grammatology: 
 Childhood is the first manifestation of the deficiency which, in nature, calls for   
 substitution [supplance]. Pedagogy illuminates perhaps more crudely the paradoxes  
 of the supplement. How is a natural weakness possible? How can Nature ask for   
 forces that it did not furnish? How is a child possible in general? (Derrida   
 Grammatology146) 
He continues, reversing the formula child equals supplement into supplement equals 
child: ÔWithout childhood, no supplement would ever appear in Nature. The 
 As he notes in Philosophy of Mind, Ôhe must obey in order to learn how to commandÕ (58), which of 89
course reminds us that HegelÕs interventions are also socio-political as well as philosophical. He is 
ÔspeakingÕ to and for a particular political class, the sons of which would grow up to be leaders.
 Hegel sees the child less as an individual being than as part of the system of family, civil society and 90
the state. For example ÔEthical Life: The FamilyÕ in Philosophy of Right Ôone is in it [the family] not as 
an independent person but as a memberÕ (160). Recent volumes on Hegel which have sought to think 
about his thought in the context of the multiplicity of modern political theories, such as Hegel: New 
Directions, ed. Katerina Deligiorgi. Chesham: Acumen, 2006. Slavoj ŽižekÕs Less than Nothing: 
Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. Verso: London, 2012 also has a useful commentary 
on HegelÕs notion of the family in Philosophy of Right, pp 440f.
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supplement is here both humanityÕs good fortune and the origin of its 
perversionÕ (147). Childhood is the original supplement, and thus a paradox, the logic 
of supplementarity proving once and for all there is no origin. The originary state of 
human being, childhood, marked by its need for supplementation proves the lack of 
an origin: the supplement is required in endless deferral from no fixed point. Hence 
what Derrida writes about education, which demonstrates clearly the paradoxical 
nature of the supplement, but also by extension childhood. What exactly is being 
asked here, when Derrida asks, Ôhow is a child possible in general?Õ In any case, 
Derrida doesnÕt answer his own question, which suggests there is not a straight 
answer but only an oblique one. For by giving us the child in its weakness, 
helplessness and dependence, Nature requires supplementation which adults are duty 
bound to oblige. As Derrida states, ÔYet all education, the keystone of Rousseauist 
thought, will be described or presented as a system of substitution [supplance] 
destined to reconstitute NatureÕs edifice in the most natural way possibleÕ (145). The   
logic of the supplement replaces nature with culture, exposing the cultural origin of 
what we so often take to be nature. But in the case of the child, Derrida is pointing 
out the relationship between interior and exterior: Ôthe supplement is exterior, outside 
of the positivity to which it is super-added, alien to that which, in order to be replaced 
by it, must be other than it.Õ (145)  
 What is both more interior and exterior than the child within the body of the 
mother? Unborn, the child is contained within the mother (her exclusion a whole 
other story) but, once born, it Ôconstitutes a security risk for the house of 
philosophyÉ [It] crawls in setting off a lot of noiseÕ says Avital Ronell (Davis 102). 
It is something that shouldnÕt be there, an interloper disturbing the silent peace of this 
ÔhouseÕ, clearly a kind of library or church which cannot entertain the messiness of 
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the child. The childÕs sheer inability to sit still, its pure energy marks it out as not 
belonging: subjected to an ÔexileÕ in Lesnik-Oberstein and ThomsonÕs words. They 
take up this logic of the child in their 2002 article, ÒWhat is Queer Theory doing with 
the Child?Ó  describing it as a Ôtheoretical exileÕ: 
 On the one handÉ[the child] may be seen asÉ wandering into text from   
 without, and remaining somehow outside text and beyond interpretation, and   
 thus simply true. On the other hand, and in the same moment, it is read as the thing  
 that is most inappropriate, that ought not to be there, that is exposed or  exploited in 
 text where it ought to be shielded, or even just that it is irrelevant. The child has thus  
 a very strange identity, one that is not at one with itself, even in the act of figuring  
 the very thing that is at one with itself. (35) 
 Lesnik-Oberstein and Thomson formulate the problem succinctly: the child 
simply is, and what it consists of is self-evident. The child exists on the level of the 
real/Real and is thus not open to reading. Just being, it doesnÕt require exegesis. But 
it is also pathos-inducing, and consists of an appeal to the ÔtendernessÕ we 
encountered in Hegel earlier. Tugging on the heart strings, the child cannot fail to 
have a positive effect on the adult, bringing all the human instincts to the fore. 
Unhelpful cultural narratives of childhood stymie attempts to think about childhood 
in a measured way:  not only this, but the childÕs presence within the text threatens 91
to derail meaning. Lesnik-Oberstein and Thomson continue: 
 [It] is the carriers of meanings and ideologies wherever it is encountered. Sometimes  
 these are deployed purposefully, but more often without a clear recognition that the  
 dynamics of the narratives within which the child finds itself may be powerfully   
 directed, redirected, diverted, accelerated or dragged to virtual standstill by its   
 presence. (36) 
In other words, there are powerful interests at work within texts to keep the child in 
its proper place, but wherever it goes it disrupts, by moving when it should be 
 See also Stephen ThomsonÕs ÒDerrida and the Child: Ethics, Pathos, Property, Risk.Ó Oxford 91
Literary Review 25 (2003): 337-359. The child requires our protection, and it is in the name of 
protection that Ôgrown upÕ discourse about the child is curtailed. See also James Kincaid. Child 
Loving: The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture. London: Routledge, 1992, which caused a furore on 
its publication. Steven Bruhm and Natasha HurleyÕs (eds.) Curiouser: on the queerness of children 
(Minneapolis and London 2004) details the controversy (xxxiii).
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standing still, or standing still when it should be moving. The child is where it should 
not be, and is not where it should be.  
The sequestered child (i): MantelÕs ÒClinical WasteÓ  
It is not only within her fiction that Mantel addresses the problem of the child. Her 
contribution ÒClinical WasteÓ to the volume Inconceivable Conceptions, for example, 
describes her experience of undergoing a hysterectomy at the age of 27. This 
operation, which she calls an ÒeviscerationÓ, provokes a desire to have a child, 
ambivalence, and anger at having her choice over-ridden. The feelings that she 
describes are complicated by the birth of her sister-in-lawÕs fourth child. They were 
Ôunexpected to me, and contained every sin: envy, pride, and a sullen babyish anger 
at being outdoneÕ; she describes her behaviour as a ÔdictatorÕ, a ÔTamburlaine the 
Great...born to lay wasteÕ (ÒClinicalÓ 19). In this context, Mantel describes her child 
self thus: 
I did not grow up assuming I should have a child of my own. I hardly assumed my 
own survival and was barely four years old when I first thought of the merits of 
suicide. The dead and embalmed babe that was me is, we must assume, strapped to 
the back of TamburlaineÕs chariot; a young child in a carapace of linen, lashed 
together to preserve its shape. (19) 
The use of the metaphor of embalming shows the child frozen in time, a physical 
representation of the psychic. This child is not within Mantel herself but outside, 
illustrating the notion of the child as an accompaniment through life, ÔqueeringÕ time, 
making it strange. The Ôdead and embalmed babeÕ may be lifeless in its Ôcarapace of 
linenÕ but its presence is felt, and carried on the back of the adult dictator. The 
doubling that the child is subject to (of) occurs here, as the dead infant makes its 
presence felt as ÔpotentialÕ in MantelÕs word. She writes, ÔÉyou are always thinking 
what you would have done. ThatÕs your condition. Your whole life exists in the realm 
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of potentialÕ (20). The frozen and dead child, ÔembalmedÕ, is similar to HegelÕs child 
of pure potential. The child thus becomes a mythical being; frozen in time while also 
representing unlimited potential for growth.  
  
The sequestered child (ii): Wordsworth and innocence 
Where do we get the idea of childhood as a time of innocence? How does MantelÕs 
writing of the child differ from Romantic myths of childhood which are still 
pervasive? These myths, which collude to represent childhood as innocent and 
unknowing, also suggest the child is contaminated by adult contact. For example, 
Diana Gittins identifies in WordsworthÕs ÔTintern AbbeyÕ: Ô[T]he template for Òthe 
childÓ and childhood innocence in the 19th and 20th centuries: other, idyllic, 
prelapsarian, something that we once were, or owned, and which is now forever 
lostÕ (Gittins 164). GittinsÕ The Child in Question (1998) investigates the idea of the 
child from a socio-cultural standpoint. Her analysis is limited in this respect, but 
illustrates a key point; that our understanding of children is based largely on the 
preoccupations of the adult world, and that innocence (and childhood as a special age 
bracketed off from the rest of life) is connected with Romantic ideals, and is largely a 
concoction of the last 200 years. As she puts it, Ôit needs to be considered therefore 
whether in fact childrenÕs innocence is, in a real sense, largely created, maintained 
and defined by adults for their own reasonsÕ (151).  92
 If we consider the example of WordsworthÕs poetry, it is possible to trace how 
the child is represented, and how that representation contributes to ideas about the 
child. In ÒTime and History in WordsworthÓ (1987), Paul de Man investigates the 
 See James Kincaid Erotic Innocence: The Culture of Child Molesting. Durham NC: Duke UP, 1998, 92
for a discussion of how innocence is constructed and maintained in modern culture.
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recurrence of the verb Ôto hangÕ in the section of the Prelude  known as ÒThe 93
Winander BoyÓ (book 5 p.190 line 389f).  He points to the significance of the verb 94
which connects the two parts of the passage, which seem at first to be unconnected. 
De Man analyses the precariousness introduced by Wordsworth in the lines prior to 
and culminating in line 412: Ôuncertain heavenÕ, concluding that this precariousness 
is linked to a Ôcentral Wordsworthian experienceÕ (de Man ÒTimeÓ 7) by the poetÕs 
use of the verb ÔhungÕ in line 406 (1805 Prelude 192). This experience is the 
realisation that we are not anchored any longer on the earth: ÔThe experience hits as a 
sudden feeling of dizziness, a falling or a threat of falling, a vertige of which there 
are many examples in WordsworthÕ (de Man ÒTimeÓ 7). He therefore links the verb 
ÔhungÕ to its corollaries; suspension, suspense, vertiginous Ôfalling or a threat of 
fallingÕ (7), and how this describes the subject in his/her relation to nature. This is the 
central preoccupation of the poet and the scholars who come after him. Yet, it is vital 
to interrogate further the verb form ÔhungÕ for clues it can offer about the child, and 
thus to illustrate a further point about Wordsworthian poetry and its connection to the 
construction of the figurality of the child. The words ÔhungÕ and ÔhangsÕ are used to 
connect the two rather ÔabruptÕ (de Man 5) sections of the poem. The placement of 
the ÔWinander BoyÕ section is interesting, also; occurring directly after the passage in 
which Wordsworth extols the virtues of childhood, bemoaning the evils of education.  
De ManÕs criticism rightly places WordsworthÕs usage of the verb Ôto hangÕ into the 
discourse of the subject in nature, and the nature of the subject, while glossing over 
the important fact that the subject as it appears in the poem is a child. However, de 
Man is vigilant towards the strangeness enacted by the child upon the time of the 
 de Man refers to the 1805 version of the text.93
 I discuss DerridaÕs use of the verb forms pendu and suspendu in the following chapter.94
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adult. De Man comments that the poem was originally written in the first person, as a 
meditation upon the poetÕs own childhood and death. Changing it into the third 
person retains the adult contemplating his own death (the future), but this future is 
represented in the past, i.e. the past in the character of the boy. Thus de Man comes at 
the adult/child relation from the point of view of the adult poet representing some 
deeper truth through his portrayal of the boy child. Consequently, the child does not 
figure much in de ManÕs analysis. Despite his alertness to the child, its complex 
temporal frame is contained by his analysis: 
It would be banal and inadequate to say that Wordsworth is praising and mourning, 
in the poem, his own youth, the boy he used to be. The movement is more radical, 
more complex. The structure of the poem, although it seems retrospective, is in fact, 
proleptic (de Man ÒTimeÓ 9). 
The prolepsis exists, according to De Man, because the poet is unable to figure his 
own death, without attributing it to an ÔotherÕ in the past. The inability to apprehend 
the frightening possibility of finitude in relation to oneÕs own subjectivity thus causes 
a narrative throwback into the past. However, the significance of the childÕs death, 
when presumably it is the death of himself as an adult that the poet finds it difficult to 
represent, taps into the idea of the child discussed previously. At once lifeless, but full 
of potential, the childÕs suspension suggests the impossibility of ever getting over or 
past childhood.  
 What is the significance of the verb Ôto hangÕ in relation to the child? To 
investigate this, it is important to note the placement of the section Winander Boy in 
the structure of the Prelude. The Winander boy, wedded as he is to nature, is 
connected eternally with one place, one time. Like the churchyard that hangs on the 
side of the hill (The Prelude 192 line 417), the boy is suspended, frozen in time at not 
quite ten years old (192 line 415).  This hang is not the precursor to a fall, as de Man 
would argue, but a suspension that exists in another time and place entirely. This 
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suspensive ÔprecariousnessÕ (to use de ManÕs word) doesnÕt presage anything, drop or 
fall, it just is, and as such has nowhere to go. Suspension differs from stasis, as in 
MantelÕs Ôdead and embalmedÕ child earlier: the child is suspended in the body of the 
adult, which is another way of saying that childhood hangs around. 
 There are further associations in Book Seven with the child suspended in 
time. The poet recalls seeing a child while in London, in a theatre. This child is 
Ôbeautiful/ As ever sat upon a motherÕs knee;Õ (270 line 369-70), the poet contrasting 
his beauty with the theatreÕs Ôdissolute menÕ and Ôshameless womenÕ (270 lines 
386-7). The boyÕs strangeness in his surroundings is further emphasised by line 377 
ÔA sort of alien scattered from the cloudsÕ (270). Wordsworth then cuts back in time 
to the description of the Ônameless babeÕ (272 line 410), MaryÕs child, who Ôsleeps/
Beside the mountain-chapel undisturbedÕ (272 lines 410-11), performing some 
interesting temporal manoeuvres as he does so. Of course, the unnamed baby, asleep 
(suspended?) beside the mountain chapel, reminds us of the Winander Boy in Book 
Five, whose final resting place Ôhangs/Upon a slope above the village schoolÕ (192 
lines 417-18). Also sleeping, the Winander boyÕs grave marks a spot of contemplation 
for the poet, a space of contemplation comparable to the space taken up by the 
memory of the Ôlovely boyÕ of Book 7 (272 line 395). Wordsworth writes of the 
memory of the boy appearing as if embalmed by nature, making explicit connection 
between the childÕs naive world and the stresses and strains of the adult world.  
Wordsworth addresses Mary directly with the words: ÔBut he perhaps,/ Mary, may 
now have lived till he could look/With envy on thy nameless babe that sleepsÉÕ (272 
lines 408-10), suggesting that perhaps it is better for children to die as infants. 
Children who grow up and live through pain, suffering the ignominy of adult life and 
its depredations, are better off frozen in time.   
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Metaphors of childhood 
So far we have seen a variety of metaphors used in relation to the child: embalming 
and hanging to name but two. Childhood ÔhangsÕ around. I wish to consider the work 
of Andre Green, from Diachrony in Psychoanalysis (2003), ÒThe Model ChildÓ and 
ÒDead Time.Ó In ÒThe Model Child,Ó Green asserts that childhood is never over; Ôthe 
claim that childhood is a thing of the past is a mythÕ (Green 137). This is what 
psychoanalysis has taught us, and to a certain extent, Wordsworth teaches us this too. 
At first, Green would seem to be arguing against the thesis of childhood haunting the 
adult. He writes that ÔfixationsÕ and ÔregressionsÕ are a ÔrejectionÕ of childhood; in 
other words, that they signal the inability to process childhood, to bring it back into 
oneself and understand that it is yours. As Green writes, to be cured is Ôto make it 
oneÕs own by internalising itÕ (137). The child needs to return to be represented in 
oneÕs own psyche, which as Green alludes to by invoking nachtrglichkeit, clearly 
shows that the bringing back of childhood constitutes a temporal movement. Yet 
crucially the inner child ÔspeaksÕ; Ôas a constitutive mode of representationÕ (137), 
rather than any attempt to recapture or re-experience childhood as it actually was. 
This is a clear example of a concept working on different levels at once. For as Green 
asserts, the banal truth of the child is that it never exists as pure child, it always has 
an adult setting the bounds of its existence. To define childhood, to seek what it is 
through observing it, risks behaviourism; to ascribe to it desires, sadisms, hatreds, 
risks losing the particularity of the individual psyche (and this is what Green is 
concerned with, from a clinical perspective). If we attempt to define the child, we risk 
the ÔillusionÕ that the child belongs to simpler categories than the adult. Moreover, to 
reduce the child to elements that are structurally simpler than the adult suggests that a 
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Ôtemporal bridgeÕ (127) can be built between them. The childÕs ÔintelligibilityÕ (128) 
is always the product of adult thought.  
 What is at stake here for Green is the legibility of the childÕs experience in the 
adult. His move to childhood as representation is therefore an attempt to clarify the 
nature of psychic experience as it relates to memory and perception, but also to 
restore the meaning of psychic reality. For Green, in other words, the child only exists 
as psychic reality. This, for Green, allows the analyst (and by extension the writer) to 
free the child from the responsibility for fiction: he does not have to Ôlive out the 
fiction which is in usÕ (139). With the onus placed back onto psychic reality, 
childhood can be seen for what it is: a representation.  
!145
WordsworthÕs idealised child 
In terms of the Romantic child, this representation is an idealisation. Judith Plotz, in 
Romanticism and the Vocation of Childhood asserts that the child so cherished and 
favoured by the Romantic writers, particularly Wordsworth, is beyond the social.  95
By wedding the child to nature, that child becomes ÔtimelessÕ and Ôan emblem of 
fixityÕ (Plotz 24). On page 71 she presents a detailed analysis of the Ôcomplex 
imageryÕ of lines 405-13 of Book Seven of The Prelude, showing how the child and 
nature are interlocking images, leaving the child in question as Ôthe most elaborate 
and exemplary instance of childhood fixityÕ (Plotz 71). This fixed status accorded to 
childhood is damaging to real children, allowing as it does the promulgation of a 
certain type of idealised childhood. By extension, it is thus possible to ignore the 
plights of real children who through no fault of their own are no longer innocent; they 
are not ÔreallyÕ children, the too soon worldly-wise (Plotz 31). The male Romantic 
writer voraciously appropriates childhood for his own purposes, creating of it a 
ÔvocationÕ: childhood being, an in PlotzÕs discussion of Elizabeth BowenÕs ÒThe 
Easter Egg PartyÓ, Ôa sugary confection contrived by regressive adults for their own 
comfortÕ (Plotz 43). And yet, WordsworthÕs sense of the memory of the boy as 
embalmed suggests an association between the comprehension of time and metaphors 
of suspension. The connections to be drawn between the embalming in memory as a 
freezing in time, and the child as the point of this freezing, or suspension, opens up 
more possible readings than can be encompassed under PlotzÕs argument. The poetÕs 
understanding of the suspended child as a means of experiencing childhood suggests 
 In Peter CoveneyÕs The Image of Childhood, revised ed. London: Penguin, 1967, he argues that the 95
child figureÕs ascendance springs from twin currents. On one hand the artistÕs concern with his own 
development, and social movements of capital. Thus Ôin a world given increasingly to utilitarian 
values and the Machine, the child could become the symbol of Imagination and Sensibility, a symbol 
of Nature set against the forces abroad in society actively denaturing humanityÕ (31). For a different 
take on Romanticism and childhood, see Ann Wierda RowlandÕs  Romanticism and Childhood: The 
Infantilization of British Literary Culture. Cambridge UP, 2012.
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his privileged status as Ôthe father of the child who is father of the manÕ (Plotz 45). 
For Plotz, Ôembalmed by natureÕ is symptomatic of the ÔsequesteredÕ child, and the 
dead child buried in the churchyard that hung on the hillside.  
ÔBrought up by handÕ (i): Pip 
Hanging features in Great Expectations: the story of Pip, brought up by his sister Mrs 
Joe Gargery in the shadow of both churchyard and hangmanÕs gibbet. We first meet 
Pip at the graveyard where his parents and siblings are buried, deciphering them by 
reading the names on the gravestone. PipÕs situation is a model of childish 
helplessness: he is at the mercy of his sister, who has Ôbrought him up by handÕ,  his 96
only comfort being the gentle Joe Gargery.  The bringing up by hand of this Pip 97
brings to mind the Hegelian stance: hard work and pedagogical adherence will ensure 
his healthy development. But what of the ÔhandÕ that brings him up? Reinhard Kuhn 
argues that Great Expectations is a novel in which Ôthe physical mistreatment of 
children is almost totally absentÕ (Kuhn 71). PipÕs acquaintance with ÔTicklerÕ would 
suggest otherwise, but perhaps Kuhn has a point: violence takes many forms; 
speaking for, belittling, ignoring, all of which do harm. Consider Mrs JoeÕs impatient 
imprecations to Pip when he asks too many questions: ÔPeople are put in the Hulks 
because they murder, and because they rob, and forge, and do all sorts of bad; and 
they always begin by asking questions!Õ (Great Expectations 16). The proto-criminal 
Pip must be brought up (and thus kept down) by this hand which keeps a tight grip on 
him. The Ôconnubial missileÕ (11), Pip is thrown and pushed about, from hand to 
 Jerome Hamilton Buckley reads the hands in Great Expectations somewhat differently, connecting 96
Pip being brought up Ôby handÕ with the various hand motifs that appear in the novel. Reprinted in 
Laura Peters ed. Dickens and Childhood. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012. 
 As Anny Sadrin notes, Ôonly solaced by JoeÕs spoonfuls of gravy and inefficient outpourings of 97
love.Õ Parentage and Inheritance in the Novels of Charles Dickens. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994 
(105) 
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hand, a fate his brothers have escaped, Ôon their backs with their hands in their 
trousers-pocketsÕ (5). In fact, Ôbringing up by handÕ stands in for the whole symbolic 
world of the childÕs frustrations, fantasises and struggles. When the convict 
Magwitch has extracted promises of help from Pip and leaves him in the churchyard, 
Pip has a fright. In the marsh mist, he can just make out the shape of the gibbet on the 
horizon,  
 Éwith some chains hanging to it which had once held a pirate. The man was limping 
 on towards this latter, as if he were the pirate come to life, and come down, and   
 going back to hook himself up again. It gave me a terrible turn when I thought soÉ  
 (9) 
Pip perceives the man as the pirateÕs reanimated corpse, thus scaring himself even 
more. There are subtle connections between the gibbet and being brought up by hand 
for Pip. As we have already seen, the significance of hanging within Romantic 
representations of childhood suggest another reading. The hand on PipÕs neck is 
figured through his fright at the gibbet, a signifier of parental authority.  
  
ÔBrought up by handÕ (ii): Thomas Cromwell 
Like Pip, Thomas Cromwell is brought up by hand: Wolf Hall also poses questions 
about parental violence. This time, however, instead of being a Ôsmall bundle of 
shiversÕ, the blacksmithÕs boy is laid Ôfull-length on the cobblesÕ in expectation of 
impending death. The novel begins with MantelÕs teenaged Cromwell abased in the 
gutter. Reading this first page is a powerfully unsettling experience: 
  ÔSo now get up.Õ 
 Felled, dazed, silent, he has fallen; knocked full length on the cobbles of the yard.  
  His head turns sideways; his eyes are turned towards the gate, as if someone  
 might arrive to help him out. One blow, properly placed, could kill him now. 
  Blood from the gash on his head Ñ which was his fatherÕs first effort Ñ is  
 trickling across his face. Add to this, his left eye is blinded; but if he squints   
 sideways, with his right eye he can see that the stitching of his fatherÕs boot   
 is unravelling. The twine has sprung clear of the leather, and a hard knot in it has   
 caught his eyebrow and opened another cut. 
          ÔSo now get up!Õ Walter is roaring down at him, working out where to kick  
 him next. He lifts his head an inch or two, and moves forward, on his belly, trying to  
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 do it without exposing his hands, on which Walter enjoys stamping. ÔWhat are you,  
 an eel?Õ his parent asks. He trots backwards, gathers pace, and aims another kick.  
            It knocks the last breath out of him; he thinks it may be his last. His forehead 
 returns to the ground; he lies waiting, for Walter to jump on him. The dog, Bella, is  
 barking, shut away in an outhouse. IÕll miss my dog, he thinks. The yard smells of  
 beer and blood.  Someone is shouting, down on the riverbank. Nothing hurts, or   
 perhaps itÕs that everything hurts, because there is no separate pain that he can pick  
 out. But the cold strikes him, just in one place: just through his cheekbone as it rests  
 on the cobbles. (Wolf Hall 3-4) 
The traumatising actions of the all-powerful adult on the helpless child create a figure 
of childhood familiar in literature. MantelÕs truth to the life of the child makes a 
claim on the reader; a detached claim, but a claim nonetheless: Cromwell is ÔheÕ, the 
third person imposing a measure of distance, yet we are invited to shift our vision. 
Oriented at the beginning by the position of the fallen boy, we must turn our heads 
sideways along with him, cheekbone resting on the cobbles. When he manoeuvres his 
body, forehead to the ground, we move with him. Mantel is within the body of 
Cromwell: as she has said in various contexts, Ôthe camera is behind his eyesÕ (ÒThe 
Lives of OthersÓ; ÒHow I came to write Wolf HallÓ), and through this she is able to 
manipulate the perspective of the reader. Moreover, the present tense immerses the 
reader within CromwellÕs experience: it is happening now, we are with him.  The 
fatherÕs outburst, Òwhat are you, an eel?Ó (WH 3) reminds us of the slipperiness of the 
child and its resistance to being pinned down. Exemplifying the struggle for 
dominance, father and son battling it out; the scene is set for the return of this brutal 
act, which reverberates through the text. 
 Why does Mantel begin Thomas CromwellÕs life here? Mantel says 
(Appendix i 241) that there is a top layer within her narrative that is what it is, itÕs not 
all allegory: her creation of CromwellÕs character adds credence to the desire to get 
her hands dirty in the archive, with the grubby specificities of facts and neat figures. 
She has spoken, however, about her use of imagination in order to make the narrative 
more real, the details of life that bring Cromwell to life. Reviews of the text have 
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focused on its historicity; what interests me here is not the question of CromwellÕs 
traumatic childhood as a historical fact, but the uses to which Mantel puts the trope of 
traumatic experience. This trope feeds into the discourse of lowly man done good, of 
course: from Putney blacksmithÕs boy to the Earl of Essex in a lifetime. There is 
something about how Mantel employs literary generalities into the service of 
CromwellÕs specificity, contained within the symbol of the traumatised child.    
  
The grip 
How can we explore further this traumatised child, put a theoretical delineation onto 
the childÕs experience of misery, abjection, and fear? The deeply unequal 
relationship, even slavery, between the helpless child and its parent(s) is a universal 
experience. Jean-Franois Lyotard calls it mainmise, which has been translated as 
Ôthe gripÕ.  He begins by echoing what we have found out so far about the figure of 98
the traumatised child, so deeply known yet utterly specific in its expression: 
 I would like simply to make a few observations. It will be difficult here, as it would  
 be in any case, to designate the place from which these observations come. That   
 place is not, I presume, the place of supposed knowledge, for I know nothing of what 
 I have to say. Nor is it that place of the love of wisdom that the Greeks instilled in us  
 as philosophy, for I have only ever liked that which does not avail itself of either   
 knowledge or wisdom, as do so many things. Perhaps, then, it is not even a place; in  
 any case, it is no more a localisable place more than it is a Utopia, for I would be   
 more inclined to grant it the privilege of the real. LetÕs leave its name or label   
 pending. (ÔMainmiseÕ Philosophy Today 419) 
Lyotard admits: ÔI know nothing of what I have to sayÕ and neither do we. Not that 
there is nothing to know or find out; the act of discovery takes us to an 
 See for example the version of this essay reprinted in Political Writings London: UCL Press, 1993. 98
The dictionary definition of ÔmainmiseÕ, from the translatorÕs note to the Philosophy Today version of 
LyotardÕs article, is Ô1.[in feudal jurisprudence] The action of taking hold of, of seizing. Such a seizure 
occurred in the case of infidelity or the paying of insufficient homage. 2. Figuratively, to exercise a 
seizure, to take hold of somebody or to strike him (archaic). 3. The freeing of serfs by their 
lords.Õ (419) Also translated as ÔstrangleholdÕ, the action of having something or someone by the neck 
expresses the strength of the gesture in much more violent terms: and brings to mind also the 
Ôstrangling handÕ written about by Mantel in Giving up the Ghost (106). Ruth ScurrÕs TLS review of 
the memoir also borrows this phrase. See Scurr, Ruth. ÒThe Strangling Hand.Ó TLS. 2nd May 2003. 
https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/giving-up-ghost-hilary-mantel/. Accessed 1st March 2018. 
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unrecognisable place that philosophy cannot reach. Lyotard intimates through his 
invocation of the ÔrealÕ that psychoanalysis can provide the answers: for our inquiry it 
is literature which grants and is granted Ôthe privilege of the realÕ. Beginning from 
this place that is no-place, Lyotard gropes his way through, explicating the onus on 
(wo)man to Ôbecome our own master and possessorÕ, which he sees as contradictory; 
Ômaster and possessor of what, if we are to be fully emancipated?Õ (419). He 
continues: 
 Does not something of infancy remain beyond infancy? Something unappropriated  
 even when appropriation has accomplished its gesture, and we find ourselves   
 exclusive owners? (419) 
Childhood never goes away, in other words, and we are subject to it even as adults, as 
those who have reached an arbitrary age of majority.  Growing up is an act of 99
appropriation, a compulsively repetitive and ultimately unsuccessful act. The desire 
to drag oneself free and claim autonomy goes unfulfilled, as Lyotard observes:  
 Dependency is inadequate to designate this condition [infancy]; it fails to reach the  
 one who is seized and held by the hand of the other. Now we know that adults, or  
 those claiming to be adults, have believed that they could define the child in these  
 terms: one who is held by the hand. In contrast to this, I would like to think about the 
 following reversal: held in the grip of others during our childhood, infancy continues 
 to exert its mancipium even when we imagine ourselves to be emancipated, or   
 independent (419). 
The powerful image of the child as Ôone who is held by the handÕ takes us right back 
to Thomas Cromwell, at the beginning of Wolf Hall, cowering underneath the blows 
from his parent. The younger CromwellÕs action of keeping his hands hidden from 
 The issue of majority as arbitrary is echoed in Avital RonellÕs article on Lyotard, ÒOn the 99
Unrelenting Creepiness of Childhood: Lyotard, kid-tested.Ó Defined under law as a being who has Ônot 
reached a certain legislated majorityÕ (101), the child brings into sharp relief both the foundations of 
the law, typified by the endless question Ôwhy?Õ, and the ethical call always placed by the birth of a 
being dependent on the other for its very survival. Note the connection between the undercurrent of 
arbitrariness, as alluded to in RonellÕs ÔcertainÕ, and Hlne CixousÕ discussion of the law in Three 
Steps on the Ladder of Writing. New York and Chichester: Columbia UP, 1993: ÔSo why are these 
birds imund [unclean]?: ÒBecause.Ó As you know, this is the secret of the law: Òbecause.Ó This is the 
lawÕs logic. It is this terrible Òbecause,Ó this senseless fatal ÒbecauseÓ that has decided peopleÕs fate, 
even in the extremity of the concentration camps....It is this because that rules our lives. It pervades 
everythingÕ (117, emphasis in original). When the doctor forbids Mantel to write, he fails to give her a 
reason. She writes: ÔBecauseÑÕ he added; and broke off. He was not going to impart to me what came 
after ÔbecauseÕ. (GUG 180)
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his father, Ô[he] moves forward, on his belly, trying to do it without exposing his 
handsÕ (WH 3) disrupts the seizure of the father, whose ÔholdingÕ consists of kicks 
and blows. We think also of that other traumatised child, DickensÕ Pip, Ôbrought up 
by handÕ. The figure of the hand suggests a holding or binding  The double meaning 
of not showing oneÕs hand, not revealing oneÕs intentions also sets the reader up for 
CromwellÕs later machinations, permeated as the narrative is with imagery of card 
tricks, magic tricks and Ôsleight of handÕ. 
Nachtrglichkeit and Wolf Hall 
How might we read MantelÕs working over of CromwellÕs memory, her structuring of 
this beating which reverberates throughout the novel? We have already seen how she 
creates a complex idea of childhood and memory, invoking the childÕs wound 
through CromwellÕs imagined childhood experience of being beaten by his father. By 
employing FreudÕs notion of Nachtrglichkeit in exploring MantelÕs recognition of 
the (re)construction of childhood, I will show the implications this has for 
provisionality.  FreudÕs discussion of Emma in ÒProject for a Scientific 
PsychologyÓ (1895) outlines how the origin of the patientÕs problem, not being able 
to go into a shop alone, is uncertain. Freud questions his patient to uncover her 
memories, and she relates to him events that have happened to her. He then 
investigates further into her memory to find the traumatic event, in this case assault 
by a shopkeeper at the age of eight (353). In this way trauma is recovered or 
uncovered and one moves backwards in time to retrieve it: 
 Here we have the case of a memory arousing an effect which it did not arouse as an  
 experience, because in the meantime the change [brought about] in puberty had made 
 possible a different understanding of what was rememberedÉ.Now this case is   
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 typical of repression in hysteria. We invariably find that a memory is repressed   
 which has only become a trauma by deferred action [emphasis added 356]. 
The analysis thus uncovers an intact memory masking a traumatic event, and 
becomes analogous to an archaeological dig. However, it is clear that FreudÕs original 
German Nachtrglichkeit also has the sense of an action of the present which 
transforms the past, containing nachtrg, postscript or supplement: nachtrglich also 
has the sense of belatedly or posthumously. The act of analysis rewrites the past, in 
light of later events.  Given the linguistic complexity of the term, the translation of 100
Nachtrglichkeit into the French Ôaprs coupÕ (ÔafterwardsnessÕ) subsequently taken 
up by Jean Laplanche, describes more accurately its sense of psychic time moving in 
two directions at once.  ÔAfterwardsnessÕ succinctly delineates what Freud already 101
understands in ÔThe Psychotherapy of HysteriaÕ, in which he suggests the psychic 
material is laid down like an archive, in layers, using the figure of a chess game to 
illustrate. The concentric layers are sedimented, laid down sequentially, creating a 
storage facility in which artefacts are stored according to their relative times. The 
further back you go, the deeper you get. The radial paths, the path of the knight in a 
chess game, however, can move in any direction and break through the sedimented 
layers and represent the unconscious processes of memory flashes, triggers and 
powerful recollections that are unknown even to the self (289-90).  102
 See for example Laplanche and Pontalis 111-2. Also House and Slotnik, who argue that the term 100
has always suggested a ÔbidirectionalÕ movement of time. House, Jonathon, and Julie Slotnik. ÒAprs-
Coup in French Psychoanalysis: The Long Afterlife of Nachtrglichkeit: The first hundred years 
1893-1993Ó. Psychoanalytic Review. 102(5). October 2015: 692-708. 
 Although in ÔTime and the OtherÕ he suggests that the Ôproper direction of timeÕs arrowÕ is not 101
compromised by aprs-coup, as the effect only occurs after maturation (235-6); he uses a complicated 
dialectic schema to show the childÕs relation to time, which for Laplanche is also the childÕs relation to 
seduction. See Essays on Otherness 1999. House and Slotnik argue that LacanÕs emphasis on 
retroactivity reverses time in a Ôretrospective modificationÕ (685-6). 
 Andre Green summarises it thus: Ôhe [Freud] sees the mind, psychic activity, as made of two 102
aspects. The first one is constituted of fine concentric layers of memory. Freud makes the comparison 
with the archives of a great administration or a library if you want. And here, since the beginning, 
there are radial side paths, which means they go through the layers and link elements belonging to the 
different layers. And it is at this occasion that he gives the comparison with the progress of the knight 
on the chess-board, which allows the knight to jump over pieces of its own campÕ (1029). ÒFreudÕs 
concept of temporality: Differences with current ideas.Ó International Journal of Psychoanalysis. 89. 
(2008): 1029-1039. 
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 If childhood is accessed via its reconstruction, then our representations of the 
child are constructions. These provisional constructions demonstrate the idea of 
ÔafterwardsnessÕ in Mantel, and how she uses its logic to imaginatively construct 
Thomas CromwellÕs inner world. Mantel employs the ÔafterwardsnessÕ of the psychic 
event in Wolf Hall, positioning the reader so that they are in CromwellÕs head, 
thinking and feeling as he does. The beating that Cromwell receives from his father 
instantiates the readerÕs understanding of his traumatic childhood, the wound of 
childhoodÕs mainmise. MantelÕs canny employment of CromwellÕs psychic traces is 
an intricately woven and complex organisation which makes CromwellÕs ÔlifeÕ seem 
real to us. The temporal development of Cromwell acts in both directions identified 
earlier: we read Cromwell forward and backwards at once. For example, when 
CromwellÕs sister and brother in law are discussing what to do with him after the 
beating he receives from his father, it is decided that Thomas will go away, helped 
along with money from Morgan Williams, to which Cromwell promises to repay the 
debt, ÔIÕll pay you back,Õ he says. ÔI might go and be a soldier. I could send you a 
fraction of my pay and I might get lootÕ (WH 10). The reader understands that 
Cromwell will be rich, so we read this backwards, but we also read this forwards in 
the hopefulness of the young Cromwell, who changes as the narrative develops.  
 We already have the image, presented so forcefully by Mantel, of the tyranny 
of ÔseizureÕ which keeps the minor under the parental cosh. The child looking 
forwards to its life, the excitement of unbounded potential and possibility. But what 
of time moving the other way? There is also the consideration of the tyranny that 
childhood Ôcontinues to exertÕ over the ÔadultÕ,  long into that adultÕs majority. One 103
 Implicit in my putting into quotes of the word adult, is a question of the extent to which we are ever 103
ÔadultsÕ and not children anymore. 
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particular example illustrates the grip of childhood on Cromwell through the figure of 
the hand, raised against him. The cardinal is speaking to Thomas Boleyn, 
interrogating him while Cromwell sits in the corner. The cardinalÕs problem is Anne 
Boleyn, referred to as Ôthe ladyÕ and Ôdaughter of the diplomat, Thomas BoleynÕ (WH 
66). She wonÕt be told what to do: promised to the Butlers of Ireland, she has been 
courted by Harry Percy, the Earl of NorthumberlandÕs heir (67). The cardinal abuses 
Boleyn, putting him firmly in his place as an undistinguished nobleman: 
Ônotwithstanding your remarkable good fortune in marrying a Howard, the Boleyns 
were in trade once, were they not?Õ (70) The cardinal does not know that Mary 
Boleyn, the elder of the two girls, is currently the KingÕs mistress, and it is while 
Cromwell hesitates to give the cardinal this information, fearing it to be gossip, that 
an extraordinary event occurs.  
          Laughing, the cardinal pushes back his chair, and his shadow rises with him.   
 Firelit, it leaps. His arm darts out, his reach is long, his hand is like the hand of God. 
           But when God closes his hand, his subject is across the room, back to the wall. 
 The cardinal gives ground. His shadow wavers. It wavers and comes to rest. He is   
 still. The wall records the movement of his breath. His head inclines. In the halo of  
 light he seems to pause, to examine his handful of nothing. He splays his fingers, his  
 giant firelit hand. He places it flat on his desk. It vanishes, melted into the cloth of  
 damask. He sits down again. His head is bowed; his face, half-dark.  
      He Thomas, also Tomos, Tommaso and Thomaes Cromwell, withdraws his past  
 selves into his present body and edges back to where he was before. His shadow   
 slides against the wall, a visitor not sure of its welcome. Which of these Thomases  
 saw the blow coming? There are moments when a memory moves right through you. 
      You shy, you duck, you run; or else the past takes your fist and actuates it, without 
 the intervention of will. Suppose you have a knife in your fist? ThatÕs how murder  
 happens.  
     He says something, the cardinal says something. They break off. Two sentences go 
 nowhere. (71)  
The sudden movement of the cardinalÕs shadow which Ôdarts outÕ causes Cromwell to 
take fright, ending up back to the opposite wall, beyond range of the cardinalÕs Ôgiant 
fire-litÕ shadow-hand. This hand, so imbued with the threat of violence in that 
moment, is in fact a Ôhandful of nothingÕ, and as the danger recedes for Cromwell he 
gathers himself back Ôinto his present bodyÕ, takes back tentative control of his 
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person. For that moment, however, when the cardinalÕs hand sparks the threat of 
violence, who is he? Which of his selves Ôsaw the blow comingÕ? What is in control 
here is the past, the past which acts for you, Ôwithout the intervention of willÕ. The 
great fire-lit hand leaping out at Cromwell reminds him of his fatherÕs hand, raised to 
slap him: both figure of memory and symbol of the mainmise.  
 The reader is left to fill in the blanks, striated through layers of memory, his 
fatherÕs beating, his actions in war, and the allusion to murder. But this incident is not 
just about the concealment of memories and their exposure: something happens in 
that moment which disrupts the self.  The self is not at home in the moment; 
something else takes control when the Ôhand of GodÕ reaches out and Cromwell 
reacts. Just as the moment discombobulates the self, so time and even matter itself 
are disrupted. In the firelight the cardinalÕs hand Ômelts into the clothÕ; a trick of the 
light certainly, but also the actualisation of a psychic moment which has material 
effects. In the moments after, Cromwell draws his selves together: boundaries are 
redrawn, the past returns to its proper place. Stuttering, as evinced by the hesitation 
of the cardinal and the sentences that break off and Ôgo nowhereÕ, time eventually 
begins to flow again. Mantel drives the point home five pages later: she describes 
CromwellÕs memories of all these different selves as  Ôa series of warnings which 
have worked themselves into fleshÉWhat went wrong was an accident of timing 
onlyÕ (WH 76). This Ôaccident of timingÕ is anything but: CromwellÕs categorisation 
of the incident as accidental contradicts MantelÕs own reflection on memory as 
Ôwarnings which have worked themselves into fleshÕ. The cardinalÕs hand is the hand 
of the father, which reaches out to Cromwell across time. Cromwell gets out from 
under his fatherÕs grip, the stranglehold of his fatherÕs authority, but his fatherÕs 
authority comes back; what Avital Ronell calls the Ôhand of timeÉraised to slap the 
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pleasure out of the child.Õ (Ronell 105)  We are the ÔwoundedÕ, imprinted with the 104
Ôuntraceable fingerprintsÕ of the grip of childhood, Ôan age that is not marked by age 
Ñ or rather, it does not age but recurs episodically, even historically.Õ (104) As 
Mantel writes ÔWolf Hall attempts to duplicate not the historianÕs chronology but how 
the memory works: in leaps, loops, flashesÕ (Mantel ÒHowÓ).  
A Change of Climate and the crypt                               
If Wolf Hall demonstrates the function of memory and the recurrence of childhood in 
ÔflashesÕ (Mantel ÒHowÓ), A Change of Climate (1994) offers the charactersÕ lived 
experience of childhoodÕs grip in its symbolic rendering of the lost child. The child in 
this novel is at once ÔfrozenÕ or suspended, and comes back; representing childhoodÕs 
ÔgripÕ on the adolescent and the adult. This novel also suggests a reading of Nicolas 
 See also FreudÕs ÒA Child is being BeatenÓ and his insistence on analysing the earliest childhood of 104
his patients. ÔThe emphasis which is laid here upon the importance of the earliest experiences does not 
imply any underestimation of the influence of later ones. But the later impressions of life speak loudly 
enough through the mouth of the patient, while it is the physician who has to raise his voice on behalf 
of the childÕ (183-4). The Father represents the Law, the Reality principle and prohibition against 
pleasure; but at the same time the act of disciplining the child has a relationship to infantile sexuality 
which cannot be easily explained away. It is FreudÕs ideas about childhood sexuality which have 
sparked the most exciting interventions into queer theoryÕs resurgent interest in the child. See for 
example the Introduction to Steven Bruhm and Natasha HurleyÕs volume of essays, Curiouser: on the 
queerness of children. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2004, in which they take as given the notion 
that we are all sexual from birth. See also Kathryn Bond StocktonÕs The Queer Child, which suggests 
interesting ways of thinking about the child(ren) in FreudÕs writings. Perhaps the most famous and 
controversial, Lee EdelmanÕs No Future critiques the notion of an inner Child. He argues against the 
myriad uses this figure has been put to, not least the unthinkingly sentimental invocation of Ôchildren 
are our futureÕ, reproductive futurism and the curtailment of civil rights for LGBTQ people. For a 
discussion of Edelman, see Mari Ruti ÒWhy there is always a future in the future.Ó Angelaki: Journal 
of the Theoretical Humanities. 13.1 (2008):113-126. Web. 27 Jun. 2013. 
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Abraham and Maria TorokÕs notion of the crypt,  in its exploration of secrets and 105
their trans-generational expression.  
 A Change of Climate is a novel about the Eldreds, a family with four children. 
Ralph Eldred runs a charitable trust helping the poor and needy, who often stay in the 
family home, the Red House. With a prologue called Ô1970: Sad Cases, Good SoulsÕ, 
Mantel plunges the reader straight into the familyÕs world, its moral system. This 
opening section demonstrates the peculiar singularity of family life for the Eldreds: 
ÔÉthis was how the world was divided, when Kit was growing up - into Good Souls 
and Sad Cases. There was no wickedness in itÕ (CC 3). Subsequently we learn about 
Ralph and AnnaÕs past as missionaries in South Africa. During this time, Anna gives 
birth to twins, Katherine and Matthew. One night during a storm the babies are 
abducted. Katherine (Kit) is subsequently returned after being rescued from a ditch, 
but Matthew is never found. The implication is that the boyÕs body was used for 
witchcraft or medicine. Ralph and Anna eventually accept that they will never know 
what happened or find MatthewÕs body, and return to England. The existence of 
Matthew, the Ôlost childÕ (CC 262), is kept from the remaining Eldred children, and 
the novel thus explores how the secret affects their lives as they reach the age of 
majority, and the sense they have of Ôsomething missingÕ.   106
 This Ôsomething missingÕ is unclear: repression stalks the text.  The 107
narrative time shifts complicate the charactersÕ individual and familial relationships. 
 Esther RashkinÕs Family Secrets and the Psychoanalysis of Narrative. Princeton: Princeton UP, 105
1992 deals with the idea of the crypt in relation to narrative in more detail. See also Nicholas RoyleÕs 
review of RashkinÕs book, ÒThis is not a book reviewÓ. Angelaki 2:1 (1997): 31-35. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/0969725970857/1914. Accessed 8th December 2015. As Nicholas Royle suggests, in relation 
to Wuthering Heights in Telepathy and Literature: ÔTelepathy is a crypt. And no doubt Ñ given the 
extremely strange, scarcely imaginable relaying or network of ÒcommunicationsÓ necessary for its 
construction within the self, in the core of the Ego Ñ it would be legitimate to describe the crypt, and 
especially the haunted crypt or ÒghostÓ, as telepathicÕ (34).
 See ÒMind What GapÓ Eileen PollardÕs interview with Mantel. 106
 See Sigmund Freud ÒRepressionÓ (1915)107
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The structure of the novel echoes this sedimentation and colludes in the secretÕs 
covering up. For example: shifting from 1970 then forward to the present, RalphÕs 
sister visits a church, writing the names of her brother and his family in a book to be 
prayed for: 
 A notice promised ALL WHOSE NAMES ARE INSCRIBED IN THIS BOOK   
 WILL BE PRAYED FOR AT THE SHRINE.  
 Éshe wrote the names of her brother and his wife: 
RALPH ELDRED 
ANNA ELDRED 
 Beneath she wrote: 
KATHERINE ELDRED 
 then hesitated, and skipped one line, before 
JULIAN ELDRED 
ROBERT ELDRED 
REBECCA ELDRED         (26-7) 
The missing child MatthewÕs name, is supposed to occupy the line after KatherineÕs 
(Kit). The lost child (though the first time reader does not yet know this significance) 
thus assumes a power in the narrative that structures the novel.  The ÔnotÕ-writing of 
the childÕs name assumes its significance by absence. 
 RalphÕs own childhood provides a subplot, illustrating the battle between 
himself and his father. Matthew Eldred comes from a line of printers and lay 
preachers. His social circle is described by Mantel thus: 
 Their homes, and the homes of their friends, were temples of right-thinking, of inky  
 scholarship, sabbatarian dullness; their religion was active, proselytizing, strenuous  
 and commonsensical. They saw no need to inquire into GodÕs nature; they   
 approached Him through early rising, Bible study and earnest, futile attempts at   
 humility (CC 32) 
Matthew EldredÕs expectation for his son is service to God in the above mentioned 
capacity, but one day he finds a fossil by chance, the Ôhundred and fifty million years 
oldÕ Gryphaea (37) and subsequently becomes fascinated by geology and evolution. 
Ralph teaches himself how to think in geological time, to strip back the landscape to 
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before man has touched it, to see the Ôpath of the glacier Éthe desert beneath copse 
and streamÕ (41). As his passion for the subject grows, 
 A frieze of evolution marched through RalphÕs head. Each form of life as its time and 
 place: sea-snail and sea-lily, water-scorpion and lungfish, fern tree and coral. Shark  
 and flesh-eating reptile; sea-urchin and brontosaurus; pterodactyl and magnolia tree;  
 cuttle fish and oyster. Then the giant flightless bird, opossum in his tree, elephant in  
 his swamp; it was as clear in his mind as it might be in a childÕs picture book, or a  
 poster on a nursery wall. The sabre-toothed cat, the little horse three feet tall; the   
 Irish elk, the woolly mammoth; then man, stooped, hairy, furrow-browed. It is a   
 success story. (CC 42-3) 
Told to us from RalphÕs point of view, this subplot is a reminiscence, which has 
resonances throughout the text. One of these is the argument between Ralph and his 
family, when Ralph decides that he will not follow in his fatherÕs footsteps. Matthew 
accuses Ralph of throwing off his religion, believing that to be a Darwinist means 
atheism. His parents Ôclosed in on himÉa pincer movementÕ (CC 46) in which they 
exhort him to give up his plans. The final act, his ÔcapitulationÕ (52) occurs when they 
use his sister Emma against him: if he continues on this path, then she will not be 
allowed to fulfil her ambitions to be a doctor. Emma Ôdid not know how he had been 
defeatedÕ (52). The language of war is no accident here: Mantel understands the 
attrition between parents and children, the generational struggles of blood, the 
Ôancient argumentÕ that circles on:  108
 These are the things sons say to fathers; these are the things fathers say to sons. The  
 knowledge didnÕt help him; nor did the knowledge that his father was behaving like a 
 caricature of a Victorian patriarch. His family has always been cripplingly old   
 fashioned; till now he had not realised the deformityÕs extent. (CC 49) 
Understanding his fatherÕs intransigence in the face of perceived defiance, Ralph asks 
himself the question ÔWhy didnÕt he get some other, reasonable adult to weigh in on 
his behalf?Õ (48). There is an echo of Thomas CromwellÕs impatience with his former 
 Hlne Cixous in Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing, refers to the Òdeadly war waged between 108
children and parents, this war that turns in circles and began before us all...you want to kill me, says 
one, no, youÕre the one who wants my death, says the other....Our murders are decided in an obscure 
and violent relation to jouissance, in jealousy, so dark, primitive, and remote we donÕt even see it. 
There, in the shadows, a scandalous scene of deprivation is played out: the parent would like to starve 
the child or at least use hunger to keep hold of him or her. And all this is not without love, not without 
hateÓ (25)
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self here, why doesnÕt he just get up? These questions both attest to the childÕs 
helplessness in the face of adult demands. The resistance to the childÕs desire to grow 
up demonstrated by the parentsÕ cold treatment, their disapproval and derision of the 
childÕs dreams. RalphÕs encounters with his father leave him bruised, battered and 
convinced that his father desires to be God: ÔIf Man was diminished, then Matthew 
Eldred was diminished: a lord of the universe was precisely what he wished to 
beÕ (49).  
 Later, on her deathbed, RalphÕs mother Dorcas speaks candidly of his father 
for the first time: 
 É[S]ix months after I was married I gave up fearing God and started fearing your  
 father. I mean that, you know. I donÕt mean it as a blasphemy. He always seemed to  
 me like a person from another age. Abraham. A patriarch. (261) 
Ralph is forced to tell his sister the true course of those events, ÔÉthis is such old 
ground, I didnÕt think IÕd ever have to go over itÕ (261). RalphÕs father is a modern 
Abraham. In sacrificing his own ambitions for his sisterÕs,  Ralph gives in to the 109
mainmise, he capitulates; the deck was stacked against him from the start. The 
stranglehold of childhood has the main character, Ralph, in its grip; ÔÉhe had never 
freed himself from his parentsÕ (CC 20). The novel plays out the doubleness of 
childhoodÕs grip: at once the pull and seizure of parental expectation, at the same 
time the grip of early childhoodÕs helplessness and loss. Mantel describes RalphÕs 
unconscious powerful feelings about his father, his dreams showing clear signals of 
repression: 
 What he could not endure were the thoughts of his heart, and the frequent dreams he  
 had, in which he murdered his fatherÉBy day he entertained, he thought, little   
 animosity to MatthewÉSo these dreams, these inner revolts, bewildered him. He  
 was forced to concede that large areas of his life were beyond his control. (53) 
 Pollard ÒMind What GapÓ (9)109
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The murderous feelings are buried and thus it is possible to read Ralph as somehow 
stuck; and the resulting horrific event as the disinterment of his powerful murderous 
impulses. The naming of the son for his father cements this reversal of the proper 
order of things - the loss of his son. God has called upon Ralph for the sacrifice, 
ironically when he perceives himself to be doing good: ÔThere is no comfort. I am the 
one who opened the door to them. They said they wanted shelter. I decided to do a 
good action, and by it my life has been split open and destroyedÕ (CC 243).  
 This displaced sacrifice disrupts the temporal logic of progress. Instead of 
evolving and growing up, as the other children do, Matthew is frozen in time. His 
presence taints, on into the next generation. After Emma and Ralph have spoken 
about his ÔsacrificeÕ for her, and she has forecast their motherÕs time of death, 
MantelÕs interjection about Matthew consolidates this notion of Matthew as absent 
presence, lost yet lingering: 
 It is a pity she cannot, with similar accuracy, put a term to the after-life of the   
 missing child. It would be possible, if one were harsh, to regard this lost child not as  
 an innocent, but as a malign half-presence, a destroyer, a consumer of hope.   
 Katherine grows up; they search her face for signs of what her brother would have  
 been. As babies, they were not much alike. So no consolation there; but no further  
 suffering, either. Except you cannot help but mark out the course of the shadow-  
 life...he would be six years old, he would be seven years old, he would be seventeen.  
 He has all we lack, he is everything we are not; we have our gross appetites, but he is 
 the opposite of flesh. Somewhere in Africa the little heart rots, the bird-bones   
 crumble or Ñ alternatively Ñ the traces dry in their jar; their child becomes a bush- 
 ghost, powder on the wind (CC 262). 
The frozen child Matthew, suspended in time, seeps into the next generationÕs 
collective psyche, despite the best efforts of the parents. They try to keep the 
repressed and dangerous knowledge of the child MatthewÕs murder from Kit, as 
Ralph explains in a letter to his uncle James, ÔShe will never remember what has 
happenedÉ as Kit grows up she must be protected from knowledge of this horrible 
thing. If she learns about it, it will contaminate her lifeÕ (244). This contamination 
occurs anyway: Kit, for example, knows something is wrong but does not know, at 
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the same time. She talks to her younger brother Robin one night, describing her 
memories of Africa, how she remembers Julian with her. She is, of course, 
remembering Matthew, her twin: but the family have successfully shielded her 
consciousness from the knowledge of her twin, and she can only assign Julian, 
younger by a year or so, to the place of the absent boy. The lacuna in her conscious 
knowledge doesnÕt exist in her unconscious. She describes early body memories of 
heat, the nanny Felicia, and this other child . When Robin challenges her chronology, 
she says, ÔWho then? Who do I remember?Õ (177) and there is a conversation 
punctuated by silence, and RobinÕs ÔÉact, which said, I wish to distract myself from 
the thought in my headÕ (177).  
 In Abraham and TorokÕs notion of the crypt, from The Shell and the Kernel 
(1994), the introjected secret forms a part of the ego that is utterly shut off from 
consciousness, and although it speaks, can only speak as the other. Thus KitÕs desire 
to go to Africa, and JulianÕs over-protectiveness of his sister Becky, his preoccupation 
with abduction and murder. The lost child Matthew exists as a contamination, passed 
down through generations. 
The lost child returns 
We have seen already how the secret lost child Matthew infects the family. Although 
the child is irrevocably lost, there is a displacement from one lost child figure to 
another. The child returns, although it is not the same child, and is thus recuperated 
into its ÔproperÕ place, through the return of the troubled Melanie. She makes her way 
back to the Red House after absconding from hospital. Ralph and Anna notice her 
first, as they stand at the door of the house: 
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 A creature moved into their view, at a distance. It came slowly over the rough   
 ground, crawling. It was a human being: its face a mask of despair, its body half-  
 clothed in a flapping gown, its hands and knees and feet bleeding; its strange head  
 the colour of the sun. It progressed towards them; they saw the heaving ribs, the   
 small transparent features, the dirt-ingrained skin...They left the Red House together,  
 stumbling over the rough grass. As they approached the child, she stopped trying to  
 crawl. She shrank into herself, her head sunk between her shoulder-blades like some  
 dying animal. But then, as they reached out towards her, Melanie began to breatheÉ 
 (CC 340) 
In her interview ÒMind what Gap?Ó Eileen Pollard and Mantel converse about A 
Change of Climate: 
 EP: É[S]he [Melanie] is returningÉAnd then I had this horrifying shock, and it   
 doesnÕt even make any sense, and it mustÕve only been for a split second, that this  
 figure that is crawling and running towards themÉ 
 HM: Was the baby. 
 EP: Was the baby! Yes!  
 HM: I think it is. Well, sheÕs got this head like the sun, and sheÕs not quite a human  
 thing as she comes crawling towards themÉitÕs their going out to her that makes her  
 human, sheÕs being taken into the house (Pollard 7). 
The return of the child Matthew from Africa ÔdoesnÕt even make any senseÕ if read on 
a spatially and temporally ÔrealÕ level, but its symbolic return offers the Eldreds some 
respite. The act of going out to meet Melanie, ÔstumblingÕ and ÔtogetherÕ, is a 
symbolic act of reparation for the family.  
 The displacement of Matthew onto MelanieÕs return demonstrates the 
suspension of the lost baby, its doubling. The description of MelanieÕs return is 
interesting for the figures of movement that Mantel employs, and how these recur 
through the novel as markers of evolution and progress. Chambers defines progress 
as Ôa forward movement, an advance to something better or higher in developmentÕ. 
Evolution is referred to as progress, but a progress that is laid down for the organism 
before it starts. And so Ralph refers to himself as having ÔÉevolved very nicelyÉ
along the only possible routeÕ (CC 336). When Ralph talks to Kit about the sad cases, 
he explains how he can predict their lives from what they came from, ÔI used to think, 
of course they have free will. But then after a few years I saw these patterns repeat 
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themselves, as if people were born into themÕ (266). RalphÕs quarrel with his parents 
over his belief in evolution leads him to inter the fossils he has painstakingly 
collected into a box. The box of fossils gives Rebecca nightmares; told by Kat that 
they were Ôprimitive creatures that once had swum and crawledÕ she Ôsaw them 
swimming and crawling again, mud-sucking and breathing at her bedroom 
doorÕ (41).  The fossils in a box, buried in the familyÕs loft, run parallel to the 110
familyÕs secret, which lays inside Sandra Glasse Ôlike a stoneÕ (281). ÔFossilisedÕ 
knowledge paralyses the family and stymies their attempts at communication. 
Melanie unlocks the conundrum, in a mirroring of the babyÕs imaginings, by 
ÔcrawlingÕ back towards the house. The fossils, as geological and archaeological 
stasis, act as a metaphor for frozen knowledge, their presence a symbol for the lost, 
suspended child. The child disturbs the rules of generational progress and critical 
reading, by rupturing temporality, by refusing to stay in its place. 
 The child in A Change of Climate exposes a double movement: Kit grows up 
and they see the child that Matthew might have been. Not only this; MelanieÕs 
retrieval draws the connection across MantelÕs texts. The symbolised lost child 
becomes not only a synthesis between Matthew and Melanie in A Change of Climate 
(1994), but also acts as a resurfacing of the psychologically lost Muriel, and her 
unnamed and unsexed baby in Every Day is MotherÕs Day (1985). The letter M in 
Mantel, Matthew and Muriel demonstrates the networks between the novels and how 
these webs of meaning, despite chronology, cross reference each other in unique 
Mantellian ways. Whereas in A Change of Climate Anna finds Kit in a ditch, 
returning with the child in her arms, Muriel and Evelyn in Every Day is MotherÕs Day 
 Consider also how Mantel describes her writing experience: ÔI remember really struggling with it; it 110
was like a wild animal that had to be civilised somehowÉWriting that book stands out as one of the 
most difficult times of my writing lifeÕ (OÕReilly 8). 
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put MurielÕs baby into a box and then into the canal. Anna is effectively reclaiming 
the baby back from the inexplicable forces of the universe, where the women in 
Every Day is MotherÕs Day are inviting the possibility that no baby will come back, 
no changeling. The social worker Isabel FieldÕs reference to ÔmischanceÕ exposes this 
too, as the AxonsÕ actions run counter to the EldredsÕ desire to entirely expunge any 
malignity from their lives, demonstrated by KitÕs perspective in the beginning of the 
novel. When Muriel is giving birth she climbs a Ôglassy pyramid of painÕ, (ED 172) 
the reference to glass another connection between the child figureÕs loss and return in 
A Change of Climate, AnnaÕs approach with Kit in her arms described Ôlike a woman 
breaking through sheets of glass, like a woman ploughing through mirrorsÕ (CC 241). 
The violence of AnnaÕs frantic return in the hazy African dawn, using the similes of 
mirrors and glass show the treachery of surfaces which can no longer be relied on. 
The splintering of these surfaces suggests the annihilation of reason; the utter 
incomprehensibility of the act shatters any attempt to process or think about the deed. 
A further layer of significance occurs in the naming of RalphÕs mistress, Amy Glasse, 
whose relationship with Ralph acts as a means for him to heal; she offers him a 
mirror. 
 The child becomes even stranger in Every Day is MotherÕs Day (1985), the 
story of mother and daughter Evelyn and Muriel Axon who live a strange, 
sequestered existence in the suburb of a nondescript city. The story of their 
relationship is told through free indirect discourse, social workerÕs notes and official 
letters. The novel opens with authorial commentary; Mrs AxonÕs discovery of her 
ÔdaughterÕs conditionÕ, about which Ôshe was more surprised than sorry; which did 
not mean that she was not very sorry indeedÕ (ED 7). We are introduced to the 
grotesque child Muriel, who in this situation Ôsat with her legs splayed and her arms 
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around herself, as if reliving the eventÕ (7). Muriel, although old enough to get 
pregnant, is not able to comprehend her plight. Interspersed is the story of the 
Sidneys, Florence and her brother Colin, who grew up next door to the Axons. There 
is an inference that Clifford Axon, MurielÕs late husband, abused Florence Sidney 
(Mrs SidneyÕs daughter) when she was a child. Colin later has a love affair with 
Isabel Field, the social worker assigned to MurielÕs case.  
 To return to the beginning of the novel, the reader ÔseesÕ old Mrs Sidney 
(mother of Florence and Colin) on her way to EvelynÕs house for a sance to contact 
her dead husband. What is first noted about the Axon household is the lack of life; 
Ô[N]o weeds pushed up between the stones of the path. And this was odd, because 
you would not have thought of Evelyn Axon as a keen gardenerÕ (9). As Mrs Sidney 
enters the house, ÔShe took in the neglected parquet floor, the umbrella stand, the 
small table quite bare except for one potplant, withered and brown. ÒNothing seems 
to survive,Ó Evelyn saidÕ (ED 10).  The situation deteriorates for the unsuspecting 
widow Mrs Sidney, who is expecting a sanitised version of the after-death exploits of 
her husband (Ôa CookÕs Tour of the other worldÕ, as Evelyn Axon calls it, (14). Where 
the consummate professional medium Alison Hart in Beyond Black shields her clients 
from the worst excesses of the spirit world, Evelyn Axon seems to take pleasure in 
informing Mrs Sidney of her recently deceased husbandÕs whereabouts. The scene 
becomes a parody of the mediumÕs contact with the dead, the closed eyes and gaping 
mouth signifying a body that is no longer in control of itself, a conduit, or as Evelyn 
has it, a Ôcruise linerÕ, an ÔaeroplaneÕ. Mrs Sidney gets instead one stark and spiteful 
sentence from Evelyn Axon ÔYour husband Arthur is roasting in some unspeakable 
hellÕ (13).  
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 This introductory scene leaves the reader with a choice of how to read 
Evelyn. Although the novel is narrated from her point of view, we are invited to 
consider if she is mad, psychic, or both? Is she a victim of her own ignorance, of 
circumstance, of an abusive husband, or of something more malign and other-
worldly? These choices are left continually and deliberately ambiguous by Mantel. 
Evelyn is convinced of the existence of another world, Ôa little removed but 
concurrentÕ (14); she is continuously tormented by the entities of this other world, 
who cross over to make mischief and try to hurt her. Upon finding objects lying 
around the house, in places they shouldnÕt be, Evelyn immediately blames the spirits. 
Muriel is denied any sort of agency, as Evelyn ascribes all of the strange goings on in 
the house to the tenants in the third bedroom. Notes are left strewn, and the mother is 
convinced that Muriel could not have written them, as she cannot write (22), but the 
reader learns that Muriel can write (21). In a social services letter it is described how, 
when asked to demonstrate her Ôbasic level skillsÕ to her mother, she Ôagreed...but 
when supplied with paper she scribbled on itÕ (ED 22). When a tin opener appears, 
seemingly out of nowhere, Evelyn is convinced the spirits Ôhave left her a giftÕ (20). 
The reader, however, has access to a Social Services letter, explaining that Muriel 
wonÕt face charges Ôregarding the removal of a tin-opener which occurred when a 
small party of clients was taken on a shopping expedition last weekÕ (26).  
 Mantel uses the epigraph from Pascal to play with the readerÕs expectations of 
finding a definitive truth, by refusing to take everything either literally or spiritually. 
The first chapter demonstrates the provisional nature of this narrative. The reader 
gains access to certain information: MurielÕs school years, her fatherÕs death at the 
age of six, the Ôbasic contemptÕ that Evelyn seems to have for her. The reader does 
not know what to do with this information, nor a clear idea of how to judge the 
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characters. The textual clues Mantel weaves about Evelyn and Muriel contradict and 
complicate; they are both at turns pathetic and vicious, credulous and knowing, 
sympathetic and disgusting. For example, the first visit that Isabel is able to make to 
the Axons, when Muriel finally opens the front door, occurs after Muriel returns from 
a catatonic trance: 
           So Monday morning brought relief. Muriel was back. Her pale eyes travelled   
 around the house, without interest, but more freely than of late. ÔYou are being a   
 good girl today,Õ Evelyn said kindly. Muriel got up and took herself to the lavatory. 
           Evelyn was in the kitchen when the knocking started up at the front door. Muriel  
 heard it too. I know what is to be done, she thought, or what can be done, when that  
 noise starts up. She remembered to rearrange her clothes, or to do as much   
 rearrangement as was necessary under the enveloping blue dress. She watched her  
 large feet going before her, placing themselves slightly sideways on each descending  
 stair. 
      Evelyn snatched the pan off the stove. As she blundered down the hallway, she  
 felt tiny malignant hands pull at her skirt and catch at her ankles. She could not,   
 could not, make headway.  
           Her face contorted with effort and alarm. ÔMuriel!Õ Muriel turned her head, gave  
 her a blank look, her hand on the catch of the front door; then a slow, spreading   
 smirk. The door swung open, framing mother and daughter, as if they had come to  
 open it together in an expansive gesture of welcome. (63)  
This passage could be the representation of a ÔnormalÕ domestic scene; mother 
speaking ÔkindlyÕ towards her young daughter, who is exploring her independence by 
going to the toilet on her own, by beginning to respond and react to stimuli such as 
the front door knocking.  Mantel undercuts this picture, when we realise that the 111
child Muriel is physically a grown and ungainly woman, with large feet whose 
Ôenveloping blue dressÕ hides her own maternity. EvelynÕs attempt to stop Muriel 
from opening the door is curtailed by Ôtiny malignant handsÕ, and Mantel ends the 
passage by further ironising the mother/daughter pairÕs Ôexpansive gesture of 
welcomeÕ, in that tiny phrase Ôas ifÕ. The narrative is thus not only undermined by the 
ÔimpossibleÕ things that occur (Ôagainst the laws of natureÕ, as Colette in Beyond 
Black says), but by the undercutting that Mantel does herself to skew the readerÕs 
perspective. 
 For example WinnicottÕs notion of the Ôtransitional spaceÕ and the child exploring its independence. 111
See Playing and Reality (new ed.) London: Routledge, 2005. 
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 This undercutting occurs also with a textual allusion to the possibility of 
Clifford Axon, EvelynÕs late husband and MurielÕs father, being a child abuser. 
EvelynÕs mind wanders back to Ôanother Christmas DayÕ (ED 116); we learn that her 
mother was an invalid and that she was sent to live with her aunt and uncle. Her 
uncle proposes Evelyn as a wife to Clifford Axon, a clerk in his firm, who Ôhad 
decided recently that his life would be better regulated if he had a wife to oversee his 
domestic arrangementsÕ (118). After the wedding, ÔUncle Reggie was vaguely sorry. 
He suspected Axon of indulging in sexual deviations. But it was too late to do 
anything about thatÕ (118). The suspicion is later confirmed the night that Muriel 
gives birth, when Evelyn needs some air and her thoughts turn to the shed Ôwhere 
Clifford used to goÕ (174). Evelyn recalls his injunction to Ôturn a blind eyeÕ which 
she obeyed Ôuntil one day she had seen the child from next door heading down the 
path, little Florence Sidney; little Florence Sidney, who was that great hulk of a 
woman nowÕ (ED 174). She shoos Florence away and confronts Clifford. The 
suggestion is that Evelyn saves Florence Sidney, but also that she continues to turn a 
blind eye to CliffordÕs antics. Possibly more children are subsequently abused, as 
well as her own daughter.  
 This ambiguous knowledge changes the readerÕs perspective on the Ôtiny 
malignant handsÕ that pull at Evelyn, stop her from moving. Who do these hands 
belong to, that impede EvelynÕs movement? Are they even ÔrealÕ? The grasping, 
pulling tiny hands manifest as fantasies but the reader, yet again, cannot be sure. We 
are back again to the mainmise, to the grip that childhood exerts on the adult, that 
stop it from moving forward, its strange and irresistible logic, but again this is 
complicated by the ghostly suggestiveness of the text. These tiny malignant hands 
really could be the ghosts of children abused and murdered by Clifford Axon, 
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EvelynÕs husband and MurielÕs father. The tiny malignant hands then come to 
represent the sinister ghosts of the wronged, looking for justice, the physical 
manifestation of EvelynÕs guilt, who knew what was happening and was powerless to 
stop it.  
 When Muriel gives birth to the baby she is carrying, she also gives physical 
form to EvelynÕs fears. The baby comes to embody EvelynÕs knowledge: 
 At first it would not breathe. MurielÕs eyes signalled something to her. Leave it, she  
 was saying. Shocked, Evelyn gripped the slippery thing and shook it. A thin hopeless 
 bleating came out. A fine idea of MurielÕs, the ghost under their feet for years,   
 learning in the parallel world to crawl, walk and talk; and perhaps blaming them for  
 its demise. (182) 
EvelynÕs fear of retribution from this ÔthingÕ in the Ôparallel worldÕ, echoes the fear 
she feels at the claims of the tiny malignant hands, the small seekers after justice who 
are coming (in EvelynÕs mind) for vengeance:  
 All morning there were rappings and banging at the front door. The screams and   
 laughter of spiteful children rang in EvelynÕs ears. She went down the hall at last,  
 and threw the door open; but no one was there. (ED 182)  
There is a ÔrealisticÕ reason for the children banging on the door and making a noise: 
while Muriel is giving birth Florence is babysitting her brotherÕs children. But again 
Mantel urges us not to choose, not to take everything literally (IsabelÕs mistake) and 
not to take everything spiritually (Evelyn AxonÕs mistake). EvelynÕs fear grows: 
 She did not wish to admit to herself that now that the child was born she was   
 confused, beginning to be frightened; menaces from the tenants she had expected,  
 but she had not reckoned on a deep shrinking antipathy to what Muriel produced, the 
 feeling that even their precarious foothold in the house was crumbling further; and  
 that feeling dated, she knew, from her first good look at the babyÕs face. (186) 
The source of her fear being the misapprehension that the baby has been fathered by 
her late husband: ÔShe bent over it; Clifford stared backÕ (186).  Later this doubt 
returns, to horrific effect: ÔShe looked down at the baby, and saw Clifford again, 
sitting behind its eyes; behind the glassy layers the years peeling awayÕ (189). The 
reader is pushed into a sickening denouement, the horror of which surpasses MantelÕs 
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ironic intention and veers into unsettling territory, exposing as it does the strangeness 
of this ÔchangelingÕ child, the ÔcreepinessÕ of its temporality. She puts the baby into a 
box, and the women go out and put the box into the canal, in EvelynÕs hope that 
another baby will appear, once that is not ÔmisbegottenÕ or Ôdemon-foodÕ (186). 
Evelyn talks to Clifford in her head, ÔBack from the dead, are you? Your own 
daughter, in your own house. Damn you, Clifford; your handiwork hasnÕt lasted longÕ 
(192). EvelynÕs idea of Clifford as father to his own daughterÕs baby is an impossible 
delusion. Clifford died when Muriel was still a child, and thus we ÔknowÕ it is a 
material impossibility.  
 The possibility of the baby being fathered by a ghost, however, makes 
macabre sense within the logic of the text, which is EvelynÕs logic, every day being 
motherÕs day after all. Although the reader is able to realign him or herself, shaking 
off EvelynÕs  perspective that the ÔmisbegottenÕ should be CliffordÕs ÔhandiworkÕ, 
within the framework of thinking about the lost child this event conforms to a twisted 
logic of mis-generation. Muriel is a child bearing a child whose father may be her 
own father; or her own fatherÕs ghost. The returned child looks like its father which 
could also be its grandfather. It is no surprise within this twisted logic that MurielÕs 
cries of ÔmotherÕ sound to Evelyn like ÔmurderÕ (ED 44). The child has been stripped 
of its Romantic innocence and now figures death. The child does not represent 
generational time, or any linear time of the plot, but occurs here in ÔfableÕ or 
fantastical mode. The gruesome return of CliffordÕs phantom also suggests murder, 
with the circumstances of CliffordÕs own death remaining ambiguous. 
 That the child figure in the novel represents something ÔotherÕ to the text is 
suggested by the child MurielÕs physical presence but psychological absence, ÔMore 
and more, when Evelyn was in a room with her daughter, she felt as if no one was 
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thereÕ (32). Muriel is monstrous, doubly monstrous for bearing a child herself, as we 
have already seen, but her obliteration in the novel also suggests her status as a 
ÔblankÕ. This possibility comes to fruition in the sequel Vacant Possession, in which 
the rehabilitated Muriel, who was sent to an institution after her motherÕs death, takes 
on the name Lizzie Blank. Mantel shows Muriel as blocking out reality, taking Ôone 
of her strange holidays from the worldÕ: 
 Muriel seemed to have lost interest in life. She sat a good deal of the time with her  
 eyes closed, her fingers in her ears. Then her fingers would pinch her nostrils closed;  
 when Evelyn had first seen this trick she had been distraught. ÔWhat is the smell?Õ  
 She had demanded, trying to drag MurielÕs hand away from her face. ÔWhat is the  
 smell?Õ (62) 
Mantel uses direct speech when she presents Evelyn, but not when she writes Muriel, 
whose words are only ever reported through her mother. The dysfunctional mother/
daughter relationship is represented by Mantel, who through manipulating the 
reaction to events in the house, can keep any interpretation ambiguous, at armÕs 
length from the reader. It is only when her mother is dead that she speaks, quietly so 
Isabel and Colin have to strain to hear her, what sounds like Ôvictor of the fieldÕ. in 
this way, every day really is motherÕs day, for Muriel anyway, whose life is subsumed 
under her motherÕs.  
 MurielÕs experiences are also relayed secondhand via the social workersÕ 
letters. For example, the Axons receive a visit from Social Services, in which Evelyn 
calls Muriel an idiot. This ÔfactÕ is confirmed by a social workerÕs report: Ô[f]or 
instance she referred to client in her hearing as a Òhopeless idiotÓÕ (ED 15). Later, 
when the pair argue about Ôthe spilt sugar, the small thefts, the china they smashed 
piece by pieceÕ, Evelyn says: 
 ÒI could move you from here. But where would you go? They are always getting into 
 my bedroom.Ó Muriel said there was a third bedroom. Evelyn stared at her. She could 
 feel again her heart hammering and pounding in her throat. The woman had made a  
 shocked face when she had called Muriel an idiot. She, Evelyn, lived with the daily  
 confirmation of her idiocy. Only a hopeless idiot would suggest she took up   
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 residence in a room already tenanted; and such tenants. ÒWash yourself,Ó she   
 commanded her. She went downstairs. (ED 18) 
This is one of many examples in which EvelynÕs speech is reported, whereas MurielÕs 
speech is indirect, effectively erasing Muriel and providing a textual manifestation of 
the ways that her mother smothers her subjectivity. Hurting herself by cutting and 
burning her arms, Muriel tests the extent of her motherÕs surveillance of her body, 
thinking that Evelyn will also feel the pain, but finds, ÔEvelyn has not been in her 
body today, not even very much in her brainÕ (30). Muriel sees her surprise, and Ôto 
be helpful, always to be helpful, she holds up her arms for EvelynÕs inspectionÕ (30). 
When Evelyn exclaims at MurielÕs torture by the tenants, 
 [m]oaning again, she washes her arthritic hands together. Could you not cry out?  
 You have gagged me, Muriel thinks. Up the stairs you would have come, rushing to  
 take my pain for yourself. With what? Sharp blades and fire, Muriel says, in her   
 casually dead voice. (ED 30) 
The obliteration of Muriel by her mother is textually coded again by the confusion of 
voices here; it takes the reader time to unravel who is speaking, and to whom.   
MurielÕs confinement, meaning both her pregnancy and her psychological retreat 
from the world, echoes MantelÕs concern with burial throughout the novel. Isabel 
Field and Colin Sidney conduct their affair within the confined space of his car: 
during one of their meetings she tells him a fable about a family trapped underneath a 
farmhouse, in hiding from the Nazis. The man in the story hides underneath a 
farmhouse, entreating the woman to join him. She refuses, until she is so desperate 
that she gives in and joins him. They have a child, who is profoundly damaged, 
Ôscreaming like a wild animal or mute as though they still had their hands over her 
faceÕ, who after the war Ôwent from one institution to anotherÕ (131). Isabel offers the 
story to Colin as a fable of the Ôstifling power of loveÕ, but the reader can read it as an 
allegory of MurielÕs life and its smothered subjectivity, the three characters in the 
intra-diegetic frame standing in for Clifford, Evelyn and Muriel. Moreover, appearing 
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practically in the centre of the book, the metaphorical story is a pin which holds the 
various iterations of burial together. Take for example EvelynÕs thoughts about her 
daughter: 
 Years passed like this, the nameable fears giving way to the unnameable, the familiar 
 dread of evening muffled under a pall of fog, of blackness, of earth; all the days lived 
 as if underground, and Muriel, she thought, if I could have mourned myself, if I   
 could have drawn breath, I might have pitied you. (174) 
The reader is left to draw the connection between the hole underground and the 
AxonÕs house, emphasised further by IsabelÕs reaction when Colin later announces 
his intention to buy it: ÔtheyÕll find your body and bury youÕ (209). His insistence that 
a coat of paint will hide the smell of misery is comical but also indicative of a central 
concern with the covering over of knowledge and the effects of concealment. When  
Isabel goes to investigate the Axons, having finally gained entry to the house, she is 
locked in the bedroom by Evelyn, describing Ôa clammy chill like wet earthÕ (195). 
EvelynÕs heart is described as Ômolten heaving and pulsating inside its coffin made of 
leadÕ (192).  
 Abraham and TorokÕs notion of the crypt offers a way to read the 
preponderance of burial metaphors in both novels, without recourse to the idea of a 
textual unconscious, or the text as equivalent to the unconscious of reader or writer. 
Boxes, fossils, and burials all figure lost children and secreted knowledge. In A 
Change of Climate the dead child qualifies as a phantom in its form as Ômemory 
buried without legal burial placeÕ (Abraham and Torok 141). The hole in memory that 
is occupied by the baby is transmitted to Kit in the form of her incomplete memories 
of Africa. The repressions of the parents form Ôa gap in the unconsciousÕ (141). 
 In Every Day is MotherÕs Day MurielÕs body is already a tomb in that the 
baby she births has no chance of life, being marked with an irrevocable punishment. 
The sins of the fathers are visited on the baby, giving the lie to innocence deserving 
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protection. But also the whole novel is based around containers and the illegitimate 
contents of those containers: the house and its ÔtenantsÕ; the shed with its child abuser 
occupant; MurielÕs body containing the baby; EvelynÕs body having once contained 
Muriel. The crypt gives a way of thinking which is useful because it conceptualises 
trauma as both fantasy and reality. Primary repression is based on fantasy for Freud; 
the phantasms and distortions it produces are a by-product. Abraham and Torok are 
able to say, look, the trauma is real, the suffering is real. They do not make the error 
of taking everything spiritually or literally. Fantasy for Abraham and Torok is Ônot the 
translation of  a psychic process; quite the opposite, it is the illusory and 
painstakingly reiterated proof that no process whatever has or should take 
placeÕ (Abraham and Torok 142). In other words, the unconsciousÕ equivalent of 
Ômove along, nothing to see here!Õ which enables repression and its second life as 
transmitted parasitical speck in the ego. The dead child ÔspeaksÕ through the body of 
Anna, and the traumatised body of the unloved Melanie, and in KitÕs memories. In 
Every Day is MotherÕs Day the child speaks via the tiny hands that pluck and the 
entities that ÔhauntÕ Evelyn. In Vacant Possession a clean up of the canal turns up tiny 
bones. This baby skeleton is packaged up in a box and returned, in a gruesome re-
enactment of its birth.  
 The child makes time strange, we might say. But instead of time, there are 
times: what Andr Green refers to as Ômultiple centres of time conjugationsÕ (Green 
Time in Psychoanalysis 37). MurielÕs relation to time is more like an animalÕs than a 
human being; she lives in an Ôeternal presentÕ (ED 31). Confusion about time occurs 
in the novel, where Ôtime is moving at its own speedÕ (45). In presenting the psychic 
wounds of Evelyn Axon and the damaged Muriel, Mantel shows how the child, in its 
suspension, does not adhere to the time of narrative, it is within time or beyond it. 
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The timelessness of the unconscious rears its head; the psychic wounds that are borne 
by the characters, the return of the repressed. But the twisted logic of generation 
displayed here also has something to say to the child in its weirdness, if we recall 
Ronell.  The child haunts, it never goes away: and so it becomes possible to read this 
novel as a fable of how we fail to get on, of what holds us back, to paraphrase 
Lyotard. The child that haunts is suspended within the narrative frame in both novels, 




ChildhoodÕs Founding Fictions: Giving up the Ghost 
Introduction: Helplessness 
It is a culturally accepted notion that the child is a helpless entity. One of the cultural 
myths that recurs from Hegel to Freud, the child is seen to be reliant on adult whims. 
For Freud, the child is helpless but the state of helplessness is not confined to 
childhood. Adult helplessness is closely related to the idea of the ego as subject to the 
unknowable whims of the unconscious mind; as Freud states in ÔA Difficulty of 
PsychoanalysisÕ, the ego Ôis not master in its own houseÕ (Freud ÔDifficultyÕ 355). Not 
all of the mind is accessible to the conscious will. The realisation of the willÕs relative 
weakness in the face of all the unconscious elements of the psyche: this is what Freud 
calls a ÔblowÕ to narcissism, and Ôprobably the most woundingÕ (352). Mantel concurs 
with Freud: ÔNothing governs down there,Õ she states (Appendix i 241). The child in 
its powerlessness exerts a powerful force. In its helplessness the child holds all the 
power, but in its helplessness the child poses a problem.  
 Although the childÕs body displays all of the features of the adult human body 
in miniature, which seems to separate him or her from animals, there is a power 
imbalance between the child and its caregivers. Hegel writes: 
 Even the most complete animal is unable to exhibit this delicately organised,   
 infinitely pliable body which we already discern in the newly born child. At first,  
!178
 however, the child appears in a far greater dependency and need than animals. Yet in  
 this, too, a higher nature already reveals itself (Hegel Mind 56).  112
For Freud, helplessness (hilflosigkeit) has a particular meaning apart from the 
general, denoting the state of the infant which relies upon another being to satisfy its 
needs. The infant feels the tension that arises from this need, but is unable to do 
anything to dissipate this tension. The fact of the human infantÕs long period of 
prematurity gives rise to this helplessness, which not only has implications for the 
infant if it doesnÕt get its needs met, but also for the adult. The whole psyche is 
structured upon the fact that we begin life entirely dependent on another for care.   113
As Laplanche and Pontalis point out, the infant helplessness that structures the 
psyche is also Ôthe prototype of the traumatic situation which is responsible for the 
generation of anxietyÕ (Laplanche and Pontalis ed. 189). The struggle of the infant in 
its dependence leads to a situation where the infant cannot exist on its own. The 
childÕs first relationship to the world is one of a power imbalance, and this power 
imbalance leaves its mark. The Ôchild is father to the manÕ conceals the subsequent 
effects that parenting makes upon the child.  The child cannot exist without the 114
adult, is dependent and helpless: but the adult would not exist without the childÕs 
 He continues, ÔWhereas the animal is silent or expresses its pain only by groaning, the child 112
expresses the feeling of its needs by screaming. By this ideal activity the child shows that it is 
straightaway imbued with the certainty that it has a right to demand from the external world the 
satisfaction of its needs Ñ that the independence of the external world in face of man is voidÕ (56, 
emphasis in original). There is thus a slight contradiction between the ideas of helplessness, potential 
and childhood as Ôthe time of natural harmony, of the peace of the individual with himself and the 
worldÕ that occurs in the Zusatz to ¤396, Philosophy of Mind (53).
 Ferenczi goes further in ÒConfusion of Tongues between the Adult and the ChildÓ (1933), 113
suggesting that the central problem is the childÕs inability to defend itself. This leads him to believe 
that the analytical situation is inadequate and will only lead to a re-creation of the damaging parent 
child dynamic in analysis. See Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psychoanalysis. 
Balint, Michael ed. London The Hogarth Press 1955. 
 John Forrester sees this ÔauthorityÕ in dialectical terms: ÔYet it is the dialectic of authority and 114
servitude, of power and helplessness, of mutual dependence, of expectation and disappointment, of 
shame and embarrassment, which characterises the relationship and which leaves its mark on the childÕ 
(80, emphasis in the original). Forrester is replying to those such as Alice Miller, who see FreudÕs 
change from actual seduction to a fantasied seduction as cowardice, and accuse him of covering up the 
large scale abuse of children. See The Seductions of Psychoanalysis: Freud, Lacan and Derrida. 
Cambridge UP, 1990. 
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particular experiences. Adult and child co-exist in a mutually interdependent 
relationship which cannot be disentangled. The child exacts its revenge on the adultÕs 
authority, gets its own back by hanging around, making the nuisance of itself it was 
never permitted to be.  
 For Freud, helplessness has another effect of enabling narcissistic 
identifications to flourish.The child is a problem because of the effect it has on its 
parents. In the second part of ÒOn Narcissism: An IntroductionÓ (1914), he writes:  
 At the most touchy point in the narcissistic system, the immortality of the ego, which 
 is so hard pressed by reality, security is achieved by taking refuge in the child.   
 Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the   
 parentsÕ narcissism born again, which, transformed into object-love, unmistakably  
 reveals its former nature (Freud ÒNarcissismÓ 91). 
Narcissism, the taking of oneÕs own ego as an object, is a necessary stage in the 
childÕs progress. Laplanche and Pontalis chart the development of FreudÕs notion of 
narcissism. Freud initially conceived of narcissism as a state coincident with the 
development of the ego as a unity and thus an internalisation of the relationship 
between self and self as ÔotherÕ  However, later he conceived of narcissism as a 115
first, ÔobjectlessÕ state, in which the infant is immersed in his own world, his ego and 
id undifferentiated (Laplanche and Pontalis 256). This is primary narcissism. One 
never lets go of this primary narcissism: as Freud points out, we never give anything 
up anyway. Our desire is always displaced onto another object. Secondary narcissism 
retains the idea that narcissism and the formation of the ego are contemporaneous, 
Ôthrough identification with the other personÕ (Laplanche and Pontalis 256). In 
FreudÕs view, parental narcissism is a re-awakening of the first relationship to oneself 
 As in LacanÕs mirror stage, where the childÕs image helps form what will become the ego, the sense 115
of self through the ÒreflectionÓ back of the self as a unified whole.
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as object. For Freud the child is a being to be protected: but in being so also offers a 
protection to its parents.  116
The Child is the Problem  
Issues of protection occur with Derrida. In his essay ÒPassions: An Oblique OfferingÓ 
he states, both in the main body of the text and in a footnote: Ôthe child is the 
problemÕ (Derrida ÒPassionsÓ 12; n.6, p.30). In Btons Rompus, (Dutoit 2009), 
Nicholas Royle asks Derrida the following question:  
 I am intrigued by the apparent absence or exclusion of creative writing in the French  
 university. What does this suggest about the problem of the child? What is the role of 
 the child and the childish in your writing? In what ways is deconstruction childlike?  
 (207)  117
In answer, Derrida refers to le chantage, or blackmail.   This blackmail Ôwhich 118
somehow organises all loversÕ duels in fantasy and actualityÉÕ (207) holds the adult 
to ransom, extorting its duty. The child remains an organising principle of the psyche, 
years beyond any numerical definition of childhood. However, it remains in some 
senses unreachable: for Derrida this is because the child is a problem. Seemingly 
tautological, the Greek problema Derrida refers to means shield; thus the problematic 
is used to shield, cover over, protect. In French, le bouclier is shield. He continues 
about the problematic: 
 ...organising insurance against that which is disquieting; the problem is reassuring.  
 When you problematise something, well, it is already a set of shields, fortresses,   
 protections, all sorts of insurance...deconstruction is not a problematic...these are   
 questions that cannot even take the form of a problem, so that we are exposed   
 without shield, helpless. This is deconstruction (Dutoit 207-8). 
 Lee Edelman takes up this argument in No Future, suggesting that the child offers the parents a 116
ÒrefugeÓ: the desire to make in oneÕs own image, to create, to be ÒGod,Ó which shores up and ensures 
the survival of reproductive heteronormativity. However, Edelman complicates this: parental love is 
narcissistic, and this Òall-pervasive, self-congratulatory and strategically misrecognisedÓ narcissism 
animates what Edelman describes as ÒpronatalismÓ (13).  The ÒmisrecognitionÓ occurs for Edelman in 
that the narcissism of the parents is dressed up as a sacrifice for the next generation, in the service of 
Ôperpetuating samenessÕ (60).
 All translations into English here and following are mine.117
 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/french-english/chantage 118
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He uses the word ÔshieldÕ to characterise the ÔproblemÕ of the Ôchild,Õ commenting 
that if something is made into a problem it is already a coverage or protection under 
which one can shelter. Deconstruction exposes even the problem to itself. So by 
setting up the child as a Ôproblem,Õ to be interrogated the child remains simply as 
what is, a remainder, at the limit. Derrida thus seems to turn the ÔproblemÕ of the 
child on its head. The helplessness of the child must be protected, as we have seen in 
Freud and Hegel. Yet Derrida seems to suggest that the discourse of child as problem 
protects something else, covers over or shields us from something unspecified. 
Nevertheless the child is made to act as something else, as stand-in (or supplement, in 
DerridaÕs words) whether in reading, in theory, or in parental love itself. 
 Narcissism is notable for its exclusion from DerridaÕs exposition on the child-
like and deconstruction. He seems to see the pre-linguistic child as analogous to 
diffrance, as the embodiment of a critique of logocentrism. He begins by speaking 
of philosophical doubt as child-like and goes on to say: 
 ...the deconstruction of logocentrism is the infant. That is to say...is not yet speaking,  
 is not subject to the law of language. It carries the possibility of speech but does not  
 yet belong to the word. It is the child who does not speak, child before he spoke. This 
 is also deconstruction....speech is also interruptedÉ(Dutoit 210) 
The child is potential, in other words: all exists in his world, all at once. In this 
respect he is like the writer, who creates his world for himself, and anything can be 
possible within it. Yet in his innocence of language he resembles not so much the 
writer as the animal. Derrida continues: 
 Deconstruction begins by suspecting the authority of language, verbal language,   
 language in general, in particular human language. So the question of the trace,   
 which is not yet language, not verbal, not even human, is it the childÕs, the infantÕs, it 
 is not necessarily even man...between the child and the animal, there are obviously  
 all the usual passages. Deconstruction is the animal, from this point of view. It is   
 child-like and animal-like (Dutoit 210-11). 
A connection is being made here between the child and the animal, as beings that are 
closer to the ÔnaturalÕ: not by buying into the reification of childhood innocence, but 
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by questioning the basis of the ÔnaturalÕ. By doing so, the child and the animal are 
shown by Derrida to be as supplementary as the other. When Freud writes about the 
childÕs helplessness, in ÒThe Sexual Theories of ChildrenÓ, he makes the connection 
between children and animals: ÔÉit is the childÕs observation of animals, who hide so 
little of their sexual life and to whom he feels so closely akin, that strengthens his 
disbelief in it [the stork fable]Õ (Freud ÒSexual TheoriesÓ 215).  Perhaps it is 119
infantile sexuality which suggests the animal connection; the child as mass of 
instincts and desires which must be tamed. But alongside this mass of instincts and 
desires is thirst for explanations. This Ôself-sustained instinct for researchÕ (213) is 
fuelled by the parentsÕ obfuscations about the stork, the gooseberry bush, and so on. 
Created by adults, these myths donÕt put the matter to bed, but awaken even more the 
childÕs deep curiosity about the situation in which he/she finds him or herself. The 
child, having an intuitive sense of what is actually going on, cannot prove it, and thus 
the myths only serve to set off a conflict within the child (214). For Freud, curiosity 
about sexuality is what begins the childÕs quest for knowledge.  120
 Freud writes about the child as thirsty for knowledge, but also suggests that 
the dreaming child is the model for the writer. In ÒCreative Writers and 
DaydreamingÓ (1908) he compares the creation of fictional worlds to the creation of 
a childÕs game; ÔThe creative writer does the same as the child at play. He creates a 
world of phantasy which he takes very seriously Ñ that is, which he invests with 
large amounts of emotion Ñ while separating it sharply from realityÕ (Freud 
ÒCreative WritersÓ 144).  The creative writer is able to present his daydreams and 121
 A well worn trope in literature about and for children; Alice and her kitten, for example, who we 119
have already met in a previous chapter.
 For a more in depth discussion of childlike wonder, see Juliet DusinberreÕs Alice to the Lighthouse: 120
ChildrenÕs Books and Radical Experiments in Art. 2nd ed. Macmillan, 1999. 
 For a recent discussion of this paper see Keith Oatley. Such stuff as dreams: The Psychology of 121
Fiction. Oxford: Blackwell, 2011. (26f). 
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fantasies to us as objects of our admiration, from which we derive pleasure. Yet, 
Freud asserts, if one were to relate these daydreams or phantasies in the course of 
everyday existence, they would hold not an element of pleasure; would Ôrepel us or at 
least leave us coldÕ (153). For Freud, the crucial question is, how does the writer 
Ôarouse in us emotionsÕ (143)? How is the writer able to effect enjoyment in an 
audience from material which in ÔrealityÕ is Ôactually distressingÕ (144). In a 
paragraph characterised by FreudÕs usual careful weighing of considerations, he 
writes:  
 A strong experience in the present awakens in the creative writer a memory of an  
 earlier experience (usually belonging to his childhood) from which there now   
 proceeds a wish which finds its fulfilment in the creative workÉI am inclined to   
 think that this way of looking at creative writings may turn out not unfruitful. You  
 will not forget that the stress it lays on childhood memories in the writerÕs lifeÉis  
 ultimately derived from the assumption that a piece of creative writing, like a day- 
 dream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood  
 (151-2). 
Although in the final analysis, how this is done remains an Ôinnermost secretÕ (153). 
Freud characteristically creates a system which for him accounts for artistic 
endeavour and the effect that it has on the audience. The writerÕs memory provides 
the Ôraw materialÕ which is worked into writing by the same process the child uses in 
his or her play. For Freud this means that we can strictly demarcate what is real from 
what is fantasied: the childÕs play or the writerÕs imaginative re-workings of his store 
of memories. 
 ChildÕs play eventually comes to an understanding of itself as fantasy. For 
example, for Donald Winnicott, play is connected to fantasies of omnipotence.  The 122
fort-da game in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is also structured this way, while 
 For WInnicott in Playing and Reality it is the experience of ÔcontrolÕ (63) and the motherÕs 122
handling of this transition that determines the psychic health of the infant. Play is central: ÔI call this a 
playground because play starts here. The playground is a potential space between the mother and the 
baby or joining mother and babyÕ (64). Routledge ebook edition 2005. https://www.dawsonera.com/
readonline/9780203441022. Accessed 1st November 2017. 
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Melanie KleinÕs analysis of children takes the form of play. For the psychoanalyst, 
play is vital; the subject takes psychic ÔnourishmentÕ from its lack of bodily 
constraints. But fantasy (or phantasy, they use the spellings interchangeably) is also 
an ambiguous term, as Laplanche and PontalisÕ definition suggests: 
 Imaginary scene in which the subject is a protagonist, representing the fulfilment of a 
 wishÉin a manner that is distorted to a greater or lesser extent by defensive   
 processes. Phantasy has a number of different modes: conscious phantasies or   
 daydreams, unconscious phantasies like those uncovered by analysis as the structures 
 underlying a manifest content, and primal phantasies (314).  
There is ambiguity implied in the term ÔfantasyÕ, as it broadly refers to imaginative 
fancies, daydreams, dreams, and of course fiction. Fantasy is something that crucially 
connects the childÕs and adultÕs worlds, as MantelÕs memoir shows. For Mantel, the 
words she chooses to describe her life have to be equal to the task of underpinning 
that lifeÕs public face: as Freud, in ÒThoughts for the Times on War and DeathÓ, 
writes, ÔIn the realm of fiction we find the plurality of lives which we needÕ (291). 
Mantel makes the connection in the memoir between childhood and the story: from 
writing her childhood, she pinpoints the storyÕs structure. By this I mean: we can 
extrapolate from MantelÕs work on her own childhood ÔtruthsÕ about childhood in 
general, for the banal fact that everyone has been a child. But it is MantelÕs 
exploration of what it means for her to be childless, overlaying the desire to discover 
her own childhood, which renders the narrative multifaceted, and the structure 
complex.  
 The setting of Giving up the Ghost, published in 2003, begins in 2000 with 
the author and her husband deciding to sell their cottage; a seemingly innocuous 
moment in their lives, until the reader understands that this house has Ôa ghost in 
itÕ (GUG 5). Mantel uses this event to launch her memoir of Ômid-lifeÕ which is also 
the story of her childhood, complete with strange hauntings and family secrets. 
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Writing about her misdiagnosed pain from endometriosis, and the medical procedures 
which dominated much of her young adult life, Mantel describes in harrowing detail 
her hysterectomy at the age of twenty-seven. The memoir is written explicitly to 
describe and explain her childhood and her childlessness, to Ôtake charge ofÕ the story 
of her life.  
 The state of childhood she writes about is an uncanny place. The child 
MantelÕs over-riding impression is the emphatic feeling that she will change into 
something else. This strangeness points to MantelÕs idea of childhood as the place of 
fantasy; within this child as described by Mantel, is the desire to be other, to be 
something else. For example, the desire to be a boy. Mantel writes of her three year 
old self as Ôfat and happyÕ: she asks, ÔWhy should I move on in life?Õ (44) Set against 
this, she is Ôwaiting to change into a boyÕ, knowing that, ÔWhen I am four this will 
occurÕ (40).  As she continues to wait to change into a boy, Ô...the onset of boyhood 
has been postponed, so far. But patience is a virtue for meÕ (52); ÔWhen exactly do I 
become a boy?Õ (55). This sense of waiting to become something else is differentiated 
from the games that she plays: for example, the child Mantel imagines she was a  
 ...Red Indian. I get a feathered headdress and a tepee...The tepee is set up in the   
 middle of my grandmotherÕs floor and in it I have a small chair and a table. People  
 step around me. I take my meals in the tepee, and believe my hands are brown, as  
 they wield the spoon. But already it feels like a game...what I feel, for the first time,  
 is nostalgia (54-5).   
 The passage through childhood comes with the knowledge that play is ÔonlyÕ 
play; she understands now that play is pretending. Whereas before it was real; ÔI had 
a right to this kitÕ, now, ÔI know that there is no truth in this beliefÕ (55). The false 
belief, the child Mantel describes, that she will change into a boy continues even after 
this, and she writes of an incident where she is bought a cottage set by her parents, 
for ÔSome ideal daughter, that they donÕt haveÕ (56). Her male cousin, however, is 
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bought a shooting range, and Mantel writes of the ensuing ÔfussÕ as she demands the 
toy designed for the boy, even though ÔI was too mature for the shooting 
rangeÕ (GUG 56). 
 For Mantel, growing up entails a ÔslideÕ. Not only has she become 
insubstantial, but she recognises 
 I am only playing, inside the IndianÕs tepee, and I know it. I have lost the warriorÕs  
 body I had before the fever. My bullet-like presence, my solidity, has vanished.   
 Ambiguity has thinned my bones, made me light and washed me out, made me   
 speechless and  made me blonde. I realise Ñ and carry the dull knowledge inside  
 me, heavy in my chest Ñ that I am never going to be a boy now. I donÕt exactly   
 know why. I sense that things have slid too far, from some ideal starting point. (57) 
The infant Mantel feels that, rather than develop, she has ÔslidÕ from where she was, 
fallen from grace. She perceives herself to be somehow inferior, not quite what she 
should be: her descriptions of her child self as weak, light and pale add to the 
impression that she is somehow insubstantial. This lack of substance, Ôspeechless and 
blondeÕ, is directly connected with MantelÕs feelings about her gender. When she has 
a fight with a boy at school, she again acknowledges the boy she hasnÕt yet, and will 
not, become: ÔShame, is somewhere among my feelings about this incident. I donÕt 
know who it belongs to: to me, or the boy IÕve beaten, or some ghostly, fading boy I 
still carry insideÕ (GUG 73). The ÔstillÕ in that sentence is a lament to the time that has 
passed since Mantel realised that she will never be a boy. The two ideas, that play is 
real, and that she will switch genders, exist somehow in tandem, or, in other words, 
as Mantel discovers the difference between reality and pretence, she has to face the 
fact that she will never be a boy. Mantel has a growing sense of what it means to be 
who she is and her desire to be a boy, something other. MantelÕs desire to be a boy 
fades with the dawning realisation of what being a girl entails: ÔsmallÕ, weak and 
without expectation that, Ômy likes would have any sway in the worldÕ (GUG 42). 
When people laugh that she is smaller than her little brother, she describes herself as 
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Ôa tiny doll creature with red smiling lips, stick limbs, and fair hair: an innocent 
abroad, a dumb broad, a feather on the breath of GodÕ (GUG 81). 
 To be female is to be weak and insubstantial, whereas masculinity (in the 
form of boys and men) equals power and access to the outside world beyond the 
domesticity of life at home. Mantel depicts this in the character of her grandfather the 
railway guard (33) and her father, who comes home smelling of Ôthe complex city 
smell of smog, ink, tobaccoÕ (39). Just as the ghostly boy remains inside the 
insubstantial girl, so Mantel describes her six-year-old self clinging Ôto the prospect 
of a manÕs lifeÕ (74). Mantel and her friend play a game called ÔMenÕ (74) and when 
she loses her first playmate, Jacqueline (ÔJackÕ), she tries to recruit another girl, but 
the game becomes boring when the little girl, whose adopted name is ÔWalterÉnever 
does anything manlyÕ (75). Mantel plays at being a man, having come to the 
realisation she will never be a boy. The two events are differentiated by an 
understanding of fantasy and reality: the fantasy of being a boy is more real than 
playing at being a man.  
 It is possible to read this desire to be a boy in the light of FreudÕs conviction 
that there is a Ôbisexual dispositionÕ in all of us. ÔIn every normal male or female 
individual, traces are found of the apparatus of the opposite sexÕ (Freud ÔThree 
EssaysÕ 141). And at the end of a long passage in ÔA Child is Being BeatenÕ in which 
Freud puts two theories of bisexuality to the test of the phantasy referred to in the 
title, he states, Ôin the last resort we can only see that both in male and female 
individuals masculine as well a feminine instinctual impulses are found, and that each 
can equally well undergo repression and become unconsciousÕ (202). The importance 
of the unconscious knowledge that she will not be a boy attests to this interpretation, 
as does the mention of the ÔghostlyÕ boy within.  
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 However, MantelÕs childhood experiences as recounted in the memoir suggest 
an alternative universe in which things change or Ôare not what they seemÕ. Her 
impressions of childhood suggest the strangeness of things and the feeling she has of 
not being able to trust her senses. Infancy is the place before play exists; for as 
Mantel attests, to play is to understand that there is a reality other to the play. It 
becomes about reality versus pleasure, reality beating pleasure hands down (as 
Ronell puts it). The potentiality of the child is limitless imagination, which for 
Mantel is the more trustworthy ally, learning young, as she does, not to trust the 
evidence of her senses. When her mother dyes her hair, for example, the child Mantel 
Ôplucked up courageÕ to ask if it had always been that colour. Musing on her motherÕs 
reaction, she writes, Ôit wasnÕt my wish to make her angry, in fact it was far from my 
mind. I just needed to know whether I could trust myself, my perceptions of things, 
the evidence of my senses. The answer, obviously, was noÕ (GUG 65). Mantel 
explores the childÕs world; the secret beliefs that structure how children see what is 
going on around them, the atmospheres that colour and shape the childÕs experience. 
She writes, Ôdeception seemed to be in the airÕ; the Ôtrue nature of things was 
frequently hiddenÕ (46). Knowledge is called into question time and again: you know, 
says Mantel, this ghost is just a migraine, but actually, no it isnÕt just a migraine. It 
ÔisÕ my stepfatherÕs ghost; it is my stepfatherÕs ÔghostÕ. The multiple sense of 
knowledge withheld goes alongside the sense of powerlessness that the child Mantel 
feels: the Ôtrue nature of thingsÕ seems to be within the power of  adults to speak of, 
although they choose not to. Childhood was for Mantel a ÔgulagÕ: ÔIt was just that I 
was unsuited to being a childÕ (120). Being ÔunsuitedÕ to childhood suggests 
retrospective understanding due to self-analysis, but it also suggests there is a ÔstateÕ 
of childhood to be unsuited to. In MantelÕs case childhood is a state of confusion 
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regarding the Ôtrue nature of thingsÕ and the feeling she has that others conceal things 
from her. 
 This sense of the thingsÕ true nature is related to the explicit reasons Mantel 
gives for writing her memoir, that the Ôbook of her life was being written by other 
peopleÕ. She demonstrates using the metaphor of ÔcopyrightÕ: 
I have hesitated for such a long time before beginning this narrative. For a long time 
I felt as if someone else was writing my life. I seemed able to create or interpret 
characters in fiction, but not able to create or interpret myself. About the time I 
reached mid-life, I began to understand why this was. The book of me was indeed 
being written by other people: by my parents, by the child I once was, and by my 
own unborn children, stretching out their ghost fingers to grab the pen. I began this 
writing in an attempt to seize the copyright in myself (GUG 70-71). 
The ÔstoryÕ of our lives is not owned only by ourselves, but by multiple authors with 
competing claims. The child is effectively someone elseÕs property, stamped with the 
mark of the parent; forced into the world under someone elseÕs auspices. The parentÕs 
rights of disposal must be reversed by seizure of oneself, oneÕs own story. There is a 
suggestion of violence; but it is not that writing emerges as violence, but the human 
condition of the mainmise as the powerlessness of childhood, the mainmise that drags 
the child down in Wolf Hall and A Change of Climate. She uses the word ÔcopyrightÕ 
in the context of her perceived inability to ÔcreateÕ or ÔinterpretÕ herself, and her 
hesitation, the holding off of her writing, feeling as though someone else is writing 
her life. What does it mean to ÔwriteÕ your own life in these circumstances? Why 
write an autobiography? There is a tension remaining between the ÔIÕ who writes and 
the ÔmyselfÕ to be represented through writing; this tension comes from writing itself. 
There is a force within the movement of writing which evades the writerÕs desire to 
Ôseize the copyrightÕ. 
 This tension can be illustrated with reference to Jacques DerridaÕs interview 
ÒThis Strange Institution Called LiteratureÓ. Asked about his thesis defence, he states 
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that his Ô...most constant interest, coming before my philosophical interest...has been 
directed towards literature, towards that writing which is called literaryÕ (Attridge ed. 
33). The literariness that interests Derrida comes in conjunction with, and is 
inseparable from, philosophy, and Derrida speaks of his teenage self as attracted by 
writing, by this intersection between philosophy and literature: 
No doubt I hesitated between philosophy and literature, giving up neither, perhaps 
seeking obscurely a place from which the history of this frontier could be thought or 
even displaced Ð in writing itself and not only by historical or theoretical reflection 
(Attridge ed. 34).  
Derrida identifies the Ôleast inadequate nameÕ of this place as ÔÒAutobiographyÓ... 
because it remains for me the most enigmatic, most open, even todayÕ (34). He goes 
on to describe the need to write, to Ôinscribe merely a memory or twoÕ, as Ôobscure as 
it was compulsive, both powerless and authoritarianÕ (34). As Derrida begins to think 
about jotting a couple of memories, he is seized by the desire to write, what he calls 
an Ôautobiographical desireÕ (34), but at the same time intuitively understands the 
Ôimpossible and endless taskÕ ahead (34). The double desire so described by Derrida 
echoes MantelÕs presentation of how and why she writes her memoir.  As Derrida 
states,  
 Still today there remains in me an obsessive desire to save in an uninterrupted   
 inscription, in the form of a memory, what happens Ð or fails to happen. What I   
 should be tempted to denounce as a lure Ð i.e., totalization or gathering up Ð isnÕt this 
 what keeps me going? (34) 
On the one hand to ÔcompulsivelyÕ write an Ôuninterrupted inscriptionÕ of what 
happens (and what doesnÕt happen, which becomes relevant further on), and on the 
other to reject such a need as a ÔlureÕ, a ÔtotalizationÕ which is not only impossible, 
but dangerous. And yet: the ÔlureÕ is what underpins MantelÕs desire Ôto seize the 
copyright in myselfÕ (GUG 70). This desire is further complicated by MantelÕs 
insistence that the story Ôcan be told only once, I have to get it rightÕ(GUG 5), and yet 
the Derridean double movement of this desire is exposed by MantelÕs own admission 
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that the Ôcomplicated sentenceÕ of her childhood ÔresistsÕ finishing. It seems as though 
Mantel works on the border between words not being enough, and words being too 
much: both ÔauthoritarianÕ and ÔpowerlessÕ, words and the desire to write circle about 
one another in endless play. As Derrida says, autobiography is that space where this 
play can happen: 
 IÕve just said Òfails to happenÓ and Òalmost doing soÓ so as to mark the fact that what 
 happens Ñ in other words, the unique event whose trace one would like to keep alive 
 Ñ is also the very desire that what does not happen should happen, and is thus a 
 ÒstoryÓ in which the event already crosses within itself the archive of the ÒrealÓ and  
 the archive of ÒfictionÓ (Attridge ed. 35).  
If DerridaÕs confessed drive here is the desire to record everything, but 
simultaneously to eschew that desire as dangerous, then autobiography keeps this 
desire in endless deferral with itself. By writing autobiographically, one exposes the 
ÔrealÕ and ÔfictiveÕ elements of writing as inseparable from one another. Derrida 
continues, ÔAlready weÕd have trouble not spotting but separating out historical 
narrative, literary fiction, and philosophical reflectionÕ (Attridge ed. 35).  
 What the memoir doesnÕt do is provide a verified and factual account that can 
be signed off and Lodged with the copyright agency. Autobiography traditionally 
offers its subject up, with the inbuilt guarantee of a real life referent: for Mantel there 
is no such guarantee. As we have seen, her memoir functions in a different way to a 
conventional autobiography. To illustrate, I turn to David LodgeÕs review of Giving 
up the Ghost, ÔLittle Miss Neverwell TriumphsÕ. Lodge casts a sceptical eye over 
MantelÕs memoir, questioning the points in the narrative where her phraseology 
doesnÕt ring true or is somehow anachronistic. He refers specifically to an episode in 
which the adult Mantel describes a holiday to Blackpool, and how she makes the 
group, her father, her mother, and herself create a ÔtableauÕ in front of the mirror. The 
infant Mantel calls this grouping ÔAll TogetherÕ, insisting that this be staged 
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whenever she requires it (GUG 52). The adult Mantel understands that this ÔcharadeÕ 
must have caused her parents pain, as their marriage is in trouble: 
Standing on the pier at Blackpool, I look down at the inky waves swirling. Again, the 
noise of nature, deeply conversational, too quick to catch; again the rushing 
movement, blue, deep, and far below. I look up at my mother and father. They are 
standing close together, talking over my head. A thought comes to me, so swift and 
strange that it feels like the first thought that I have ever had. It strikes with piercing 
intensity, like a needle in the eye. The thought is this: that I stop them from being 
happy. I, me, and only me...For what am I but a disposable, replaceable child? And 
without me they would have a chance in life (GUG 52-3).  
David Lodge interprets this episode in the memoir differently, however: referring to 
MantelÕs assertion of her prodigious memory, and the ambiguous relationship that 
memory has to recall and writing. He argues that this event, and MantelÕs 
interpretation of it, do not accurately reflect the thoughts of a child: 
ÔThough my early memories are patchy,Õ Mantel writes, ÔI think they are not, or not 
entirely, a confabulation.Õ The qualification is important. Her powers of recall are 
obviously remarkable, but sometimes she reads an adult awareness into the vague 
intimations of the young child. For instance, at the age of four, looking up at her 
parents talking, ÔA thought comes to me, so swift and strange that it feels like the 
first thought that I have ever had....The thought is this: that I stop them from being 
happy....without me they would have a chance in life.Õ It is possible for a child of 
four to sense some parental unhappiness and blame herself for it, but not, surely, to 
have a concept like Ôa chance in lifeÕ (Lodge ÔLittle Miss NeverwellÕ 42). 
The reading stands in one respect, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to say whether 
the child has a concept like Ôa chance in lifeÕ, and Lodge errs on the side of common-
sense to declare the child as incapable of this understanding. But his reading 
disregards the clarity of the infant MantelÕs thought, weakening its power, which is 
Ôlike a needle in the eyeÕ (GUG 53). LodgeÕs point, that the infant Mantel could not 
have possibly ÔknownÕ about her parentsÕ troubles stands if we accept the assumption 
of a strict division between adult and child.        
 David Lodge recognises that MantelÕs memoir is different from conventional 
autobiography in this sense.  However, the separation that occurs within the 123
passage between the thought as it is experienced and what Lodge perceives to be an 
 See also Derek Neale ÒWriting and Remembering: Paradoxes of Memory, Imagination and Fiction 123
in Stories about Lives.Ó Literature Compass. 8/12 (2011): 951-961.
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adult Mantel imposing her interpretation, is important. This separation allows the 
reader to apprehend the quality of the thought, its texture: its power as the child 
perceives it. MantelÕs ways of ÔknowingÕ cannot be confined within the boundaries 
set by the sharp-eyed reviewer: her work is much stranger in terms of how she sees 
the child.  The simile Ôlike a needle in the eyeÕ forces the reader to apprehend the 124
suddenness of the thought, alongside its painful, stabbing power. It is this power that 
guides the reader towards the child MantelÕs intuitive knowledge of her parentsÕ 
struggling relationship. The swiftness and sharpness of the thought contrasts with the 
ÔswirlingÕ, Ôrushing movementÕ of the waves; the conversation going on above the 
infant MantelÕs head seems to blend in to the Ônoise of natureÕ; demonstrating the 
hidden perceptions that the child picks up, eddying and swirling like the waves she is 
studying, Ôfar belowÕ her. The Ôneedle in the eyeÕ suggests damage to a vital organ, 
the eye/I, with the association of the importance of seeing and observing, with the 
needling of a thought, something scratching, bothering at the edges of sense, of 
consciousness. The connection of ÔeyeÕ to ÔIÕ suggests the symbolism of a psychic or 
primal wound. Seeing retreats into the background as the intuitive takes over. The 
childÕs thought blinds her, and in that moment she has to rely on the feel of the 
situation, its texture in sound and movement.  
 MantelÕs emphasis on the synaesthesic quality of her memory demonstrates 
her attempt to capture in words the texture of experience.   Words often fail to 125
express this texture, and so writing her ÔselfÕ is a task that cannot be anything other 
 For a philosophical critique of psychological theories of development, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty 124
ÒThe ChildÕs Relation with OthersÓ in The Primacy of Perception and other essays on 
phenomenological psychology. Northwestern UP, 1964.
 Neil Vickers suggests Ô[w]hat Mantel calls her synaesthesic perception could equally be described 125
as a capacity to disperse her emotional experience into different sensory fieldsÕ (63). ÒHilary Mantel 
and the Space of Life WritingÓ in Eveline Kilian and Hope Wolf eds. Life Writing and Space. 
Farnham: Ashgate, 2016. 
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than inconsistent, distorted, a ÔconfabulationÕ (GUG 23; 24): Ôthe invention of past 
experiences either consciously or unconsciously, to compensate for loss of 
memoryÕ (Chambers). And yet, it is where this confabulation takes place that shows 
us most beautifully the ways that words cannot do justice to life and its Ôghosts of 
meaning shivering between the linesÕ (23). In its most radical form, MantelÕs writing 
exposes the inner workings of what we call reality and how we ÔknowÕ the world.  
  
Phenomenality  
I will now turn to Paul de ManÕs notion of phenomenality, to assess if this idea can 
offer a way of thinking about reality and how we represent that reality to ourselves. 
De Man sets great importance on how the immediate perception of words through 
sound (and to a lesser extent, vision) exposes the split between word and thing, by 
being ÔinvolvedÕ in the convention of connecting a word with the thing that it 
connotes. Phenomenality thus encompasses consciousness, in how we perceive 
things, but is also the object of perception: there is an overlap between the meeting of 
consciousness and the world. He suggests that our perceptions ÔtrickÕ us into thinking 
that the world (the referent) functions like language. In fact the assumption 
underpinning the separation of fiction from reality springs from this trick, which is 
itself Ôthe offspring of an uncritically mimetic conception of artÕ (de Man Resistance 
11).  MantelÕs explication of her childhood world employs fantasy in order to 126
express its truth, which is not to say that the memoir is entirely fictional. In writing 
her childhood and its singularity, Mantel demonstrates the importance of fantasy and 
play: the strange temporalities of memory which have their own power.  
 Rodolphe Gasch, in The Wild Card of Reading, analogously defines de ManÕs use of the word 126
ÔphenomenalÕ and its different permutations as Ôthe object of cognitionÕs appearing to the senseÕ (53).
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 Childhood comes back; it haunts and wonÕt leave us alone. Any explication of 
this strangeness requires a term more suitable than ÔphenomenalityÕ which does not 
encompass enough of the strange ÔothernessÕ of MantelÕs autobiography. I suggested 
the term ÔprovisionalityÕ to capture the radical aspects in the memoir: the event is no 
longer pinned down by the logic of Ôthis really happenedÕ or Ôthat really happenedÕ. 
She holds her Ôinvestment in accuracyÕ and the Ômight have beenÕ in tension which is 
unresolved by recourse to the referent. As she writes, Ôwhen you turn and look back 
down the years, you glimpse the ghosts of other lives you might have led. All your 
houses are haunted by the person you might have been....You think of the children 
you might have had but didnÕtÕ (GUG 20). It is the choices not made and paths not 
taken that structure the life story, as much as those choices made consciously. This 
understanding of ÔeventÕ as the unmade choice, untaken path is continually pitted 
against MantelÕs Ôinvestment in accuracy: I would never say, ÒIt doesnÕt matter, itÕs 
history nowÓÕ (GUG 24). 
 It is this provisionality in MantelÕs writing in which the sense of ÔeventÕ 
Mantel describes in unswerving detail the visions, hallucinations and aural 
disturbances that accompany these attacks, treating them all as if their 
epistemological status was the same, not stopping to demarcate clearly the different 
types of experience, including dreams. She describes the:  
 Éstrange dreams, from which I wake with hallucinations of taste. Once,    
 thirty years ago, I dreamt that I was eating bees, and ever since I have lived with   
 their milk-chocolate sweetness and their texture, which is like lightly cooked calvesÕ  
 liver (GUG 3).  
Mantel places the dreams, hallucinations and visions into the context of her 
migraines, the day to day illness which impairs her cognition. However, this context 
is placed into question by the paragraph that begins directly after she describes seeing 
her stepfatherÕs ghost in the cottage: ÔIt may be, of course, that the flicker against the 
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banister was nothing more than the warning of a migraine attack...I donÕt know 
whether, at such vulnerable times, I see more than is there; or if things are there, that 
normally I donÕt seeÕ (emphasis added, GUG 2). The equivocation in these words 
shows a lack of definitive attribution, and the repetition of seeing what may or may 
not be ÔthereÕ is a powerful indicator of the questioning of reality that starts with the 
ÔghostÕ.  It is the questioning of reality, and MantelÕs openness to ÔotherÕ ways of 127
seeing and knowing which are at the heart of her provisionality as a writer. This is the 
source of MantelÕs power: the ability to say ÔyesÕ to all kinds of experience.  
 To return to the dream of eating bees: the reader is invited to share and revel 
in the synaesthesic sensation, Ô...ever since I have lived with their milk-chocolate 
sweetness and their texture, which is like lightly cooked calvesÕ liverÕ(3). Again, 
Mantel evokes a physically and materially solid experience of an event (in this case 
the dream) that is somehow insubstantial. The taste and texture of the bees thus 
described opens up the reading, contrary to the specificity of Ômilk-chocolateÕ and 
Ôlightly cooked calvesÕ liverÕ. The identification of specific flavours and textures 
situates MantelÕs dream within the context of her outward experience, whilst also 
remaining necessarily subjective and unverifiable. The power of the dream, which 
stays with Mantel, suggests that the strangeness of the taste, itself a hallucination 
within a dream, somehow overrides the pleasure of the eating. To dream of eating is a 
common enough thing, as is savouring the pleasure of the taste on waking, yet the 
flavour invariably fades soon after. For Mantel the weirdness of being able to 
remember the exact taste mitigates the pleasure.   
 Mantel thus writes the texture of her own experience which is the heart of 
provisionality. The physical sensations of taste and sight that she explores relate to 
 As discussed in the first chapter. 127
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childhood fantasies, but also to the telling of her life story. The readerÕs sense of 
chronology in the text is influenced by the intertwining voices of the adult and child 
narrators. The dream of eating bees is narrated from a retrospective viewpoint. 
MantelÕs use of present tense narration, in another episode in which she fears she has 
swallowed a fly, signals a tonal shift to the childÕs voice. Moving back into the past, 
Mantel writes about learning to walk, Ôin the house, but [I] donÕt remember 
thatÕ (GUG 28). Moving outside onto the street, she turns left, although ÔI donÕt know 
itÕs leftÕ (28). She describes how there is a Ôrusty iron ringÕ in the stone of the house, 
near the front door: 
I always slip my finger into it, though I should not. Grandad says it is where they tied 
 the monkey up, but I donÕt think they ever really had one; all the same, he lurks in  
 my mind, a small grey monkey with piteous eyes and a long active tail (28).  
The thought of the monkey is given real status by the child Mantel, filling in as she 
does all the details of its appearance. She knows there is no monkey, but the thought 
and the image of the monkey continues to exist within her consciousness, until she 
states, ÔTwo things not to believe: the monkey. People who say, ÒI have eyes in the 
back of my headÓÕ (31). The change in tone signals a kind of transition for the child 
Mantel, in learning to differentiate between what is real and what is not; but the next 
episode demonstrates the limited extent of this differentiation: 
I sit on the stairs, which are steep, box-like, dark. I think I am going to die. I have 
breathed in a housefly, I think I have. The fly was in the room and my mouth open 
because I was putting into it a sweet. Then the fly was nowhere to be seen. It 
manifests now as a tickling and scraping on the inside of my throat, the side of my 
throat thatÕs nearest to the kitchen wall (31). 
 The short sentences, the repetition of I, and the use of ÔandÕ and ÔthenÕ as 
connectives show the reader that this event is being presented to us by the child 
Mantel. She has not yet learned which way is left, and can only identify the affected 
side as nearest to the kitchen wall. The episode continues as the childÕs internal 
monologue, where she resolves to die quietly, is asked what is wrong and says 
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nothing, although Ômy resolve to die completely alone has falteredÕ (GUG 32). The 
sweet that the child Mantel was eating when the fly disappeared represented an act of 
considerable courage on the part of the child, knowing as she did that to hesitate over 
the box would mean no sweet at all, but Ônow IÕm on the stairs not knowing whether 
itÕs green sweet or flyÕ (32). The childÕs perception of causality is exposed here, the 
fact that if the fly is no longer in the room it must be buzzing inside her throat, 
causing the rasping. The tragic-comic nature of the scene is alluded to, by author 
Mantel, in her mention of the word ÔabsurdityÕ. The adult is intruding, here, although 
the scene is narrated in the present tense, and continues to be as the adult voice 
slowly takes over the childÕs urgent telling of her story: 
 The dry rasping in my throat persists, but now I donÕt know if it is the original   
 obstruction lodged there, or the memory of it, the imprint, which is not going to fade  
 from my breathing flesh. For many years the word ÔmarzipanÕ affects me with its   
 deathly hiss, the buzz in its syllables, a sepulchral fizz (32-3). 
The imprint of the fly becomes connected in the infant MantelÕs vocabulary with the 
word ÔmarzipanÕ, the name of the sweet she did not get to choose in the first place, 
knowing that her hesitation in the choice would cost her the choice altogether. It is 
the choice not made that leaves the imprint. The fear of imminent death is forgotten, 
and all thatÕs left is ÔmarzipanÕ, the sense of death having been displaced onto this 
word, with its Ôdeathly hissÕ and Ôsepulchral fizzÕ (GUG 33). A sweet paste used to 
decorate cakes is now associated with death, sibilance completing the connection 
with the fly as a signifier of decay. This moment marks a kind of education for the 
child Mantel, who is learning to differentiate between reality and fantasy; yet these 
lessons are not entirely absorbed by the child or the adult, and never completely for 
any of us. A bit like the sweet/fly, they stick in the throat, are not swallowed whole or 
completely taken in. It is the word ÔmarzipanÕ, seemingly innocuous, that continues 
to denote the childÕs feeling of imminent death: not entirely ingested, words stick in 
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the throat, like the fly she may or may not have swallowed. We have already seen 
how MantelÕs writing of childhood fantasies blurs the boundaries between reality and 
fiction, adult and child. The implications of this blurring become clear in thinking 
about autobiography, and how Mantel bends the form to account for the singularities 
of her experience and its texture.  
Memoir and autobiography: critical approaches  
(David Lodge and Paul de Man) 
Paul de Man summarises the assumptions underpinning the ÔorthodoxÕ notion of 
autobiography: 
It [autobiography] seems to belong to a simpler mode of referentiality, or 
representation, and of diegesis. It may contain lots of phantasms and dreams, but 
these deviations from reality remain rooted in a single subject whose identity is 
defined by the uncontested readability of his [or her] proper name (de Man 
ÒAutobiographyÓ 920). 
The act of writing an autobiography, for de Man, exposes the workings of the Ôproper 
nameÕ in fixing the identity of the subject being written about. The exposure of these 
workings leads to the assumption of ÔpresenceÕ; the self-evidently ÔrealÕ subject 
exists, the version supplied by the subject is Ôthe truthÕ. This exposure leads to 
another in its turn, that writing is a reflection, or representation of life and needs the 
life to ÔguaranteeÕ meaning. Autobiography in its ÔtraditionalÕ sense is a second order 
representation, a record of what happens, and yet is not all it ÔseemsÕ, for de Man, as 
for Mantel, who writes, ÔI have an investment in accuracy; I would never say, ÒIt 
doesnÕt matter, itÕs history nowÓÕ (GUG 24). She constantly undercuts her statement 
of intention, ÔI have an investment in accuracyÕ by the very commitment to writing as 
a means of obtaining that accuracy.  
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 With this in mind, MantelÕs choice of the memoir form is already problematic. 
Another example from David LodgeÕs review of Giving up the Ghost illustrates these 
assumptions. In ÒLittle Miss Never Well TriumphsÓ, Lodge writes: 
In short there has always been something of an enigma about the person behind   
 Hilary MantelÕs novels, as if each of them were a mask held up to disguise herself in  
 a new and unpredictable way. Now she has dropped or discarded the masks of fiction 
 by writing an autobiographical memoir, focusing particularly on her childhood (42).  
For Lodge, autobiography acts as a form of revelation, a means by which we might 
learn something startling about the enigmatic author. Autobiography becomes a 
personal history with an ontology that differentiates it from the fictional, indeed 
ÔallowsÕ the writer to ÔdropÕ or ÔdiscardÕ her masks to reveal the ÔtruthÕ hidden within 
the fictional. The autobiography is a history of childhood which can be used to glean 
facts about the life of the author which will stand as guarantor over the work.  A 128
clear demarcation emerges between autobiography as truth, pertaining to real life, 
and fiction as created and untrue. If we take as read that Giving up the Ghost is 
somehow part of the creation of what Mantel calls her Ôself,Õ it is possible to read the 
rich and strange in her work in a much less reductive way. Not only does she dispute 
orthodox notions of what ÔautobiographyÕ is or should be, her work also challenges 
traditional assumptions of writing as the translation of psychological experience into 
a concrete medium of expression. Reading Mantel demands that we attend both to 
her desire to Ôseize the copyright in myselfÕ (GUG 71), and to the assumptions which 
underpin the critical work on literary autobiography.  
 To put it simply: Mantel writes autobiography in a different way. Amy 
Prodromou, for example, rightly recognises MantelÕs work as subversive and pushing 
 BarthesÕ formulation of the Ôreality effect,Õ in which the writerÕs Ôuseless detailÕ offers a verification 128
of the writingÕs adherence to reality, operates in a similar way. Like the literary detail (FlaubertÕs 
barometer) which underpins the ÔrealÕ, details in autobiography are used to explain and inform 
readings of the writerÕs novels, and offer a guarantor of authenticity. See Roland Barthes ÔThe Reality 
EffectÕ in The Rustle of Language. Los Angeles: U of California Press, 1989. 141-148.
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boundaries: she writes about Giving up the Ghost and its Ôinbetween-nessÕ as part of 
the grief memoir sub-genre she terms Ômemoir of textured recoveryÕ (Prodromou 58). 
In this article Prodromou identifies MantelÕs place Ôin how these narratives of loss 
invoke and produce a gendered selfÕ (60), arguing: 
	 Éso whileÉMantel on the one hand engender[s] a whole, solid sense of self through 
 the autobiographical act, the tension between self as either fragmented and   
 discontinuous or whole and continuous (a tension never fully reconciled) is the basis  
 for this nuanced, Ôtextured recoveryÕ that I am arguing forces us to rethink theories of 
 the self, narrative and healing (Prodromou 71-2)!
ÔTextured recoveryÕ works as a metaphor to a point, emphasising as it does the messy 
bodily functions and ways in which Mantel seems to draw the lines of her body 
through writing. I would argue, however, that there is never a Ôsolid sense of selfÕ in 
Mantel that is not also at the same time in a process of decay. What Prodromou takes 
to be a Ôsolid sense of selfÕ is the textual residue of MantelÕs narrative voice that puts 
meat on the bones of her words. For instance: Prodromou quotes Mantel writing 
about writing, Ôwhen you have committed enough words to paper you feel you have a 
spine stiff enough to stand up in the windÕ (Prodromou 68). Continuing, Mantel 
writes, ÔBut when you stop writing you find thatÕs all you are, a spine, a row of 
rattling vertebrae, dried out like an old quill penÕ (GUG 223). In the act of writing 
Mantel builds a sense of self that can Ôstand upÕ to scrutiny, but the act is the very 
thing that sustains the bodyÕs solidity. Without writing, she seems to say, she is dry 
bones and old feathers, and could blow away in a puff of dust.  
This intimate and strange connection between the body and writing occurs 
even more powerfully in MantelÕs hospital diary of 2010, Ink in the Blood. She 
writes, ÔI am fascinated by the line between writing and physical survivalÕ (Ink 28). 
This short diary is full of parallels between the written word and MantelÕs 
descriptions of her body. The description of her wound, Ôit has a spiral binding, like a 
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manuscriptÕ is written with her inimitable humour and self deprecation: Ôon the whole 
I would rather be an item of stationery than be meÕ (Ink 5). She describes the new line 
she discovers on her palm, and the ÔlinesÕ of the drip going into her wrist: ÔThe 
iambic pentameter of the saline stand, the alexandrine of the blood drain, the 
epiduralÕs sweet sonnet formÕ (Ink 7-8).  When she has to stay longer in hospital due 
to complications, she invents stories in her head, Ôthe novel is composed in elaborate 
Jamesian circumlocutions, and I breathe along with the punctuationÕ (Ink 24). Text 
and body combine in this diary to form an unusual symbiotic entity. Leaving aside 
the references to Woolf,  MantelÕs commitment to writing and its connection with 129
the inside of her body, its most intimate spaces, is less a space of recovery than of 
exploration. Mantel goes exploring in her own abdominal cavity, in effect. She makes 
the body metaphorical to investigate her own insides, and through writing thus 
problematises the relationship between the inside and outside.  
Looking at Ink in the Blood thus enriches the reading of Giving up the Ghost 
by showing how Mantel intervenes in autobiography: not as a predetermined subject 
representing oneself in writing, but as a subject whose physical existence cannot be 
separated from its textual existence. As Sidonie Smith trenchantly states, ÔÉlife 
narrative is a site of embodied knowledgeÉlife narrative inextricably links memory, 
subjectivity, and the materiality of the bodyÕ (Smith and Watson 49). Mantel makes 
the explicit link in Giving up the Ghost: 
 I have been so mauled by medical procedures, so sabotaged and made over, so thin  
 and so fat, that sometimes I feel that each morning it is necessary to write myself into 
 being Ñ even if the writing is aimless doodling that no one will ever read, or the   
 diary that no one can see until IÕm dead (GUG 222).  
 Stella Bolaki discusses the connections between Mantel and Woolf in ÔÒWhen the Lights of Health 129
go DownÓ: Virginia WoolfÕs Aesthetics and Contemporary Illness NarrativesÕ, arguing that MantelÕs 
critique of Woolf threatens to reinstate the hierarchy between mental and physical illness. In Ryan and 
Bolaki ed. 
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If by writing, then, Mantel is drawing and redrawing the limits of herself, the 
remaking that takes place Ôeach dayÕ (222) is a social act. This may seem paradoxical, 
given the tension that judgement invokes, but her explicit statement of intent, to 
Ôwrite herself into being,Õ shows that by writing autobiographically Mantel is 
grappling with identity, and this engagement is absolutely implicated in the wider 
social implications of class and gender in particular. As Leigh Gilmore writes in the 
preface to Autobiographics: A Feminist Theory of WomenÕs Self-Representation 
(1994), Ôself-representationÕ is a Ôcontradictory code whose interruptive effects can be 
located in other genresÕ (ix). The contradiction of Ôself-representationÕ Gilmore 
identifies is played out in MantelÕs autobiography as a dialogue between the I who 
writes and the ÔmyselfÕ whose story the ÔIÕ is attempting to tell.  
 This contradictory practice can be read as a social act. To explore this further, 
Marianne DekovenÕs essay ÒThe Literary as Activity in PostmodernityÓ reimagines 
the literary as a practice within postmodernity, rather than simply denoting certain 
kinds of texts. Ô[T]he literaryÕ thus becomes a doing with a social and cultural 
application, with implications for what Dekoven calls the Ônon-hegemonic 
constituencies empowered by the opening of the canonÕ (Beaumont-Bissel ed. 105). 
For Mantel, a woman from a working-class background, writing is a way of creating 
and delimiting the self. If the literary offers a site of resistance, as Dekoven argues, 
MantelÕs writing is a revolutionary act that calls into question accepted ideas of who 
should write, and what they should write about. MantelÕs attempt to Ôseize the 
copyright in myselfÕ not only puts the stability of the I into question, it also exposes 
the workings of the narrative self-in-the-world, the self that writes in order to be a 
part of the world and the social (dis)order. This ordering and disordering of the self, 
the making of Ôsomething fit to be seen inÉto go out in and face the worldÕ (GUG 
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223) refers back to the suggestion of writing for Mantel as a space less of recovery  - 
as Prodromou argues -  than of exploration. Moreover, this exploration into the self 
demonstrates the primacy of visibility and the network of inescapable social 
connections that exist in Giving up the Ghost. MantelÕs attempts to redraw herself 
through writing constitute a revolutionary literary act which reconfigures the way 
bodies and writing are represented and created in the social.  Her need to create a 
Ôspine stiff enough to stand up in the windÕ (222) is only assuaged through writing. 
Writing her-self is a kind of defiance, a way of breaking out of socially prescribed 
ideas of what that self should be, whether these are mediated through her stepfatherÕs 
proscriptions or the doctor who forbids her to write. 
 If the ÔtruthÕ of MantelÕs autobiography rests in its value to the reader as a 
document of lived experience, then the reading of her autobiography becomes Ôan 
intersubjective process that occurs within a dialogic exchange between writer and 
readerÕ (Smith and Watson 16). Taking this into account, moreover, means that the 
Ôauthority of the autobiographical, then, neither confirms nor invalidates notions of 
objective truth; rather it tracks the previously uncharted truths of particular 
livesÕ (Smith and Watson 16). Mantel has spoken about the ÔtextureÕ of lived 
experience in her Reith lectures (ÔCan these bones live?Õ 2017), referring to the 
process of writing about historical characters. This attention to ÔtextureÕ creates a 
relationship to writing and meaning which is predicated upon a different kind of 
reading; a reading which elucidates how Mantel challenges both autobiography and 
literary realism. The dialogue created through writing, between writer and reader, 
informs the process of creating and representing identity.  
 In her essay ÒÔFictionÕ and the experience of the otherÓ, Peggy Kamuf 
(Beaumont-Bissell ed. 2002) writes about what she calls the fictional operation, 
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characterising it as: Ô[T]he irreducible possibility of fiction that is brought to bear in 
such a way as to shift the ground on which any theoretical discourse may claim 
validityÕ (Beaumont-Bissel ed. 157). MantelÕs creation and representation of identity 
makes use of such a Ôfictional operationÕ in the places where she self-consciously 
references her own writing practice. For instance: ÔEat meat. Drink blood. Give up 
your social life and donÕt think you can have friends. Rise in the quiet hours of the 
night and prick your fingertips, and use the blood for inkÉÕ (GUG 5). Writing, for 
Mantel, allows her to make her self recognisable. The mention of her diary as hidden 
until death suggests that what is at stake is not only visibility, but (il)legibility. The 
episode of the Ômagic slateÕ in Giving up the Ghost adds weight to SmithÕs claim that 
writing is inextricably linked to the production of the self.  
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MantelÕs magic slate 
Mantel writes about her first writing as a child, Ôletters from an imaginary me to an 
imaginary someoneÕ which Ôcould be disappeared in an instantÕ (GUG 69). These 
attempts take place on a childÕs toy, the Ômagic slate,Õ a piece of equipment well 
known to Freud as the ÔWunderblockÕ or ÔMystic Writing PadÕ. Consisting of a thin 
sheet of paper over a waxy surface, writing upon the paper with a stylus causes 
writing to appear: lifting up the paper makes the writing disappear.  The secrecy of 
this writing is a comfort to the child Mantel, all the time she is unaware that it is 
visible to others: ÔI could write anything I liked, but if someone loomed into view I 
could disappear it in an instantÕ (GUG 69); ÔI believed I was doing it in perfect safetyÕ 
(69). On closer inspection, however, the imprint of what has been written is still 
visible. When the child Mantel discovers that the Ôpen left marks on the plastic 
sheetÕ (69-70), the magic slate is changed for her forever. She thus gives up writing 
on the magic slate, for fear that her words could be deciphered, ÔI didnÕt dare to risk 
itÕ (70). What disconcerts the author Mantel so much about this episode is the feeling 
of a safe space being invaded or violated: the word ÔloomedÕ suggesting an adult 
overlooking the child MantelÕs writing. The reader is left with the sensation of the 
interruption as a negative event, a precursor to judgement or censorship. The tension 
created throughout this passage allows us to experience the child MantelÕs fears. The 
continuing ÔhorrorÕ the adult Mantel feels if someone reads her work in the drafting 
stages is translated into pragmatic writing advice, ÔdonÕt show your work before 
youÕre readyÕ (70). This fear of exposure not only betrays the persistence of the 
childÕs ÔhabitÕ of ÔconcealmentÕ (71), it also demonstrates the power of writing to 
create the self. Writing brings order to the chaotic interior world, but at the same time 
creates a vulnerability.  
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 Derrida writes about this vulnerability and the threat of exposure in ÒFreud 
and the Scene of WritingÓ: ÔThere is no writing which does not devise some means of 
protection, to protect against itself, against the writing by which the ÒsubjectÓ is 
himself threatened as he lets himself be written: as he exposes himselfÕ (Derrida 
Writing 281-2). To write is to court the threat of exposure, and flirt with judgement. 
To not write, however, means the dissolution of the self, the inability to draw oneÕs 
boundaries tightly enough. This is MantelÕs dilemma: writing delimits the boundaries 
of the body, and marks off what is inside from what is outside, but this process is 
always unstable: writing is a risky activity. MantelÕs description of her body as Ôa 
shabby old building in an area of heavy shellingÕ (GUG 222) emphasises the ever-
evolving nature of her attempts to Ôwrite myself into beingÕ (222).  The Wunderblock 
offers an analogy for this writing and structure of the psyche, suggesting a model of  
how the psyche receives ÔinnervationsÕ (in FreudÕs word) from within and without. 
The childÕs toy provides for Freud an amalgamation of what were previously 
mutually exclusive, either one has a permanent mark, but the available surfaces are 
subject to the constraints of space and time (eventually we will run out of paper and 
ink), or the material to be written on is inexhaustible, but the writing is 
impermanent.  The Wunderblock allows for both to be available, simultaneously. 130
What is interesting is how Freud defers the act of memory into its analogy with 
writing. Without the act of writing (in its banal sense of putting pen to paper/chalk to 
slate), memory cannot be guaranteed, cannot be said to exist.  
The mnemic intrapsychic process always runs the risk of forgetting, according to 
Freud: 
 ÒFreud and the Scene of WritingÓ, p.279 ÔAll the classical writing surfaces offer only one of the 130
two advantages and always present the complementary difficulty.Õ
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If I distrust my memory...I am able to supplement and guarantee its working by 
making a note in writing. In that case the surface upon which this note is preserved, 
the pocket-book or sheet of paper, is as it were a materialized portion of my mnemic 
apparatus, which I otherwise carry about with me invisible. I have only to bear in 
mind the place where this ÔmemoryÕ has been deposited and I can then Ôreproduce Ô it 
at any time I like, with the certainty that it will have remained unaltered and so have 
escaped the possible distortions to which it might have been subject in my actual 
memory  (Freud ÒMysticÓ 429). 
Writing acts as the guarantor of memory, faithfully reproducing it and preventing it 
from becoming subject to ÔdistortionsÕ; the vagaries of time, neuroses, and so on. 
FreudÕs ÔcertaintyÕ that what is written is solid, and a pure reflection of the memory, 
pervades this passage. Ironically, also, the act of memory is recorded and can be 
reproduced, but another act of memory is required in order to remember where the 
physical manifestation of the original memory is stored. Thus there is no originary 
memory which grounds the representation of it in the mystic writing padÕs analogy.  
 Enter Derrida, for he is concerned in his exploration, ÔFreud and the Scene of 
WritingÕ, with representation, and how this imperfect machine can act, how it acts as 
an analogy, an analogy that slips out of FreudÕs grasp and refuses to behave, indeed 
cannot behave, as Freud expected it to. FreudÕs logic (whether he knows it or not) 
exposes the relationships between perception and memory, perception and 
impression, and how these relate to writing: ÔWhen perception Ñ the apparatus 
which originally en-registered and inscribes Ñ is described, the Òperceptual 
apparatusÓ can be nothing but a writing machineÕ (Derrida Writing 278). In short, 
what Derrida is referencing here is representation; the mechanisms by which the 
psyche and its contents can be described, physically manifested into the world, as 
word, or image. He breaks FreudÕs system into three analogies. The first analogy 
consists of Ôthe conditions which customary writing surfaces impose on the operation 
of mnemic supplementationÕ (279), which while simplifying also problematises the 
idea of an originary memory, or event from which that memory takes its impression. 
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The writing fulfils a dual function: ÔA double system contained in a single 
differentiated apparatus: a perpetually available innocence and an infinite reserve of 
traces...Õ (280). Derrida thus calls into question the very perception of what we call 
ÔdepthÕ or ÔsurfaceÕ, making and simultaneously undercutting empirical moves which 
would situate the subject-in-writing on solid ground: 
Let us note that the depth of the mystic pad is simultaneously a depth without 
bottom, an infinite allusion, and a perfectly superficial exteriority: a stratification of 
surfaces each of whose relation to itself, each of whose interior, is but the implication 
of another similarly exposed surface. It joins the two empirical certainties by which 
we are constituted: infinite depth in the implication of meaning, in the unlimited 
envelopment of the present, and, simultaneously, the pellicular essence of being, the 
absolute absence of any foundation (281). 
How we ascribe depth to the psyche holds the key to the idea that the psyche is 
foundational, that in its depth of meaning it has presence. In this sense, the mystic 
pad is like a mirror; its depth and surface, its Ôperfectly superficial exteriorityÕ are one 
and the same, there is no interior. The problem that Derrida draws attention to, via 
FreudÕs mystic pad, can be illustrated by referring back to MantelÕs description of her 
inner world: ÔMy thoughts remained in my head, multiplying, buzzing like 
bluebottles in a boxÕ (GUG 71). Writing this sentence creates the image, the simile of 
thoughts likened to bluebottles. Writing creates and defines the feel, the sense, but it 
does not reproduce. MantelÕs secret writing to herself allows the space to order, apply 
sense, but only if it remains secret, and this is something she now cannot trust to be 
secret. The structure of metaphor is being exposed here: itself the first clue to the lack 
of presence, even while its existence protests a foundational strength. 
 Which leads us to the next analogy: the permanent trace which Ôsupplements 
perception before perception even appears to itself [is conscious of itself]Õ (Derrida 
Writing 282). This is the aspect that concerns Mantel, her secret writing thwarted by 
the marvellous permanent trace, writingÕs purpose obliterated. As Derrida continues: 
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ÔÒMemoryÓ or writing is the opening of that process of appearance itself. The 
ÒperceivedÓ may be read only in the past, beneath perception and after itÕ (282). 
There is no presence that exists before perception; perception and its description 
always come after, the making of meaning in writing exposing the psyche as origin 
that is unattainable. The third analogy, Ôtemporality as spacingÕ, links and divides all 
three levels of the psyche in their discontinuity, Ôthe remarkably heterogeneous 
temporal fabric of psychical work itselfÕ (283). Or, as Derrida more succinctly puts it, 
Ôtime is the economy of a system of writingÕ and Ôtraces are constituted by the double 
force of repression and erasure, legibility and illegibilityÕ (284). Derrida effectively 
demolishes FreudÕs assumption of the psyche as presence and foundation of meaning. 
The permanent trace on the magic slate, which so filled Mantel with horror, is only 
permitted an existence through this Ôdouble forceÕ. Thus, Derrida continues: 
Writing is unthinkable without repression. The condition for writing is that there be 
neither a permanent contact nor an absolute break between strata: the vigilance and 
failure of censorship...The apparent exteriority of political censorship refers to an 
essential censorship which binds the writer to his [or her] own writing. (285) 
Derrida questions the assumption of an inner ÔdepthÕ that contains the meaning of an 
outer surface or appearance, thus drawing attention to the porosity of boundaries 
between inside and outside. The relationship between ÔinsideÕ and ÔoutsideÕ (if they 
can be differentiated) is always already contaminated. When he writes in Of 
Grammatology, Ôthere is no outside textÕ, Derrida is questioning the metaphysical 
assumption of ÔpresenceÕ in representation and scrutinising the binary of inside 
ÔinterpretationÕ and outside ÔrealÕ. This assumption is what is at stake in his argument 
with Saussure, and his use of the image of writing as ÔdisguiseÕ: 
Strange ÒimageÓ. One already suspects that if writing is ÒimageÓ and exterior 
ÒfigurationÓ, this ÒrepresentationÓ is not innocent. The outside bears with the inside a 
relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple exteriority. The meaning of the 
outside was always present within the inside, imprisoned outside the outside, and 
vice versa (Derrida Of 35). 
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A book is an ÔoutsideÕ, a surface exterior which yields its meaning from within its 
pages, its ÔinsideÕ. If we take the metaphysical view, any meaning given by the 
hypothetical book is fixed only by recourse to another ÔoutsideÕ: the authorÕs 
biography (which is the example Derrida gives), the historical context, the sex of the 
author, and so on. By interrogating the binary inside/outside, Derrida questions the 
existence of (and indeed the necessity for), some other place from which to fix 
meaning. This fixture of meaning only serves to close reading off. Words are always 
already implicated in the web of what Derrida calls Ôarche-writingÕ, and thus Ôwhat 
opens meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural 
presenceÕ (Derrida Of 159). And again, in ÔFreud and the Scene of WritingÕ: ÔTraces 
thus produce the space of their inscription only by acceding to the period of their 
erasureÕ (Derrida Writing 284). What Derrida calls Ôarche-writingÕ is a provisional 
stance of making meaning, an implicit but interrogative understanding of writing as 
never present to itself, always supplementary. 
 The supplementarity of writing connects with MantelÕs own sense of her 
writing practice: ÔThe inner process, the writing life, it doesnÕt change at all. Every 
day is like the first day, itÕs like being a beginner. ThereÕs no time for complacency. 
You need to be extending your range all the timeÕ (Elmhirst New Statesman 2012: 
43). Writing is mandatory for making and remaking the self, this much is clear. What 
lies beneath, however, is always to some extent obscured: the interior that the mirror 
does not reach. Mantel writes this obscurity, which necessitates the provisional 
stance, by redrawing the connections between dreams, reality and writing. She does 
this in subtle ways to not only represent her experience (Ôseize the copyrightÕ) but to 
move beyond the crude differentiation of experiences that takes place in narrative, the 
theoretical cul-de-sac of Ôdid this or that really happen?Õ MantelÕs writing, by 
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troubling the boundaries set by ÔtruthÕ opens up possibilities for critical readings. By 
presenting the writer in hyperbolic fashion, and showing an aesthetic sensibility 
clearly worked over by the fictional, Mantel creates a kind of hybrid which invests 
the memoirÕs narrative with rhetorical value. This traversing of limits between fact 
and fiction does not sit well with traditional autobiographical conventions, as David 
LodgeÕs reading shows. But the emphasis on the visceral and bodily nature of the 
writing process opens up the autobiographical to reading provisionally. By making 
problematic the relationships between all the different modes of life that are 
represented in the autobiography, and her openness to ÔotherÕ ways of seeing and 
knowing, Mantel takes up a provisional stance.  
An Experiment in Love: synaesthesic words 
This is the source of MantelÕs power: the ability to say ÔyesÕ to all kinds of 
experience. Words are synaesthesic things in themselves, for Mantel. As Timberlake 
Wertenbaker points out, at a Royal Society for Literature event, the reader is struck 
by the fascination with words, in Giving up the Ghost (citadel, vaunt), and the 
Ôsensory nature of descriptionÕ in MantelÕs work. She asks Mantel, Ôwhat is the 
process by which the flesh is made word, if you like?Õ, using a passage in An 
Experiment in Love to illustrate. In this episode the focaliser, Carmel, is switching 
between narrating her present life, newly arrived at college with two of her school 
friends, and looking back over her past life, giving the background story to her 
friendships with both of these girls. In one of these reminiscences, she and her friend 
are walking home from school when they pass a pub- the Lady Smith:  
ÔLetÕs talk like grown-ups,Õ I said. ÔIÕll be Lady Smith.Õ There was no picture of her 
on the sign but I thought I knew what she looked like. She would have a tailored 
costume, like our landladyÕs. ÔYou can be my husband,Õ I told Karina. ÔYou can be...Õ 
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I searched my inner catalogue of painted heads, Ô...you can be the Prince of 
Connaught.Õ  
ÔI donÕt want to play it,Õ Karina said. (EL 60) 
There follows a conversation in which Karina expresses her reticence at playing the 
game, and Carmel tries to convince her by saying, ÔYou just talk. You say grown-up 
wordsÕ (60). When there is no reply forthcoming from the resolutely unimaginative 
Karina, Carmel ÔoffersÕ her the word ÔpneumoniaÕ. Karina says ÔI am the Prince of 
Connaught. I have pneumonia,Õ(EL 61) and the narrator gets angry: 
You have to be that person, I wanted to say to her, put their skin on your back. 
Grown-up words came bubbling into my mouth: rouge, piano stool, niece. I felt my 
face blossoming out, round as the full moon, and I smelt the fragrance of pink face 
powder: I had become Lady Smith. ÔI returned home last night,Õ I enunciated 
carefully, Ôto find my favourite niece seated on the piano stool.Õ (61) 
Words are the gateway to ÔbeingÕ someone else, and the words come first, in what 
Mantel describes as a process, Ôto do with viewpointÕ (Mantel ÒLivesÓ). Wertenbaker 
asks Mantel, how is the flesh made into word, referring to the process by which Ôreal 
lifeÕ is transmuted onto the page; although clearly here, it is the other way round. The 
words precede the transformation from Carmel into Lady Smith. She feels and smells 
the effect the words have; to make her into a different person entirely, a Ôgrown upÕ 
person. Similarly, in another episode in the novel, the ÔgirlsÕ have a fire drill in their 
halls of residence, and as they are herded towards the exits, the ÔposhÕ character 
Julianne (who changes her name to Julia in the course of the story), who also comes 
from the Holy Redeemer to London, starts to cough on the stairs.  Carmel addresses 
Julia: 
      ÔWhy are you doing that?Õ I demanded. 
  ÔAuthenticity. We really ought to be down at floor level gasping in the air. We ought  
 to crawl.Õ 
          The impact of these absurd words was so powerful that when I look back at this  
 scene I seem to catch a whiff of smoke indeed. I seem to see it curling under the    
 corridorÕs closed doors, and gradually rising into the air to form a haze at the level of 
 our shoulders....But in fact, on that night, there was nothing but the cold air and the  
 sirenÕs wailÉ(EL 155) 
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Here JuliaÕs words and the impact they have on Carmel is refracted through the 
narratorÕs knowledge of what happens next (on subsequent readings the reader is let 
into the story too), a real fire which kills one of the girls, with Karina, CarmelÕs 
childhood friend implicated in the death. Again, only Karina and Carmel ÔknowÕ this. 
However the call for authenticity from Julia demonstrates the complication between 
life and story in Mantel: the power of the words to evoke the smell of smoke and its 
insistent journey into the halls of residence reminds us of the ÔLady SmithÕ incident: 
the words create the feel, the smell, the sense. In one very important sense Mantel is 
the process of memory and recall, and in so doing storytellingÕs process is laid bare. 
In the ÔLady SmithÕ episode, the reader is carried along with CarmelÕs imagination, 
with the queer sense that words evoke the feeling, that the words, in some important 
sense, come first. In this novel the recall of the past is exposed through a 
foreshadowing. Just as she does with Giving up the Ghost, Mantel puts into question 
the causality of flesh first, words second.   131
 MantelÕs work plays with aspects of causality. I will now consider how her 
work, in the memoir particularly, plays with ideas of psychoanalytic causality. Take 
the ego, for example, and FreudÕs understanding of its development. His model, set 
out in The Ego and the Id, suggests that the development of the self involves a certain 
adaptation to the world. It is the egoÕs function to lead this adaptation. The ego seems 
to be an accretion or particle which grows through layer upon layer, eventually 
forming the interface between the hostile world and the id, whose drives must be 
protected.  Leo Bersani, however, in The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and art 132
 See also my discussion of the ÔTudorÕ novels in the previous chapter.131
 Anna Freud, in her work The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, shows how the ego builds up 132
structures to protect itself from external threat; and in Kleinian thought the outside world, in the 
childÕs paranoid schizoid position, must consist of all bad objects in order to protect the psyche, which 
must be perceived as Òall goodÓ.
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questions FreudÕs conception of the ego, arguing that it becomes an Ôaffective 
dumpÕ (93); ÔmoribundÕ (100); Ôa kind of cemetery of decathected object 
choicesÕ (100). Bersani argues that the description of the Oedipal complex, Ôthe 
theory of self on the basis of the human subjectÕs first passionate attachments to the 
worldÕ (93) eventually starts to dissolve under FreudÕs attempt to incorporate all 
possible identifications into it.  
 It is possible to see how MantelÕs work in the memoir also degrades the 
Oedipal complex, for example with the existence of her double father identification. 
Both father and step-father are present; her father always shadowed by Jack, who her 
mother has taken as a live-in lover. Her father one day just becomes a ÔnotÕ; ÔWithin a 
few weeks we were moving house: myself, not my father, my mother, JackÉÕ (GUG 
121). When they arrive she imagines he is still there, speculating that he has 
something to do with the ghosts in the house. The doubling of fantasmatic 
identifications through her two fathers is compounded by the ghost of childhood 
which always returns. Childhood exerts the greatest pull for Mantel; the ghostliness 
of childhoodÕs return. Two episodes demonstrate this ghostliness. She writes of 
walking up the road to her godmotherÕs funeral, which is the same road she walked to 
school as a child: 
 Retracing it as an adult, in my funeral black, I felt a sense of oppression, powerful  
 and familiar. Just before the public road joins the carriage drive came a point where I 
 was overwhelmed by fear and dismay. My eyes moved sideways, in dread, towards  
 dank vegetation, tangled bracken: I wanted to say, stop here, letÕs go no further.   
 (GUG 21) 
That evocative sentence, Ôstop here, letÕs go no furtherÕ is an injunction not only to 
stop the young childÕs gloomy walk into school, Ôthe Palace of Silly QuestionsÕ (63), 
but to stop the march of time itself and its ineluctable slide. School represents the 
proper order of things, according to the authorities that impose themselves on the 
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childÕs life. She writes about school as a disruption: ÔI knew, also, so many people 
who were old, so many people who were dead; I belonged to their company and 
lineage, not to this, and I began to want to rejoin them, without the interruptions now 
imposedÕ (60). This sense of being out of step, out of time with her own generation is 
echoed within the textÕs structure and in lexical choice. ÔI was both too old and too 
young for the place I had arrived at. My best days were behind meÕ (GUG 61). 
MantelÕs ÔattemptÕ to write becomes an attempt at the impossible, to fix time.  But 
time wonÕt be fixed; it keeps returning, like MantelÕs memory, like the ÔbrackenÕ 
which is the setting for MantelÕs Ôthing that she canÕt writeÕ (102).  The ÔbrackenÕ is 
thus the background setting for these two distressing incidents. The first recounted in 
the memoir is her emotional flashback on the day of her godmotherÕs funeral, on the 
carriage drive. The second, which actually occurs before the first in Ôreal timeÕ but 
appears after it in the memoir, is MantelÕs encounter at the age of seven with Ôsome 
formless, borderless evilÕ (107). As she puts it, ÔI am haunted by the ghosts of my 
own sense impressions, which re-emerge when I try to write, and shiver between the 
linesÕ (23). 
 Leo BersaniÕs conception of the ego as ÔcemeteryÕ suggests that there is a 
fantasmatic quality to the self that borders on the spectral. This is seen in MantelÕs 
memoir as a doubling identification, father and stepfather, and her preoccupation 
with the texture of her experience. What about the mother? The mother/child 
relationship is often fraught in MantelÕs novels, particularly Every Day is MotherÕs 
Day. I wish to turn to Melanie KleinÕs conception of the mother/child relationship, 
with a particular reference to MantelÕs attempts to Ôself-motherÕ. This idea connects 
to MantelÕs writing practice as a means of mothering that is not about bearing 
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children physically, but is a means of coping emotionally with childlessness imposed 
by external circumstances. 
Mothering Mantel: Klein and little Fritz 
In the 1921 paper ÒThe ChildÕs resistance to enlightenmentÓ, Melanie Klein analyses 
her own son at the age where he is starting to become curious about Ôwhere babies 
come fromÕ. Klein begins with the following logic, the Ôirrefutable deductionÕ (Klein 
Contributions 38) that because in adult analysis the roots of trauma can be traced 
back to early childhood, the reverse ought to be the case. She thus sets out to deal 
sufficiently with the childÕs neuroses in order to avoid its mental ill health as an adult. 
This is psychoanalysis as ÒprophylaxisÓ (38), and the proposition of an entirely 
symmetrical relationship ÔforwardÕ in time between child and adult, and ÔbackwardÕ 
in time between adult and child. Klein soon realises through the course of the 
treatment, however, that the admirable ideal of curing the child of probable adult 
neuroses, before they have had a chance to harden into strong resistances, can only 
ever work in part: 
 It appears, e.g., in spite of all educational measures aiming amongst other things at  
 an unreserved satisfying of sexual curiosity, that this latter need is frequently not   
 freely expressed. This negative attitude may take the most varying forms up to an  
 absolute unwillingness to know...At times this attitude sets in only after partial   
 enlightenment and then, instead of the lively interest hitherto displayed, the child  
 manifests a strong resistance against accepting any further enlightenment and simply  
 does not accept it. (Klein Contributions to Psychoanalysis 40). 
What is it in the child, working to create this attitude of disinclination to accept the 
knowledge offered to it? Klein calls this something an ÒattitudeÓ (40) in the child, 
while also pointing out the impossibility of disentangling the many influences on 
upbringing; environmental, parental, or internal. She then describes the questioning 
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of the child and charts his turmoil, which seems to oscillate according to the answers 
he is given and his ability to accept those answers, finally culminating in his fixation 
upon the stomach: 
 ...the stomach had a peculiar significance for this child. In spite of information and  
 repeated correction, he clung to the conception, expressed on various occasions that  
 children grew in the motherÕs stomach (Klein 46). 
Therefore the stomach, as J.B. Pontalis points out in his essay ÒThe question childÓ, 
becomes an Ôall purpose signifierÕ to Fritz.  The stomach, important for the taking in 
and expelling of nourishment, becomes the site of significance for him because he 
literally cannot Ôstomach the explanations given to himÕ (Stonebridge and Phillips ed. 
86). The oral fixations of the child Mantel function in a similar way. However, 
whereas FritzÕs Ôall purpose signifierÕ is the stomach and thus things taken in are 
digested and processed, in the child MantelÕs case objects get stuck.  The 133
persistence of both children in the face of their parentÕs obfuscations is striking; 
neither child believes what they are being told. But at the same time as needing the 
truth, both children donÕt want to know, and are engaged in refusals of knowledge 
which attest to the power of the childÕs unconscious Oedipal Ôinstinctual 
organizationÕ (85). Fritz wants to know, but he doesnÕt know what it is he wants to 
know. In any case, it is certainly not what the adult in charge of these things wants to 
tell him. And Klein isnÕt so keen, when it comes down to it, in hearing his truth 
either, inscribing as it does in words the forbidden and transgressive nature of the 
little boyÕs love for his mother. When she explains how a child is made:  
 Fritz listened with great interest and said, ÔI would so much like to see how a child is  
 made inside like that.Õ I explain that this is impossible until he is big because it canÕt  
 be done till then but that then he will do it himself. ÔBut then I would like to do it to  
 mamma.Õ ÔThat canÕt be, mamma canÕt be your wife for she is the wife of your papa,  
 Mary CappelloÕs study of foreign bodies explores the deeper psychoanalytical meanings of taking 133
in a range of bizarre objects, and what it might mean to categorise them in this way. Swallow: Foreign 
Bodies, Their Ingestion, Inspiration, and the Curious Doctor who Extracted Them. New York: The 
New Press, 2011.
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 and then papa would have no wife.Õ ÔBut we could both do it to her.Õ I say, Ôno, that  
 canÕt be. Every man has only one wife. When you are big your mamma will be old.  
 Then you will marry a beautiful young girl and she will be your wifeÕ (Klein   
 Contributions 47). 
PontalisÕ investigation exposes KleinÕs optimism: her false belief that she could cure 
neuroses in the child, what he calls the Ôprophylactic illusionÕ. More interestingly for 
the study of Mantel, he points out her desire to Ôparticipate in the ÒbirthÓ of an 
unconscious and, as it were, to mother itÕ (Stonebridge and Phillips ed. 89).   
KleinÕs desire was to create children free from neuroses by enlightening them with 
sexual knowledge, answering their questions with honest and simple answers, giving 
them the tools to overcome repression. Klein emphasises the social nature of 
repression, which she saw as an external social tool, forbidding the acquisition and 
practice of such knowledge (82). Sexual education, therefore, was to benefit society 
in the long term. Rather than see the child as somehow lacking in his infancy, 
dependent and helpless, Klein took a great interest in what the child had to say.  
 KleinÕs attempt to project the truths of psychoanalysis forward into the childÕs 
future is not so different from education, after all: yet this particular case gives a 
practical demonstration of the multiple relationship between adult and child. This 
multiplicity can enable us to think about the act of writing as analysis, even as 
confession.  The child grows into the adult, forms his/her character; the adult looks 134
back upon his/her childhood; the child dreams of the adult he/she will be, or could be, 
and of all the things she wants to be but never will be, knowing that she is confined. 
Mantel, however, writes of how: 
 ÔIntransigenceÕ was not a word I knew. But I was learning from my mother, learning  
 to keep intact my own opinion of myself. I was learning it too early, though, for my  
 circumstances. My adult reasoning and my small status were at odds (GUG 130).  
 Josh Cohen also explores the relationships between writing, analysis and ÔconfessionÕ in The 134
Private Life: Why we remain in the dark. London: Granta, 2013 (141)
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MantelÕs perception of this intransigence is not so dissimilar to FritzÕs unconscious 
refusal to ÔknowÕ what is being offered to him in the way of sexual knowledge, yet 
the chasm that has opened up between MantelÕs intellectual maturity and her bodily 
immaturity seems to work in the opposite direction with Fritz. In a sense, he refuses 
to ÔknowÕ what his body is already telling him. Or, to put it another way: the state of 
childhood as Mantel perceives it involves the very disjunctions that psychoanalysis is 
concerned with. The child of KleinÕs analysis and the child in Mantel (in this case 
MantelÕs own child) have to negotiate their way in a state that is contradictory, not 
easily categorised, and consequently difficult to capture. 
 If KleinÕs aim is to somehow cure the neurotic before they become neurotic 
and thus to create a world without neuroses, then MantelÕs aim is to find her child and 
plot its development. Like Klein, Mantel finds that there is no linear way for this to 
happen. Klein imparts the truth to her son, to ease his passage in life. There is a sense 
in which Mantel is trying to do this for herself: there is no mention of healing, or 
peace, just the Ôseizing of copyrightÕ (GUG 71), the desire to write Ôwords that are 
ready to stand up and fightÕ (70). Yet, the phantasmatic world of the child playing and 
the writerÕs imagination comes up against a model of psychoanalysis, that we, 
following Leo Bersani, would call psychology.  This psychology seeks adaptation to 
the world, taking as its model an embattled ego at odds with the world that must 
conflict yet make peace with that world. Questioning this, then, is necessary for the 
thinking of the theoretical child.  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Conclusion: ÒYou have to hold it loosely, so it doesnÕt snapÓ: MantelÕs 
provisional stance 
The attempts made in this work to limit provisionality, to define it, are failed 
attempts. ProvisionalityÕs work is always unfinished, always temporary, ready to rip 
up its writing or unpick its stitches and start again. Always remaking, it is more than 
a textual metaphor, trope or figure. Movements of reading texture erode any 
uncomplicated sense of realism. Although Mantel is clear that she is, in the sense of 
being attentive to facts and figures, a Ôdevoted servant of realismÕ (Appendix i 235), 
her writing as texture evokes a sense of threads being tugged and pulled into shape. 
She writes:   
 But if you imagine the artistÕs thread stretching and stretching, it quickly runs   
 beyond your individual vision, and itÕs subject to all sorts of interference and fraying  
 Ñ picks up resonances from the country it passes through Ñ you have to hold it   
 loosely, so it doesnÕt snap. That looseness sounds like ÔprovisionalityÕ - anything   
 could happen, and you should be able to accommodate twists and turns without   
 dropping the thread (Appendix i 235).  
 Text as weaving is thus suggested by the etymology of text and texture: the 
preponderance of needles that occur in MantelÕs writing also demonstrates the 
stitching together of fabric. The stylus of the Ômagic slateÕ is like a knitting needle 
(GUG 69). The needle is pointed, sharp, like an arrow. One end will always be used 
to thread the needle, the other to work the thread through the fabric. You can stitch 
together with a needle, or unpick. Provisionality suggests the metaphor of weaving, 
while also exposing ÔtimeÕs arrowÕ in the figure of the needle.  
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 I suggested in my Introduction that provisionality is one of many, perhaps 
infinite deconstructions. More than a figure, provisionality suggests the suspension of 
ÔrealityÕ as a common-sense or taken for granted ÔfactÕ. This thesis attempts to use 
provisionality to explore aspects that are so often taken for granted: the visual, the 
child, reality, and so on. The metaphor of suspension hovers around this whole study, 
and is explored explicitly in chapter three. The metaphor of suspension expresses one 
way of thinking through the problem of the child that underpins the whole project: its 
doubleness, at once growing and developing, and at once arrested, Ôremains intactÕ, 
as Andr Green suggests (Green Diachrony 137). The problem of the child is, 
ultimately, how can the child speak, when it is subsumed and submerged in the adult 
it becomes? The adult always speaks for the child, always imprints its own meanings 
onto it.  The child chapters were intended to avoid this reduction of child into its 135
future adult self, by attempting to explain the far stranger and uncanny relationship 
between child and adult, walking a fine line between indeterminacy and a breakdown 
in meaning. Christa WolfÕs way of getting round this problem, in Patterns of 
Childhood: she speaks her childhood in the third person (23). They get around, these 
Wolves, one could say they ÔloupÕ. We not only have Virginia Woolf overseeing the 
whole thing, as ancestor, precursor. Another ghost. Wolf Hall, which although giving 
its name to MantelÕs novel only appears at the very end of it. Another oblique figure, 
to add to the pile.  
 Getting to the problem: the explored and unresolved tension between 
obliquity and the Ôclear-eyedÕ Mantel. On the one hand, provisionality is seen from 
 See Blum, Virginia L. Hide and Seek: The Child between Psychoanalysis and Fiction. Chicago: U 135
of Illinois P, 1995 (5)
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the side. The first chapter suggested the sideways look, the blink and wink as figures 
for the provisional reading stance. These figures of intermittency are spectral: the 
ghost is seen in the in the moment, in glimpses, flashes. Chapter one discussed 
MantelÕs use of the expression Ôtail of the eyeÕ and how she uses this trope, along 
with the sideways look, to signal a different type of seeing on the margins of vision. I 
made some tentative steps to the provisional nature of MantelÕs writing, through 
etymological explorations of seeing, connected by the Shakespearean ÔblenchÕ. The 
sideways look appears within Wolf Hall intra- and extra-textually: as both textual 
device and way of reading. For example: the title of Wolf Hall signposts MantelÕs 
oblique intention. The house of the title is to the side of the action, as Rosario Arias 
points out, until the very end of the text when Cromwell fills a gap in the kingÕs 
itinerary with a visit to the Seymours: ÔHe writes it down. Early September. Five 
days. Wolf HallÕ (WH 650). When Cromwell dines with Thomas More and his family 
in Wolf Hall, he comes across the family portrait ÔEntering the house, you meet the 
family hanging upÕ (227). But something strange happens when he interacts with the 
flesh and blood family; Ôit is as if time has performed some loop or snared itself in a 
nooseÕ (230). Looking at the portrait signals something strange happening to time. 
Mantel describes the portrait, not in ekphrastic style, but as a figure of the 
provisional: looking Ôclear-eyedÕ and obliquely at once.  
 It is time to call on anamorphosis to draw together the strands of my 
argument.  Anamorphic painting presents an object that has to be looked at from an 
entirely different angle, in order for it to make sense to the viewer. The most famous 
example is the Holbein the YoungerÕs painting The Ambassadors (1553), in which the 
figure of a skull is interposed between the figures of the men depicted. Distorted 
beyond recognition when viewed head on, the image comes into focus when the 
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viewer changes position to look sideways from the right. The viewer of a painting has 
to change his or her position entirely in order to ÔseeÕ correctly the juxtaposed image, 
which makes no visual ÔsenseÕ until the viewer adjusts his/her position relative to the 
picture. You have to come at it side on. In the dominant, head-on view, the 
anamorphic object is seen as an undefined shape. The dominant view in some way 
fixes, anchors or guarantees the anamorphic shape, in the same way that a narrative 
is ÔframedÕ by a dominant perspective. The skull shape of HolbeinÕs painting would 
Ômake senseÕ on its own, but is framed by the dominant painting. Margorie Garber 
connects HamletÕs ghost with the painting: 
 For there is a way in which Hamlet performs the same operation as HolbeinÕs   
 painting upon the gaze and the trope of vanitas. Its final tableau of the deathÕs head  
 in the graveyard scene is another critique of the subject (Garber 136). 
 This sense of having to come at something Ôside onÕ, that it is looked at 
sideways rather than straight ahead connects MantelÕs novels with other thoughts 
about reading. DerridaÕs ÔPassions: ÒAn Oblique OfferingÓ for example; in which he 
suggests that Ôsome might think [of being oblique] as a failure of duty since the figure 
of the oblique is often associated with lack of frankness or directnessÕ (11). It is a 
case, for Mantel, of being direct while being indirect; of cutting straight to the heart 
of the matter, via the side on. Derrida rejects the oblique (13) while acknowledging 
its value. MantelÕs obliquity is a tool for reading, and part of her provisionality. 
MantelÕs representation of her stepfatherÕs ghost speaks to DerridaÕs notion of 
spectrality as an other kind of ÔbeingÕ, hauntology rather than ontology, and thus to a 
notion of death on a provisional continuum with life. For Mantel, death is not about a 
cessation of life. The dead, she says Ôare always in processÕ (Appendix i, 234). The 
ghost, the being that has passed into death, is another phenomenal (dis)guise which 
cannot be perceived straight but must be somehow beneath perception, looked at 
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indirectly, aslant. There is a particular form of looking required in order to ÔperceiveÕ 
the spectre. On the one hand then, the sideways look, the blink, glance, glimpse, all 
of these figures suggested by the anamorphic painting and the spectre. On the other 
hand, the loop which doubles back, figuring the image of the clear-eyed Mantel. 
The circle 
The loop figures in Mantel as a way of making time strange, as we have already seen. 
The loop connects the wolf (loup) and the circle that for Derrida is so often 
associated with time (Derrida ÒGiven TimeÓ 167). The circle also suggests an infinite 
Ôdoubling backÕ, in Peter BrooksÕ words (100).  What does this doubling back consist 
of? So many different ways of thinking about provisionality are suggested by the 
circle. The word doubling, meaning ÔmantlingÕ, is itself haunted by MantelÕs Ôghosts 
of meaningÕ (GUG 222): attesting to the power of words to carry their own spectral 
meanings with them. At once present and absent, the ghost is the best figure we have 
to explain the power of words, both full with meaning and empty at the same time. 
As Derrida states in Writing and Difference, about the absence at the heart of the 
letter: 
 Absence is the permission given to letters to spell themselves out and to signify, but  
 it is also, in languageÕs twisting of itself, what letters say: they say freedom and a  
 granted emptiness, that which is formed by being enclosed in letterÕs netÉ   
 Signifying absence or separation, the letter lives as aphorism (Derrida Writing 87)   
This doubling back is not only a return, but constitutes a loop or circle, a figure that 
haunts MantelÕs novels, as circle and as loup (wolf). In Aphorism 28 of ÒAphorism 
CountertimeÓ, Derrida writes ÔThe circle of all these names in oÉHe [Romeo] 
simultaneously gains himself and loses himself not only in the common name, but 
also in the common law of loveÉÕ (138). The circle of loop, to plunder DerridaÕs 
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idea, is the figure of doubling, mantling. Provisionality is mantling: to double 
meaning upon meaning, to create circles.  
 To circle back to Derrida and ÒAphorism CountertimeÓ, he writes in aphorism 
12:   
 Éthe anachronous accident comes to illustrate an essential possibility. It confounds a 
 philosophical logic that would like accidents to remain what they are, accidental.   
 This logic, at the same time, rejects as unthinkable an anachrony of structure, the   
 absolute interruption of history as deployment of a temporality, of a single and   
 organized temporality (130).  
There are two temporalities functioning in MantelÕs work. There is the temporality of 
time as it is lived, the tendency to see the past as behind us, and the future ahead. 
There is the temporality of the psyche, the crypt, deferred action, which allows the 
past to infect the present and the future, changing the course of timeÕs arrow in 
LaplancheÕs words. And even more radically, there is the time of the democracy to 
come, which for Derrida in Spectres of Marx is always on its way.  
 What is at stake in writing about Mantel is this notion of a democracy to 
come: of an equality before the social that infuses her writing about class, gender, 
families. MantelÕs trick is to be able to dress up her subversion and the revolutionary 
impacts of her work as literary fiction (and popular literary fiction, that sells). 
Far from being a bourgeois desire to reproduce the status quo, MantelÕs work offers a 
way of thinking about objects, things, people that perhaps are otherwise taken for 
granted. Take for example the child. Lee Edelman in No Future rails against what he 
calls Ôreproductive futurismÕ which  
 generates generational succession, temporality and narrative sequence, not toward  
 the end of enabling change, but, instead, of perpetuating sameness, of turning back  
 time to ensure repetition Ñ or to assure a logic of resemblance (more precisely: a  
 logic of metaphoricity) in the service of representation and, by extension, of desire  
 (Edelman 60). 
By contrast, I would argue that Hilary MantelÕs fiction and memoir do precisely this 
through the figure of the child: the child is the place by means of which this 
ÒmetaphoricityÓ is counteracted. In other words, in MantelÕs fiction, far from treating 
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the child as a nostalgic construction she utilises it in the service of a new means of 
representation. A means of representation in which the child and creative writer can 
stand for the complicating of boundaries and limits between reality, dreams, ghosts, 
and in which even though there is death, the dead can speak.  
The ego as provisional fiction: or, looking sideways  
The very basis of who we think we are is fictional, and thus provisional. Lacan says:  
 Éthis form situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its social determination, in 
 a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single individual or,  
 rather, that will only asymptotically approach the subjectÕs becoming, no matter how  
 successful the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve, as I, his discordance  
 with his own reality. (76) 
What does it mean to call the ego fictional? At its simplest, we have to create a story 
with which to live in the world. The consequence of the egoÕs fictional direction is 
that the ÔselfÕ which houses the subjectÕs Ôown realityÕ, becomes a kind of shadow or 
ghost. When we consider the identificatory mis-steps that occur on the way to 
becoming a subject, all those lives that might have been lived haunt us. They dwell in 
the unconscious, and provide us with fresh material for frustration, for wishes and 
desires to be denied. The fictional ego, that pretender in the social order, has to 
function as a responsible citizen, but all those other selves are allowed the freedom to 
dream, to transgress. Lacan comes to a rather depressing conclusion with this aspect, 
that the subject is doomed always to be alienated, searching and never finding the 
thing that he most desires, of which he knows nothing, ÔÉthis gestaltÉsymbolizes 
the IÕs mental permanence, at the same time as it prefigures its alienating 
destinationÕ (Lacan 76). The ego is destined to ÔmissÕ the self, and never be fully 
identified with it. For Lacan, the ego is an approximation and is thus alienated from 
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itself and from the social, familial context in which it has to function. The ego, the 
very basis of self, begins from the basis of mconaissance, misidentification.  
 The subjectÕs ego, its ability to function in the world, is based upon the first 
ÔlookÕ; and so the privileging of vision in culture is no surprise, and neither is the 
preoccupation with seeing things as they really ÔareÕ. MantelÕs writing thinks about 
these Ôother lives we might have ledÕ (GUG 20), but rather than face them straight on, 
she looks at them sideways: her line of vision is extended. If the ego is characterised 
by the inadequacy of looking straight on (quite apart from the fact that the mirror 
image is always distorted), MantelÕs Ôfictional directionÕ attempts to play with, or 
circumvent the image, in order to come at what is Ôreally thereÕ. If misidentification 
somehow Ômakes usÕ, then the image (and not only the mirror image) has spectral 
quality. We are back to BersaniÕs complaint about Freud that the ego becomes a 
cemetery. The fictional direction of the ego and its irreducibility means that our entire 
psyches are on some level spectral. We are haunted at all times by choices made or 
not made and lives un-lived. 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Appendix (i): Message to the Author 
Transcript of questions sent to Hilary Mantel, March 2016. Her emailed answers 
appear in italics below the questions.  
¥ Your writing is full of allusions to other writers, to fairy tales and folklore.  Your 
story, ÔThe Present TenseÕ, makes reference to The Mill on the Floss. How would 
you describe the relationship your writing has to writers who have gone before? 
And George Eliot in particular? 
I canÕt help think of myself as a creature bred within texts. I do remember my life 
before I could read, but even then it was replete with stories, and I had learned to 
repeat whole passages from books adults read to me, so I could fake reading before I 
could do it. I always thought of stories as an education, which meant that I thought 
they were already latent in me. And I thought of any added stories as an induction 
into the world, rather than an escape from it. It wasnÕt until I was about eight that I 
became aware of the existence of people called Ôwriters,Õ as a medium for stories: 
before that, I suppose I thought stories just naturally existed, and grew like trees in a 
form natural to themselves. But once I knew about writers - that many books were 
produced by one individual - I became suddenly hyper-conscious of form. I never 
read innocently again, but always with calculation, checking my own reactions, and 
looking to see how it was done. So it is natural that intertextuality is crucial to my 
own work - I am doomed to think and talk in quotations. As a child I had a sense of 
being saved by books, hauled back from an abyss of unknowing. 
But at the point where I was able to imagine Ôa writer,Õ I imagined authors to be 
mostly dead - anyway, all at an equal distance, and very far away. The idea of liking 
or following a particular writer didnÕt seem to occur to me until I was about 10. I 
didnÕt have the sense of writers having a body of work. I think this was because of the 
incoherent and sparse nature of my experience as a reader Ñ I had simply not 
enough books at the right time. 
However, the estimates of writers I formed at about that age have been hard to shake. 
I couldnÕt then get on with Dickens and still canÕt. I didnÕt come across George Eliot, 
except as a name. I didnÕt read her till I was in my twenties. When I became 
(accidentally) a teacher in Botswana I taught Silas Marner to teenagers. I kept 
wanting to apologise for it. But they got on with it quite well. The moral nature of the 
story appealed to them.  
GE [George Eliot] is probably going to go on appearing in my fiction. As I say, I was 
aware of her long before I read her. When I was about 8 I became fascinated by 
Susan CoolidgeÕs Katy books. They are gruesomely unhealthy in some ways, but I 
was drawn by their picture of happy siblinghood and nurturing fatherhood, and I 
liked the slight exoticism of a book about American life Ñ I was reading Little 
Women about the same time, but not yet Tom Sawyer. In What Katy Did Next, there is 
a moment which seems to me like a hallucination. Katy is a grown-up and travelling 
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in Europe, and in London, she sees George Eliot in the street. An author IN a novel? 
I knew a frame was being broken. I found it very exciting. More exciting than Silas 
Marner.  
¥ It seems to me that you are attempting something quite different from both 
traditional realism and detached ÔpostmodernismÕ. In Beyond Black, for example: 
although the text is ambiguous, there is an emotional quality to the portrayal of 
Alison that means the reader is invested in her. We care about what happens to her, 
quite apart from belief in ghosts. How do you see your relationship to realism, and 
the realistic form? Would you say there are surreal elements to your work?  
I think the ghost story as a form has always fascinated me, and it seems to me that the 
most successful are those most rooted in realism, where the texture of normal life is 
faithfully described - then something slips, minutely but consequentially. I am looking 
for those points where we have to admit that our assumptions are useless - that 
because of the events or perceptions of a split second, everything we thought is 
invalid, that every perceived truth is trashed. If you saw a ghost, you would have to 
revise your idea of how time works, and what death is - radically. If someone shot the 
king, youÕd be caught up in a revolution. If YOU shot the king, youÕd have changed 
history. ItÕs the work of a moment. IÕm looking for those moments. I think they are 
common, in an individual life. They need not involve events that are public, or 
spectacular. They can be in a minor key - an epiphany, after which life can no longer 
be lived on the old terms. ItÕs at that point of change I am working - where the status 
quo crumbles: and it may be that part of what falls away is the solid nature of the 
world, the Ôuniversal laws.Õ ItÕs not so much a question of leaving behind realism for 
surrealism, but of abandoning innocence or ignorance for a state of deep alarming 
knowingness. Once a character has realized nothing is at it seems, thereÕs no going 
back into the comfort zone.  
¥ There is a strong non conformist streak in your work, I think, an irreverence that in 
the social world we now inhabit is really important. You have described yourself as 
a non aligned radical in the past,  and part of the reasoning behind using the word 
provisionality in my own work was to capture a sense of the questioning and the 
open reading of your texts, that there is no finished product. Is this something that 
you have set out to do deliberately?  
It seems an inevitability. All situations that one might describe are in process. The 
dead are in process. A book is never really finished, only continued under another 
title and in a different form. If you are an artist of any kind and setting yourself out 
for a lifetimeÕs work, you are trying to hold on to the thread which represents a 
continuity, which traces the path back - you are doing that in the teeth of 
impermanence - but it works, after a fashion. Whereas the non-artist is like someone 
who tries to keep a trace on the road home by dropping crusts of bread - they just get 
snapped up by the ravens, and when you look back you say, ÔHow did I get here?Õ But 
if you imagine the artistÕs thread stretching and stretching, it quickly runs beyond 
your individual vision, and itÕs subject to all sorts of interference and fraying - picks 
up resonances from the country it passes through - you have to hold it loosely, so it 
doesnÕt snap. That looseness sounds like ÔprovisionalityÕ - anything could happen, 
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and you should be able to accommodate twists and turns without dropping the 
thread. My process as a writer is designed to leave structure loose - to postpone 
decisions till, of the many possibilities within a novel, some show themselves as 
clearly preferable. This means I generate much more text than I can use, and can 
never say where I am up to. As soon as I start a novel, I am up to everywhere.  
I am fascinated by the debates that went on in the French Revolution about how the 
revolutionary spirit could be sustained - how did you stop the new order ossifying 
and becoming the old order? How often did you throw out the government and make 
it new? As soon as you arrive, you must set off again. That is my perception about 
writing - there is no point of stasis.  
¥ The Gothic and spectrality seem to be the dominant ways of reading your work at 
present, what do you think about this?  
Okay so far as it goes. I think A Place of Greater Safety is the least inflected by the 
supernatural, but even that has a single creepy scene. But then the Gothic is not 
about the supernatural - it is about power and the hiding of power, the concealed 
hand in the sleeve - not per se about groaning in vaults. We shouldnÕt mistake the 
trappings for the thing itself, but it is a mistake people do easily make. The paranoid 
position is common to victims of all sorts - we miss a lot if we over-identify it with the 
feminine, and describe gothic as a feminine form. I write about a lot of trapped 
women but also trapped men; it just takes the men longer to see the trap. I wouldnÕt 
like my work to be seen as entirely fable, or allegory. Everything is layered, but often 
there is a top layer that is entirely solid, and is just what it is. Critics of historical 
fiction often have trouble with this point,. They think that your writing about the past 
is an elaborate code for your commentary on the present. In my case it isnÕt. Thomas 
Cromwell really is Thomas Cromwell, no one else. That is why I pay a great deal of 
attention to documents and tight little facts and figures. In that way I think I am a 
devoted servant of realism. I often question the received version, but that is different 
from departing from the mode. I think, though, that historical fiction has often been a 
pedestrian and conventional form. I am trying to deploy imagination as a tool to 
reinforce the reality of the pst - to make it more imaginable and more solid for others 
- rather than to vanish it into myth. Except when it insists on vanishing, at the edges 
if not the centre. What is fascinating about Mrs Thatcher is that she was wholly 
unconscious of her own mythic dimension. So were the people about her. They just 
didnÕt think on that plane at all. So they could never understand either her vote-
winning popularity with some sections of the country, or why she was so hated by 
others. Contrast this with Henry VIII, Elizabeth I - they didnÕt have to fight elections, 
but if they did they would have won them all - because they were wholly conscious of 
what they represented in the collective imagination, and were able to manipulate 
their image, and they were served by people who understood the process.  
Whether the subject is herself conscious of her archetypal quality - as Mrs Thatcher 
was not - the author is conscious of it. So the author can write ÔbigÕ fiction. ItÕs within 
the realist remit, but it goes deep, and digs down into the readerÕs psyche. You canÕt 
write or read it simply as an intellectual exercise. It requires commitment and the 
opening of your own imagination.  
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¥ Poet Wayde Compton says his teacher called the semi-colon a Ôgutless colonÕ. 
Considering your commitment (addiction?) to the semi-colon, what do you think of 
that? 
IÕd never heard of that. I suppose he couldnÕt resist the awful pun. In my view, it 
should be possible to mark up prose like music, employing many more punctuation 
marks than we currently have in use. I donÕt like to write things that donÕt work when 
read aloud. SO the semi-colon is important to me, not only for meaning, but for 
breathing. I enjoy the colon too and would like to liberate it from some of the rules I 
once learned about how it should be deployed. I am conscious that I donÕt always use 
the semi-colon ÔproperlyÕ - but needs must. There just arenÕt enough possibilities.  
¥ I was fascinated by ÔThe Assassination of Margaret ThatcherÕ. Firstly the 
representation of history, but also how the reactions to it (TebbitÕs being a notable 
example) seemed to prove the point about the philistinism of the Tory, the inability 
to grasp the intangible or what canÕt be counted in monetary terms. Thatcher 
becomes an image, as representation she operates across time. Then I came across 
this about Margaret Thatcher, in a book called Letters Against the Firmament by 
Sean Bonney: 
There are those who say Thatcher is just a frail old woman and we shouldnÕt 
pick on her. I prefer to think of her as a temporal seizure whose magnetosphere 
may well be growing more unstable and unpredictable, and so demonstrably 
more cruel, but whose radio signature is by no means showing any signs of 
decreasing in intensity soon. They can hear it on fucking Saturn. The paradox 
being, of course, that Thatcher herself sits far outside any cluster of 
understanding the bourgeois mind could possibly take into account.  
ThereÕs something about the coincidence here of the idea of Thatcher as image and 
sound wave that intrigues me. Bonney writes about the riots, which becomes even 
stranger (on a textual and temporal level, I think) when you consider your use of the 
name Duggan, as Mark DugganÕs killing precipitated the riots in Tottenham. There is 
something about how you write fictional texts around real life details that is 
interesting and intriguing. For example, the name Duggan which is on one level a 
signifier of ÔIrishnessÕ, so that it becomes a shorthand for the plumbers possible 
ÔaffinitiesÕ, but on the other a kind of wormhole that the reader can get stuck down, 
do you mean the Balcombe Street siege perpetrator Harry Duggan? Or Mark 
Duggan? Possibly all or neither, but I think what IÕm trying to think about is the way 
you invite the reader to question and think these possibilities, without ever trying to 
limit those possibilities or close the reading down. Can you comment on this at all?  
None of that was present to my mind when I chose the name ÔDuggan,Õ but that 
doesnÕt mean it is wrong for other people to read it in. You have to allow people that; 
they release their own power into the story. I am the last person to claim a street-
smart knowledge of my own sub-conscious. Nobody governs down there.  
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